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Foreword
T he levels of support that trade and domestic farm policies afford to agriculture, and the related processes of policy reform intended to improve the economic efficiency of ag-ricultural production, processing, and marketing, are important issues for developing 
countries. The effects of policy on agriculture are well documented for wealthy countries, 
especially by the established and respected studies from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. However, systematic analysis is often lacking for poor countries 
because of the difficulty and cost of measuring policy effects consistently over time and across 
commodities.
 This study contributes to filling the existing research gap by examining the impacts of 
agricultural policies and policy reforms on the incentives of agricultural producers in India, 
Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. It investigates critical measurement issues and analyzes the 
levels of market price support and producer support estimates for key commodities and in 
aggregate for each country. The results show a range of outcomes. In India a countercyclical 
support policy is evident despite market-oriented institutional reforms; in Indonesia high levels 
of support for agriculture have persisted; while China and Vietnam have moved away from 
past disprotection toward modest support for agriculture. The results demonstrate the impor-
tance of tracking the transitions of agricultural policy that improve farmers’ incentives as eco-
nomic growth occurs, as well as the difficulty of making reforms in cases of entrenched policy 
interventions.  
 The report is part of a series of recent studies carried out by researchers at the International 
Food Policy Research Institute and their partners on the impact of domestic support policies, 
trade policy, and trade agreements on the poor in developing countries. These include studies 
of the impact of alternative outcomes from the World Trade Organization Doha Development 
Round, the effects of global cotton markets on poverty in Benin and Pakistan, the impact of 
rice policy on poverty in the Philippines, and analysis of the potential effects of trade liberal-
ization in the Near East and North Africa region. These studies provide policymakers with 
objective, empirically based analyses to inform pro-poor policies related to agricultural sup-
port and trade. 
 We hope the report will contribute to informed policy discussions both at the domestic 
level and in international negotiations. 
Joachim von Braun
Director General, IFPRI
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Summary
This report provides an analysis of the evolution of agricultural policies from 1985 to 2002 and presents empirical estimates of the degree of protection or disprotection to agriculture for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. In all four countries—as in many 
other developing countries with smallholder-dominated agricultural sectors and weak market 
infrastructure and institutions—government interventions were initially pursued, in lieu of re-
liance on market forces, to achieve the twin goals of self-sufficiency and low food prices for 
consumers.
 The policy reform processes pursued in these countries during 1985–2002 differ in many 
details yet display similar characteristics. In each country there has been a movement from an 
autarkic and state-led setting to a more deregulated market environment with greater integra-
tion into the world economy and a new and larger role for the private sector. The agricultural 
reform process has often lagged reforms in other parts of the economy; it has not been uniform 
over time or across the countries; and it has been marked in each case by policy reversals and 
setbacks. However, it has been two decades since agricultural reforms began in China and 
Vietnam and over ten years since India extended its broad-based economic reforms into agri-
culture. Indonesia too has recently included agriculture more fully in its policy reform process.
 After a brief introduction, we describe the conceptual and measurement issues that arise 
in assessing agricultural protection or disprotection among developing countries, where most 
of the effects arise from the gap between domestic and international output or input prices, not 
direct subsidy payments. Next we provide a brief overview of the general economic situation 
in each country since the 1980s; of the pivotal role of the agricultural sector in output, employ-
ment, and trade; and of the international trade and domestic policy regimes for agriculture. 
With this background, we report our key results about agricultural protection or disprotection 
for both specific commodities and the agricultural sector as a whole. We describe the specific 
coverage of commodities and budgetary expenditures by country and other unique aspects of 
each analysis. We present commodity-specific results and the total producer support estimate 
(PSE) measure computed for each country. For India and China we extend the analysis to ex-
amine the effects of exchange rate misalignment on the measures of agricultural support.
 Our key findings can be summarized as follows. For India, our results, based on eleven 
main commodities, indicate that support for agriculture has been largely countercyclical to world 
prices. Agricultural support has increased when world prices were low (as in the mid-1980s and 
the period 1998–2002) and decreased when world prices were high (as in the early and mid-
1990s). The results demonstrate an increased level of budgetary payments for input subsidies 
to agriculture over the period of study. Yet in the aggregate, taking into account both price 
support and budgetary costs, the countercyclical dimension of agricultural policy dominates a 
clear trend from disprotection toward protection over the period 1985–2002.
 By using different variants of market price support (MPS) and PSEs, we also extend ear-
lier analyses for India in several dimensions. We find that, when trade volumes are relatively 
small, as occurs with India pursuing a self-sufficiency policy for important commodities, the 
standard procedure of computing the MPS through a comparison of the domestic price to an 
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adjusted international reference price based on the direction of observed trade can lead to a 
misleading conclusion about the level of support provided. Under the approach we adopt to 
address this reference price issue (following that of Byerlee and Morris 1993), the level of 
protection or disprotection is based on a counterfactual reference price (import, export, or au-
tarky) chosen according to economic criteria as the price that would exist domestically in the 
country if the policy interventions were removed.
 We also observe that, in the standard PSE approach, the MPS measured for the covered 
commodities is often scaled up based on the share of these commodities in the total value of 
agricultural production. When the commodity coverage is less than complete, the scaling-up 
procedure leads to a total MPS of greater absolute value than the MPS for the covered com-
modities, a result that is only appropriate when MPSs for the two sets of commodities are 
similar.
 Taking these and other measurement issues into consideration, the support estimates we 
derive confirm that Indian agriculture was disprotected in the 1990s. More recently, high  levels 
of subsidies were required for India to export the key food grains of rice or wheat during 
2000–02, a conclusion reached by several other studies. However, we report less disprotection 
of Indian agriculture in the 1990s, and less protection at the end of the decade, than in earlier 
assessments. This difference is partly explained by the modified procedure for choosing a ref-
erence price. A large component of this difference can be accounted for by whether or not the 
scaling-up procedure is invoked.
 For Indonesia we evaluate agricultural support for four imported commodities (rice, sugar, 
maize, and soybeans) and two exported commodities (crude palm oil and natural rubber). The 
MPS and PSEs show that, in spite of the reforms, the government of Indonesia has consistently 
subsidized agriculture since 1990, although not uniformly across commodities. Support was 
interrupted briefly by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, but it subsequently reverted to 
precrisis levels and increased during 2000–02 for some crops and in the aggregate.
 For China our analysis is limited to the years 1995–2001. Over this short period, China’s 
agricultural policies are estimated to have been nearly neutral (neither protection nor dispro-
tection), although domestic prices lagged the run-up in world prices in 1996, creating negative 
protection for that year. For China and also for India, we evaluate the effects of exchange rate 
disequilibrium on the MPS and PSE measures of agricultural support. Our results show that 
the indirect effect of exchange rate misalignment can either amplify or counteract the direct 
effect from sector-specific policies. In India the indirect effects are relatively small after the 
macro economic reforms undertaken in the early 1990s. In China the exchange rate under-
valuation since the end of the 1990s has had a greater impact than the direct policies, serving 
to subsidize agricultural output prices.
 Finally, Vietnam has followed China in moving from a centrally planned economy toward 
a market-oriented economic system under a communist political regime. Our results, covering 
more than 70 percent of the value of agricultural output, show that most agricultural products 
were taxed in Vietnam from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s. Domestic economic reforms 
have opened up the economy since the early 1990s, and there has been a policy shift from an 
import substitution strategy toward export promotion, with decreasing disprotection changing 
to positive protection overall.
 Taken together, our measures of support and disprotection of specific crops and agricul-
ture in total provide a reasonable basis for assessing the agricultural policies of India, Indone-
sia, China, and Vietnam. Our attention to measurement issues provides a form of sensitivity 
analysis, and the results we report are indicative of the range of outcomes likely to be found more 
broadly among developing countries. Starting with a regime of heavy intervention in agricul-
tural markets, each of the four countries in our study has undergone a substantial reform pro-
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cess that has reduced government involvement and created opportunities for economic activities 
within the private sector. Nevertheless, the outcomes in terms of levels of support show clear 
differences. Indonesia has provided the most consistent support for agriculture, particularly 
food crops. India has supported agriculture when world prices are low but has disprotected key 
grains, including rice and wheat, as well as agriculture overall, during many years. In these two 
economies, the reform process does not seem to have fundamentally changed the pattern of 
support levels observed over the period 1985–2002. China and Vietnam, in contrast, have transi-
tioned from communist disprotection of agriculture to providing net support to the sector. 

1C H A P T E R  1
Introduction
Governments intervene in agricultural markets with trade and domestic support policies not only in developed countries but also in most developing countries. The nature and degree of these distortions, however, differs widely across developed and developing 
countries, with quite different impacts on their producers, consumers, and taxpayers. Support 
for agriculture in developed countries came into sharp focus during the 1986–94 negotiations 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
reporting market price support (MPS) and producer support estimates (PSEs) for the devel-
oped countries has helped to sharpen this focus. One often hears that agriculture in OECD 
countries receives support from government policies of one form or another totaling almost a 
billion dollars a day, a level that has significant repercussions on developing country agricul-
ture.1 However, fewer estimates are available of support provided by developing countries for 
the recent period, such as from the Uruguay Round onward. One does not really know how 
much support (positive or negative) the governments of developing countries are providing to 
their agriculture through a complex web of policies, nor what impact this support has on their 
own agriculture and on world agriculture more broadly.
 In a seminal work, Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1991) studied agricultural policy distor-
tions in 18 developing countries over the period 1960–85. Their findings, based on a partial 
equilibrium framework, revealed that developing countries had inflicted substantial implicit 
taxation on their agricultural sectors through their restrictive trade, pricing, and exchange rate 
policies. The implication was that the policies of developing countries had limited the output 
and growth of their agriculture. The effect of removing these distortions was estimated to be 
substantial. In particular, it was estimated that the rate of growth in agriculture in these coun-
tries would as much as double if the distortions were removed (Schiff and Valdés 1992).
 Since the mid-1980s, many developing countries have undertaken major policy reforms 
directly and indirectly affecting agricultural output and input prices. Moreover, the URAA 
has imposed several disciplines on agricultural trade policies in the developing countries. Given 
that more developing countries are becoming members of the WTO, including such large 
1To be precise, agriculture in OECD countries received support of $318 billion in 2002, which is 35 percent of 
the value of agricultural production in OECD countries and nearly double the value of agricultural exports from 
developing countries (OECD 2003a). This comprises only 1.4 percent of the combined gross domestic product 
(GDP) of OECD countries, indicating that it is relatively easy for them to bear this burden. But OECD farm sup-
port is costly for taxpayers and consumers and for developing countries. According to an early IFPRI estimate, 
the OECD policies reduce economic welfare among developing countries by almost $24 billion per year (Diao 
et al. 2005; see also Anderson and Martin 2005). Throughout this report, figures in “$” refer to U.S. dollars.
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economies as India and China, and given 
their increasing influence on trade and trade 
negotiations, it is important to know more 
about the structure of farm support or taxa-
tion among developing countries. The need 
for such assessments is underscored by the 
highly confrontational positions taken on ag-
riculture by the developing and developed 
countries, which have complicated progress 
in the ongoing Doha Development Round of 
WTO negotiations, launched in 2001.
 This report provides an analysis of the 
evolution of agricultural policies from 1985 
to 2002 and presents empirical estimates of 
the degree of protection or disprotection to 
agriculture for four developing countries in 
South and Southeast Asia where the largest 
numbers of the world’s poor (both farmers 
and nonfarmers) reside: India, Indonesia, 
China, and Vietnam. These four countries 
are major developing agricultural economies, 
and changes in their trade and domestic 
support policies will have significant impli-
cations internally and for world agricultural 
markets. Its regional concentration gives 
co hesion to the study, but the countries in-
cluded are nevertheless characterized by 
diverse agricultural resources, production, 
and trade.
 India and China are two of the world’s 
largest agricultural economies. They have a 
relative advantage owing to their low labor 
costs and are largely self-sufficient in agri-
culture, but they are net exporters of some 
major commodities and importers of others. 
Indonesia is primarily an importer of food 
grains but an exporter of palm oil and rubber, 
while Vietnam has recently emerged as a 
substantial exporter of rice as well as coffee 
and several other specialty crops. India and 
Vietnam can be characterized as being food 
insecure, at least from the household per-
spective.2 Indonesia and China are less vul-
nerable to food insecurity. India and Vietnam 
are low-income countries; Indonesia and 
China are lower middle-income countries.
 Agricultural policies among the four 
countries differ given their different cir-
cumstances and the choices articulated by 
their policymakers. India and Indonesia have 
deep traditions as market economies, while 
China and Vietnam have emerged from 
communist central planning and continue 
to be governed by communist regimes. In 
all four countries—as in many other devel-
oping countries with smallholder-dominated 
agricultural sectors and weak market infra-
structure and institutions—government in-
terventions were initially pursued, in lieu of 
reliance on market forces, to a3chieve the 
twin goals of self-sufficiency and low food 
prices for consumers.
 The policy reform processes pursued 
among these countries during 1985–2002 
differ in details yet display several similar 
characteristics. In each country there has 
been a movement from an autarkic and state-
led setting to a more deregulated market 
environment with greater integration into 
the world economy and a new and larger 
role for the private sector. The agricultural 
reform process has often lagged reforms in 
other parts of the economy; it has not been 
uniform over time or across the countries, 
and it has been marked in each case by oc-
casional policy reversals and setbacks. How-
ever, it has been two decades since agricul-
tural reforms began in China and Vietnam 
and over ten years since India extended its 
broad-based economic reforms into agricul-
ture. Indonesia too included agriculture more 
fully in its policy reform process in the 
1990s. At this juncture, it is useful to have 
quantitative measures of the extent of agri-
cultural protection in these countries in 
order to evaluate the levels of subsidization 
(or disprotection) that have existed and have 
been retained for major agricultural com-
2See Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, and Robinson (2000) for a statistical classification of countries by income level and 
degree of food insecurity by several measures.
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modities. Such measures, while subject to 
limitations, inform the debate on how to 
proceed with agricultural reforms from a 
domestic policymaking perspective and from 
the standpoint of the international trade ne-
gotiations such as the WTO Doha Develop-
ment Round.
 Various indicators of agricultural protec-
tion can be computed to measure the degree 
of subsidization or taxation of the agricul-
tural sector as a whole and of important 
commodities individually. In contrast to the 
aggregate measure of support (AMS) on 
which production-related (amber box) do-
mestic support commitments are reported 
under the WTO, the PSE is a broader mea-
sure of the transfers to farmers from border 
protection and domestic policy interven-
tions.3 It is defined by the OECD as “an 
indicator of the annual monetary value of 
gross transfers from consumers and tax-
payers to agricultural producers, measured 
at the farm gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture, regard-
less of their nature, objectives or impacts on 
farm production or income” (OECD 2002a, 
p. 59). Thus the PSE spans all of the cate-
gories of support policies (amber, blue, and 
green boxes) reported to the WTO. The PSE 
includes transfers arising through domestic 
market intervention, border policies, input 
subsidies, and direct payments to producers. 
The OECD’s annual calculation of PSEs has 
focused on its member countries and some 
transition economies, and recently it has 
completed assessments for Brazil, China, 
and South Africa (OECD 2005a, 2005b, 
2006). Others have applied variants of the 
approach to several developing countries 
(Pursell and Gupta 1996; Valdés 1996; 
Cheng and Sun 1998; Cheng 2001; Tian, 
Zhang, and Zhou 2002; Gulati and Nara-
yanan 2003).
Organization of the Report
In the next chapter we describe the concep-
tual and measurement issues that arise in 
assessing agricultural protection or dispro-
tection among developing countries. These 
countries have often relied on border inter-
ventions and other price-based policy mea-
sures (input and/or output price controls) 
more than on fiscally budgeted direct sup-
port payments. Consequently most of the 
protection or disprotection of producers 
results from the gap between domestic and 
international output or input prices. In com-
paring a country’s domestic price to an in-
ternational price, an accurate estimate of 
the policy-related gap must account for such 
factors as external and internal transport 
costs and marketing margins, as well as 
processing costs and quality differences be-
tween the products being compared. In ad-
dition, the net trade status of a commodity 
may itself be the result of policies already 
in place, which must then be taken into ac-
count in choosing the price comparison that 
would be appropriate in the absence of the 
policies. Finally, when MPS by commodity 
is combined with overall budgetary expen-
ditures to assess the total PSE for agricul-
ture, the extent of commodity coverage, and 
assumptions applied for commodities not 
included in the price support analysis, can 
play a critical role in the assessment. 
 In the third chapter of the report, we 
provide a brief overview of the general eco-
nomic situation in each country since the 
1980s and describe the pivotal role of the 
agricultural sector in output, employment, 
3Under the URAA, subsidies are characterized in colored boxes. Amber-box policies are directly trade-distorting 
and are subject to limitation commitments by countries. Green-box policies are presumed not to affect trade 
directly, or to have offsetting social benefits, and are exempt from expenditure disciplines. Blue box policies com-
bine potentially trade-distorting support with some supply-constraining provisions, and again are not subject to 
expenditure limits. There are also provisions regarding de minimis, allowing additional amber box subsidies up to 
a certain percentage of the value of total agricultural production. See further discussion in Chapter 2.
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and trade. We then review, in Chapter 4, the 
international trade and domestic policy re-
gimes for agriculture in each country, with 
reference to the policies affecting output and 
input markets and to the URAA commit-
ments. These brief analyses are supported 
in greater depth in a set of background pa-
pers to which the reader is referred for fur-
ther discussion.4
 Chapter 5 provides our key PSE results 
for each country. Results are presented for 
both specific commodities and the agri-
cultural sector as a whole. First, we describe 
the specific coverage of commodities and 
budgetary expenditures by country and other 
unique aspects of each analysis; again the 
reader is referred to the background country 
studies for further details. We compare the 
commodity-specific results for rice and sugar, 
which are important commodities subject to 
substantial but quite different policy inter-
ventions in the four countries. Results for 
the other commodities included in the coun-
try analyses are also summarized. We then 
compute the total PSE measure for each 
country.
 The commodity-specific and total PSE 
results presented in Chapter 5 follow the 
standard measurement approach of evalu-
ating support at the prevailing nominal ex-
change rate. For the two larger economies, 
India and China, we extend the analysis, in 
the sixth chapter, to examine the effects of 
exchange rate misalignment on the measures 
of agricultural support. We utilize more ad-
vanced time series econometric techniques 
in this chapter to derive estimates of the 
equilibrium real exchange rates in India 
and China as determined by economic fun-
damentals, then examine the effects of cur-
rency undervaluation or overvaluation on the 
total PSE, taking exchange rate pass-through 
to domestic prices and budgetary payments 
into account.
Summary of Main Results
For India there has been substantial eco-
nomic policy reform and economic growth. 
Though reforms in agricultural policy have 
lagged those in other sectors, they have none-
theless created a more open economic ori-
entation than existed prior to the 1990s. We 
evaluate protection and support versus dis-
protection of agriculture in India by com-
paring domestic and international reference 
prices for 11 crops that comprise about 45 
percent of total agricultural output, and by 
evaluating the total value of input subsidies 
benefiting farmers for fertilizer, electricity, 
and irrigation. We are fortunate to be able to 
draw in this analysis on the extensive price 
comparison and subsidy measurement data-
sets and assessments developed by Ashok 
Gulati and his co-authors, which often pro-
vide disaggregated estimates for key surplus 
and deficit Indian states (Gulati and Purcell 
2002). This extensive data and prior research 
allow us to explore in depth how several key 
cost adjustments in our analysis affect the 
Indian MPS and PSE results.
 Our findings indicate that support for ag-
riculture in India has been largely counter-
cyclical to world prices. Agricultural support 
has increased when world prices were rela-
tively low (as in the mid-1980s and 1998–
2002) and decreased when world prices were 
relatively high (as in the early and mid-
1990s). The results demonstrate an increased 
level of budgetary payments for input subsi-
dies to agriculture in recent years. Yet in the 
aggregate, taking into account both price 
support and budgetary costs, the counter-
cyclical dimension of agricultural policy 
dominates a clear trend from disprotection 
toward protection over the period 1985–
2002.
 Using different variants of MPS and PSE 
measurement, we also extend earlier analy-
ses for India in several dimensions. The im-
4The country studies and assessment of measurement issues were initially reported in MTID discussion papers 
by Mullen et al. (2004), Nguyen and Grote (2004), Thomas and Orden (2004), Cheng and Orden (2005), and 
Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005). 
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pact of key assumptions on the calculations 
is important to consider. For example, we 
find that, when trade volumes are relatively 
small, as has occurred with India pursuing 
a self-sufficiency policy for important com-
modities, the standard procedure of comput-
ing the MPS through a comparison of the 
domestic price to an adjusted international 
reference price based on the direction of ob-
served trade can lead to a misleading con-
clusion about the level of support provided. 
The approach we adopt to address this ref-
erence price issue follows that of Byerlee 
and Morris (1993). We compute the level of 
protection or disprotection based on a refer-
ence price chosen according to economic 
criteria as the price that would exist domes-
tically in the country if the policy interven-
tions were removed. The relevant price can 
be either the import- or export-adjusted ref-
erence price or the autarky (no trade) equi-
librium price, depending on the relationship 
among these prices. We apply this modified 
procedure to six crops (rice, wheat, maize, 
sorghum, sugar, and groundnuts). The choice 
of the crops is dictated by the fact that India 
has been near self-sufficiency or there have 
been changes in the direction of trade over 
the period of analysis.
 We also observe that in the standard 
PSE approach, as described by the OECD, 
the MPS measured for the commodities 
covered in the analysis is often scaled up-
based on the share of these covered com-
modities in the total value of agricultural 
production. If the commodity coverage is 
less than complete, as is nearly always the 
case, the scaling-up procedure leads to a 
total MPS of greater absolute value than the 
MPS for the covered commodities. Yet this 
result is appropriate only if MPS for the com-
modities not covered is similar to that for 
the covered commodities.
 Taking these and other measurement is-
sues into consideration, the support estimates 
we derive suggest that Indian agriculture 
was disprotected in the 1990s. High levels 
of subsidies were subsequently required for 
India to export the key food grains rice or 
wheat during 2000–02, a conclusion reached 
by several other studies. However, we report 
less disprotection of Indian agriculture in 
the 1990s, and less protection at the end of 
the decade, than in earlier assessments. This 
difference is partly explained by the modi-
fied procedure for choice of a reference price. 
A large component of this difference can be 
accounted for by whether or not the scaling-
up procedure is invoked.
 For Indonesia we evaluate agricultural 
support for four imported commodities (rice, 
sugar, maize, and soybeans) and two ex-
ported commodities (crude palm oil and 
natural rubber). Our analysis is based on the 
conventional OECD approach to reference 
prices for imports and exports, but we take 
the scaling-up issue into account.
 From the late 1960s through the mid-
1990s, Indonesia’s economy grew at an 
impressive rate. The progress in economic 
development is widely attributed to stable 
macroeconomic policies coupled with con-
siderable investments in human resources 
(especially public health and education) and 
rural development. As in India, agriculture 
benefited from green revolution technolo-
gies. Agriculture also received injections of 
resources from the management of oil ex-
port revenues, and it has been an important 
income generator for the poor. Agricultural 
and trade policies have been dominated by 
the twin goals of achieving self-sufficiency 
in various food commodities and providing 
light manufacturing sectors with supplies of 
primary agricultural inputs. The government 
has intervened in the production, marketing, 
and trade of agricultural products through 
a set of complicated agricultural price, pro-
curement, distribution, storage, and input 
subsidy policies. The government has also 
utilized many trade policy instruments, such 
as import tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
import and export licensing, and inter-
regional marketing restrictions, primarily to 
support domestic agriculture.
 The economic policy reform process in 
Indonesia started in the mid-1980s. The major 
agricultural reforms, which came relatively 
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late in the process, have been the tariffi-
cation of quantitative trade restrictions for 
agricultural products, elimination of input 
subsidies, and removal of the monopoly on 
the importation and distribution of key 
commodities by the state-owned enterprise 
BULOG (the Food Logistics Agency), which 
nonetheless continues to be instrumental in 
implementing intervention policies for major 
food crops, especially rice.
 The support measures we compute quan-
tify the net effects of the agricultural policy 
interventions and reforms. The MPS and 
PSEs show that, in spite of the reforms, the 
government of Indonesia has consistently 
subsidized agriculture since 1990, although 
not uniformly across commodities. Support 
was interrupted briefly by the Asian finan-
cial crisis of 1997–98, but it subsequently 
reverted to precrisis levels and increased 
during 2000–02 for some crops and in the 
aggregate.
 Agricultural policies in China fall into 
two distinct periods. From 1949 to 1978, 
China’s agricultural polices were set within 
a communist centrally planned economic 
system. During this prereform era, China’s 
socialized agricultural sector was charac-
terized by large-scale production units in 
which farmers were organized on collectiv-
ized land or in communes. Agriculture was 
squeezed during the early stages of Chinese 
industrialization, with gross fiscal contribu-
tions to the sector outweighed by implicit 
taxation in the form of depressed prices for 
farm products, neglect of public infrastruc-
ture in rural relative to urban areas, and capi-
tal outflows via the financial system. Dra-
matic economic reforms initiated in 1978 
brought rapid economic growth. The agri-
cultural sector witnessed major changes in 
policies through the development of China’s 
dual-track system of a “socialist market 
economy.” The economic regime rapidly 
shifted from central planning to increased 
reliance on market mechanisms, with greater 
responsibilities of individual peasant house-
holds in the agricultural sector. The liberal-
ization process also featured major changes 
in agricultural trade policies. The highly 
monopolized foreign trade system was de-
centralized, and direct trade planning was 
replaced by indirect trade policy instruments. 
Trade and domestic agricultural policy re-
forms continued under China’s WTO acces-
sion process, culminating in 2001 with com-
mitments to lower tariff and nontariff trade 
barriers, eliminate agricultural export sub-
sidies, and cap trade-distorting domestic 
support.
 For China, we base our evaluation on the 
PSE analysis by Sun (2003), which is lim-
ited to the years 1995–2001. MPS is reported 
for nine major commodities. For rice, maize, 
sorghum, and peanuts, an export price is 
assumed to be the relevant international ref-
erence price. For wheat, cotton, soybeans, 
rapeseed, and sugar, an import price is as-
sumed to be appropriate. During the period 
1995–2001, there were few input subsidies 
or direct payments to farmers in China. 
Various taxes and fees targeted at specific 
agricultural commodities were collected by 
the local and central governments and are 
included in our analysis as negative budget-
ary payments.
 Over the short period of our analysis, in 
our estimation China’s agricultural policies 
have on average been nearly neutral (neither 
protection nor disprotection), although do-
mestic prices lagged the run-up of world 
prices in 1996, creating negative protection 
for that year. In a longer-term context, there 
has been a substantial move toward lessened 
disprotection of agriculture in China (Cheng 
and Sun 1998; Mullen et al. 2004; OECD 
2005b). The magnitude of the MPS we esti-
mate for China is relatively small, so there 
is little impact of the scaling-up procedure.
 Vietnam has followed China in moving 
from a centrally planned toward a market-
oriented economic system under a commu-
nist political regime. The country has under-
taken several major economic and trade 
reforms since 1986 and has been negotiating 
accession to the WTO since 2000. Positive 
results of the reform process became visible 
in the early 1990s when poverty declined 
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sharply. Since then the Vietnamese agricul-
tural sector has experienced high growth, 
and Vietnam has gone from an importer to 
one of the world’s major exporters of rice.
 For Vietnam, the commodities included 
in the MPS and PSE calculations include 
rice, coffee, tea, rubber, pepper, sugar, ground-
nut, cashew nut, and pig meat. These nine 
commodities encompass the main agricul-
tural products and exports of Vietnam. Their 
shares of total output exceed 70 percent, 
limiting the effect of the scaling-up of MPS 
and providing an estimated PSE representa-
tive of the whole agricultural sector. Our re-
sults show that most agricultural products 
were taxed in Vietnam from the mid-1980s 
until the mid-1990s. This taxation was due 
to the dominance and monopoly position of 
the state-owned sector, inefficiencies in the 
production and processing of agricultural 
commodities, restrictive trade policies such 
as import and export quotas and licenses, 
and distorted markets and prices maintained 
among regions within the country. Domes-
tic economic reforms have opened up the 
economy since the early 1990s, and there 
has been a policy shift from import substi-
tution toward export promotion. Since the 
mid-1990s, the support of agriculture shows 
a clear increasing trend. The level of support 
is moderate compared with that in many 
other countries, but it represents a reversal 
of prior discrimination against agriculture 
in Vietnam.
 For India and China, we also evaluate 
the effects of exchange rate misalignment on 
the total PSE measure of agricultural sup-
port. Long-run equilibrium relationships are 
found between the real exchange rate and 
economic fundamentals in both countries, 
and the estimated models suggest that the 
Indian rupee was continuously overvalued 
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s while 
the Chinese yuan was undervalued in the 
early 2000s. Our results show that the “in-
direct effect” of exchange rate misalignment 
has often counteracted the “direct effect” of 
sector-specific policies at the prevailing ex-
change rates. We estimate relatively high 
aggregate coefficients of exchange rate pass-
through to domestic prices in India and 
China for the commodities covered in our 
PSE analysis. We then define a “counterfac-
tual PSE” computed under the assumption 
that the exchange rate moves to its equilib-
rium level and the pass-through is taken into 
account. This measure suggests that Indian 
farmers would have faced improved produc-
tion incentives in the late 1980s and early 
1990s had the exchange rate misalignment 
during this period been corrected. In con-
trast, price incentives to Chinese farmers 
would have worsened in the early 2000s had 
the exchange rate appreciated.
Synopsis of 
Broader Conclusions
In drawing conclusions from agricultural 
support measures such as MPS and PSEs, 
there are various reasons for caution. Our 
discussions of basic measurement issues in 
Chapter 2 and of exchange rate impacts 
in Chapter 6 highlight the types of assump-
tions and judgments made when computing 
and integrating the various components of 
these measures. The results reported herein 
for each country are drawn from coordinated 
but independently conducted studies under-
taken by IFPRI from September 2003 to 
June 2005. The analyses are broadly compa-
rable, but specific details of the evaluations 
differ across countries and commodities. 
By presenting results under various measure-
ment assumptions, a form of sensitivity anal-
ysis is provided through which the findings 
can be compared and evaluated. Readers are 
also referred to the background study pa-
pers for additional details about the analysis 
for each country.
 With these caveats, our various measures 
of support and disprotection of specific 
crops and agriculture in total provide a rea-
sonable basis for assessing the agricultural 
policies of India, Indonesia, China, and 
Vietnam. The results are indicative of the 
range of outcomes likely to be found more 
widely among developing countries. Thus it 
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is timely that, as our study neared its con-
clusion, a major initiative to provide further 
analysis of developing country policies and 
their impacts was being undertaken at the 
World Bank, drawing partly on our assess-
ment of measurement issues and empirical 
results (Anderson et al. 2006).5
 The four countries included in our study 
all began with regimes of heavy interven-
tion in agricultural markets and then under-
went substantial reform processes that have 
reduced government involvement and cre-
ated opportunities for economic activities 
within the private sector. Yet the outcomes 
in terms of levels of support provided to 
agriculture show clear differences. Indone-
sia has provided the most consistent support, 
particularly to food crops. India has sup-
ported agriculture when world prices are low 
but has disprotected key grains, including 
rice and wheat, and has also disprotected 
agriculture overall, during many years. In 
these two economies, the reform process does 
not seem to have fundamentally changed 
the pattern of observed support levels over 
the period 1985–2002. China and Vietnam, 
in contrast, have transitioned from commu-
nist disprotection of agriculture to providing 
net support to the sector.
 These divergent results in terms of lev-
els of protection and support to agriculture 
occur even as domestic and border policy 
reforms have successfully provided greater 
opportunities for private-sector activity in 
the agricultural sectors of India, Indonesia, 
China, and Vietnam. This outcome high-
lights two distinct political economy dimen-
sions to the evolution of support. The switch 
from taxation to protection is one important 
aspect of policy change among developing 
countries. The reliance on market-oriented 
reforms to improve incentives for agricul-
tural producers in two of our cases, China 
and Vietnam, as they have transitioned from 
centrally planned economies, is a construc-
tive policy reorientation in that it has re-
moved distortions, enhanced efficiency, 
and thus raised rural incomes. Yet further 
shifts into production-distorting subsidiza-
tion would be more troubling and have his-
torical precedents in other countries as na-
tional incomes rise.
 Our results also highlight the difficulty 
of achieving open-market, liberalizing pol-
icy reforms in cases in which farmers have 
traditionally been protected. For India, we 
conclude that the countercyclical character 
of its support/disprotection policies has 
persisted from the mid-1980s through 2002. 
For Indonesia, agriculture has been persis-
tently protected except during the country’s 
financial crisis. Thus across the four coun-
tries in our study the policy outcomes are 
more nuanced than a single story of move-
ment from disprotection to protection. Past 
and potential cases of such monotonic move-
ment toward support are important to track 
and understand. So too is the difficult task 
of lowering existing protection among devel-
oping and developed counties alike in order 
to attain a more open and less distorted 
global agricultural trade regime.
5The website of the World Bank project is www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.
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Measurement of PSEs 
in Developing Countries
Our measurement of PSEs for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam follows the ap-proach utilized by the OECD, with modifications described below, and is elaborated more fully by Mullen et al. (2004). Within the PSE, policies are divided into one of 
eight subcategories. Market price support (MPS) is defined as the component that is “an indi-
cator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agri-
cultural producers arising from policy measures that create a gap between domestic market 
prices and border prices of a specific commodity measured at the farmgate level” (Portugal 
2002, p. 2). It is calculated based on the difference between the domestic price and an equiva-
lent world price of a commodity. The seven other subcategories of support are measured by 
budgetary outlays for various types of government payments that subsidize farmers. On aver-
age for OECD countries, the total MPS (for all of agriculture) accounted for 63 percent of the 
total PSE in 2000–02 (OECD 2003a). The OECD also reports consumer support estimates 
(CSEs) and general services support estimates (GSSEs), but our analysis is limited to PSEs.
Estimating Market Price Support
Assuming competitive markets, ex post price certainty, and a small open economy whereby a 
nation’s domestic and border policies do not affect world prices, the domestic farmgate price, 
Pd, is compared with an adjusted reference price, Par. The types of adjustments made to deter-
mine P
ar
 are as follows, for an imported and an exported commodity, respectively:
P
ar
 = P
r
 + (Cp + Td1) – (Td2 + M) – Qadj (importable) (1)
P
ar
 = P
r
 – (Cp + Td1) – (Td2 + M) – Qadj (exportable). (2)
 The reference price at the border, P
r
, is the “world market” c.i.f. price for an importer or 
f.o.b. price for an exporter expressed in the domestic currency. The reference price is com-
monly measured either from observed unit values for imports and exports of the country or 
from observed international prices adjusted by international transportation costs. Under the 
latter approach, if the commodity is imported P
r 
can be imputed from the f.o.b. price of a major 
exporting country, P
exporterfob, plus the international freight, Ti, and other international costs 
(including insurance and margins) of moving the commodity from the exporting country to 
the importing country, Ci, according to
P
r
 = P
exporterfob + (Ti + Ci). (3)
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If the country is an exporter of the com-
modity, the point of comparison in world 
markets between the country’s export price 
and the international price takes place as 
arbitraged at the border of a third-country 
importer (that is, the c.i.f. price in that third 
country). Similar to (3), the reference price 
at the border of the exporting country can 
be imputed from the c.i.f. price of a major 
importing country, Pimportercif, minus the 
costs associated with moving the commod-
ity from the exporting country in question 
to the importing country, according to
P
r
 = Pimportercif – (Ti + Ci). (4)
 Once a relevant international reference 
price is determined, it is then further ad-
justed by the port charges (Cp); by the costs 
of handling, transporting, and marketing 
the commodity between the port and the 
wholesale market (Td1); by the costs of han-
dling and transporting (Td2) and marketing 
and processing (M) the commodity between 
the farm and the wholesale market; and to 
account for differences in quality between 
the domestic and internationally produced 
commodity (Q
adj), as shown in equations (1) 
and (2).6 The price gap at the farmgate level, 
∆P = Pd – Par, then is a monetary measure of 
MPS per unit of output. Ideally ∆P captures 
the differences induced by visible and invis-
ible policy interventions. Expressed in per-
centage terms relative to the reference price 
(∆P/P
ar
),
 
the price gap is a traditional nomi-
nal rate of protection (), or as we refer to it 
later, the “%MPS.” The total MPS for any 
commodity is given by the per-unit price gap 
multiplied by the level of output.
 The difficulties in assessing market price 
gaps in the real world, especially in devel-
oping countries, are substantial, for several 
reasons. First, developing countries are more 
likely to utilize border policies or commod-
ity price support programs backed by mar-
ket interventions and government stockhold-
ing. These are policies whose effects are 
measured in an MPS. Second, with less-
developed infrastructure, various costs as-
sociated with adjusting the reference price 
are likely to have larger impacts. Third, a 
developing country may be more likely than 
a developed country to switch from being 
an importer to being an exporter of a com-
modity across years. The relevant inter-
national reference price adjustments for in-
ternal costs will then differ, depending on the 
trade circumstances as shown in equations 
(1) and (2) and as discussed further below. 
Fourth, the price gap in developing coun-
tries, and difficulties in assessing its policy 
component, may be accentuated by imper-
fect competition in the handling, transporta-
tion, processing, or marketing sectors. Im-
perfect competition in these sectors would 
affect the mark-ups, but with different im-
plications than border or price support inter-
ventions. Fifth, government polices toward 
markets or processing and infrastructure in-
vestments can raise costs by restricting effi-
cient domestic movement, processing, and 
marketing. These are also policy effects that 
would influence the observed price gaps, 
but addressing these sources of inefficiency 
would require quite different reforms or in-
vestments than price support or border pro-
tection measures. Sixth, even if competitive 
market forces are functioning relatively well 
in the handling, transportation, processing, 
and marketing sectors, acquiring the requi-
site data on various costs may be particu-
larly resource intensive (beyond plausible 
research budgets), or consistent data over a 
range of years may simply not exist.
 Since a substantial amount of data is re-
quired to calculate the price gaps, attempts 
to assess MPS in a developing-country con-
text must be geared toward reducing mea-
surement error. The importance of errors re-
lated to various within-country adjustments 
6In the equations Q
adj > 0 implies that the domestic quality is lower than the quality of the internationally traded 
commodity. If Q
adj = 0, domestic and international goods are considered perfectly homogeneous substitutes.
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to the reference price will vary among situ-
ations. In the case of commodities that re-
quire complex processing, a substantial de-
terminant of the MPS will be the adjustments 
to the reference price for these processing 
costs. In such cases, a comparison is some-
times made between the reference price of 
the processed commodity and the domestic 
price of that commodity at the wholesale 
level. Such a comparison might be more ac-
curate than an estimated farmgate compari-
son given available data, but it does not sep-
arate protection (or disprotection) between 
domestic farmers and processors. This could 
be an important distinction, especially if 
processing is inefficient or noncompetitive 
(see Cahill and Legg 1990; Doyon, Paillat, 
and Guion 2001).
 A second issue of particular importance 
in measuring MPS in large developing coun-
tries is the need for regional-level analysis 
in cases in which there are substantial dif-
ferences in the within-country adjustments 
to the reference price or in which support 
policies differ across states or provinces. 
In these large developing countries, it is 
pos sible that producers in some regions 
could be benefiting from policy interven-
tions, while those in other regions could be 
losing.7 If internal markets are well inte-
grated, observed differences in regional 
prices presumably result from differences 
in real costs, rather than being the result 
of policy interventions. Yet different adjust-
ments for internal transport and marketing 
costs could lead to different MPS by region 
when, for example, panterritorial farmgate 
price support is provided by the govern-
ment. If there are movement restrictions, 
state-level variations in minimum support 
prices, or other policies that vary at the sub-
national level, as can be the case in large 
developing countries, MPS may again differ 
markedly by region.
 One useful distinction when state-level 
analysis is necessary for a particular com-
modity is to separate states in a country that 
are “net surplus” producers of that com-
modity from those that are “net deficit” re-
gions. The deficit regions both produce the 
commodity and must purchase it from other 
states or internationally in order to meet re-
gional demand. In these states, the relevant 
reference price may vary slightly from that 
in equation (1). Gulati, Hanson, and Pursell 
(1990) and Pursell and Gupta (1996) sug-
gest that, assuming the commodity is an 
import, the domestic price in the deficit 
states should be compared with the lower 
of (1) the reference border price plus port 
charges plus transportation, handling, and 
marketing costs from the border to the defi-
cit region or (2) the adjusted reference price 
for a nearby surplus region given by equa-
tion (1) plus the transportation, handling, and 
marketing costs from the surplus region to 
the deficit region. Pursell and Gupta (1996) 
find that, in the case of wheat in Lucknow, 
Uttar Pradesh, India, the latter adjustment 
gives the lower price, meaning that without 
trade or price interventions farmers in the 
deficit region would have to compete with 
domestic wheat from the surplus region. 
This adjusted reference price compared with 
the state-level domestic farmgate price gives 
a measure of the degree of protection (or dis-
protection) for farmers in the deficit region.
 The choice of annual (calendar year, crop 
year, or fiscal year) or average harvest sea-
son prices can also affect the results, partic-
ularly in developing countries. The OECD 
(2003a) uses annual average prices in the 
MPS and PSEs it computes for its member 
countries. Pursell and Gupta (1996), in con-
trast, use average prices during the period in 
which the bulk of the specific commodity is 
harvested to calculate nominal protection co-
efficients for Indian agriculture. They argue 
7The same could be true among regions in a developed country, but in developed-country PSE computation it 
is usually assumed that there is one domestic and import-adjusted (or export-adjusted) reference price for each 
commodity.
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that annual average prices capture the stor-
age costs of traders in addition to the prices 
received by farmers. In many cases, owing to 
capital market inefficiencies and limited on-
farm storage facilities, smallholder farmers 
in developing countries sell their products 
immediately after harvest. Under these cir-
cumstances, it may be more appropriate to 
use harvest season prices rather than annual 
average prices, keeping in mind that both 
the time of year and the duration of the har-
vest season are commodity- and region-
specific.
 Several authors have suggested that ag-
ricultural support indicators for developing 
countries be measured based on the quan-
tity of marketable surplus rather than on the 
entire quantity produced, since a large por-
tion of the output produced by smallholder 
farmers is consumed on the farm. How-
ever, in a household model framework, each 
producer maximizes utility by selling a por-
tion of his or her output and allocating the 
rest to home consumption. This assumes 
that the producer values all production at 
the market price. In this case, MPS should 
be computed based on total production 
valued at producer prices rather than on 
marketed surplus, as the OECD has done 
for the transition economies (Melyukhina 
2002).8
Budgetary Payments
and Commodity-
Specific PSEs
In the OECD measurement of PSEs, bud-
getary payments (BP) are divided into seven 
subcategories depending on the conditions 
of eligibility on which transfers are made to 
farmers: those based on (1) output, (2) area 
planted or animal numbers, (3) historical en-
titlements, (4) input use, (5) input constraints, 
(6) overall farming income, and (7) miscel-
laneous payments.9 The patterns and levels 
of budgetary expenditures on agricultural 
support by developing countries differ sub-
stantially from those of wealthier OECD 
countries. In transition (and developing) 
economies, particular care must be taken 
to include budgetary assistance, even when 
it is not associated with direct payments to 
farmers (Melyukhina 2002). Preferential 
prices for such inputs as fertilizer, electric-
ity, irrigation, and transportation are often 
more important in developing than devel-
oped countries. These subsidies are catego-
rized as budgetary payments, though subsi-
dies on tradable inputs at the farmgate level 
may be better measured through a price gap 
method analogous to the calculation of MPS 
for output commodities than by govern-
ment expenditures, as Gulati and Narayanan 
(2003) have demonstrated. 
 The calculation of commodity-specific 
support measures requires that budgetary 
support be allocated across commodities to 
determine the budgetary payments for a 
given product, BPj, where j denotes a spe-
cific commodity. If such payments are re-
ported by commodity, the procedure is 
straightforward. However, for payments such 
as input subsidies or general subsidies such as 
tax or capital grants, calculations of alloca-
tion across commodities are required. In this 
case, the payments are often distributed on 
the basis of each commodity’s share in total 
value of agricultural production (Melyukhina 
2002). Other criteria, such as the share of 
acreage, also provide plausible approxima-
tions, although each may introduce a mea-
surement error.
8For the nonmember transition economies, the use of official value of production was viewed as problematic 
by the OECD because on-farm consumption was valued at shadow prices that differ significantly from market 
prices (Melyukhina 2002).
9With the increased use of support payments in developed countries that are at least partially decoupled from 
current production of any particular crop, the OECD is in the process of reexamining its classification scheme 
for various payments and how they are allocated within the overall measure for agriculture (OECD 2003b).
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 Once budgetary payments are allocated 
among commodities, the commodity- specific 
PSE is the sum of the MPS and budgetary 
support for that commodity. As discussed 
in Mullen et al. (2004), the commodity-
specific PSE can be expressed on a percent-
age basis in two ways. The first approach, as 
in the OECD studies, expresses the propor-
tion of gross farm income that is a result of 
policy measures, using (VPj + BPj) as the de-
nominator of its percentage measure, where 
VPj is the value of production at domestic 
producer prices. An alternative (“trade econ-
omist”) measure (denominator) is to express 
support received by farmers as a percentage 
of the value of output at farmgate-equivalent 
international prices, VPj*. Because pro-
duction is valued at international prices in 
the %MPS and in the trade economist 
commodity-specific %PSE denominator, the 
latter will be at least as high or higher than 
the %MPS (assuming positive budgetary 
payments). Quite different numerical repre-
sentation of the policy effects can arise with 
the OECD commodity-specific %PSE, be-
cause the denominator for this measure is 
the value of farm output at domestic prices 
plus budget payments.
Calculating Total 
PSEs with and 
without Scaling Up 
of the MPS of 
Covered Commodities
The total PSE expressed in nominal terms 
for all agricultural producers is the sum of 
an aggregate MPS and aggregate budgetary 
payments. In the OECD approach, the cal-
culation of aggregate MPS consists of three 
steps. First, a nominal value of MPS is esti-
mated for individual products (the price gap 
per unit of each output multiplied by the 
quantity of output) included in the analysis, 
the set of which is known as the covered 
MPS commodities. The second step is to 
sum the commodity-specific MPS results 
into an MPS
c
 for the covered commodities. 
One method to estimate the total nominal 
PSE for a country (not used by the OECD) 
is to include only the MPS derived for these 
commodities in the calculation PSE
c
 = MPS
c
 
+ BP, where BP is the total budgetary pay-
ments to producers. In the OECD approach, 
a third step is included to calculate the PSE. 
The MPS
c
 for covered commodities is scaled 
up to all products based on the share (k) of 
the covered commodities in the total value 
of production. The third step, or MPS ex-
trapolation procedure, can be expressed as 
MPS = MPS
c
/k, where MPS is the estimated 
total MPS.
 With the scaling up, the OECD “total 
PSE” is calculated as PSE = MPS + BP. 
Either approximation (scaled up or not scaled 
up) introduces error, and any error is rela-
tively more or less important as the MPS 
component of the PSE increases relative to 
the budget-payment component. For devel-
oping countries, feasible commodity cover-
age is likely to be less than for the OECD 
countries, and the assumption imposed by 
scaling up may be unrealistic if support is 
concentrated among those products included 
in the analysis.
 Total PSE measures are also expressed 
on a percentage basis. The measure reported 
by the OECD uses (VP + BP) as the denomi-
nator (where VP is the total value of agricul-
tural production at domestic producer prices). 
This %PSE gives a “subsidy counter’s” mea-
sure of support relative to domestic farm 
revenue. Alternatively, a “trade economist” 
measure of support uses VP* as the denom-
inator to give %PSE relative to the value of 
output at international prices. Because the 
value of total production at international 
prices may not be known, an approximation 
is required. One approach is simply to sub-
tract MPS
c
 from VP. This corresponds to 
not scaling up MPS
c
 in computing the nom-
inal value of PSE because commodities not 
covered are assumed to have the same value 
at international and domestic prices. Alter-
natively, an estimate of VP* can be based on 
scaling up the value of production at inter-
national prices of the covered commodities 
by the same k as above.
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Modified Procedure to 
Account for Domestic 
Market Clearing Prices
Beyond the practical difficulties in obtain-
ing the necessary data to compute PSEs, 
and the issues involved in combining MPS 
and budgetary payments, another factor is 
likely to be relevant to their measurement 
and interpretation for developing countries. 
World price fluctuations, changes in the 
government intervention price levels, and 
domestic supply and demand shocks all 
 determine whether a country will be im-
porting or exporting (or, alternatively, de-
pleting or accumulating) stocks of storable 
commodities.
 Byerlee and Morris (1993) pointed out 
that the likelihood that any of these factors 
will result in a change in the trade status of 
a country is greater if the country is near 
self-sufficiency in a particular commodity. 
They suggest that, under these circum-
stances (which describe the situation for ce-
reals in many developing countries), agri-
cultural protection indicators computed by 
the conventional methods of comparing the 
domestic price to an import- or export-
 adjusted reference price can lead to an in-
correct estimate of the level and even the 
direction of protection. Instead, a corrected 
protection measure may need to be calcu-
lated based on a domestic market-clearing 
equilibrium price as the adjusted reference 
price rather than the import or export price, 
especially when a country has relatively 
high internal or external transport costs, so 
that there is a wide gap between the adjusted 
reference prices for imports versus exports. 
(From here on, the adjusted reference price 
for exports will be denoted as P
e
 and that for 
imports as P
m
.) Byerlee and Morris demon-
strate this approach for Pakistan, which was 
more than 85 percent self-sufficient in wheat 
during 1985–90, had a controlled producer 
price slightly above the export price and 
well below the import price, and was a net 
importer of wheat. Conventional measures 
of support showed the domestic price as 
much as 40 percent lower than the adjusted 
import reference price. But Byerlee and Mor-
ris conclude that if controls were removed 
the price would have increased by only about 
10 percent to a domestic market-clearing 
level.
 Byerlee and Morris provide a more sys-
tematic approach than relying on the current 
direction of trade to dictate the adjusted ref-
erence price used to evaluate the MPS com-
ponent of the PSE, but one that requires 
additional assumptions about elasticities of 
demand and supply. In order to know which 
price will be relevant when the policy inter-
vention is removed, one must know the re-
lationships among the autarky equilibrium 
price, which we denote as P*, and the ad-
justed reference prices P
m
 and P
e
. Because of 
international and domestic cost adjustments, 
it is always the case that P
m
 > P
e
. When P* 
>P
m
, then P
m
 is the relevant P
ar
; when P
e
 > 
P*, then P
e
 is the relevant P
ar
; and when P
m
 
> P* > P
e
, then P* is the relevant P
ar
. This 
price relationship, not the observed trade 
under the policies in place, determines the 
level of protection or disprotection relative 
to the price level that would exist in the ab-
sence of the policy interventions. The argu-
ment is shown graphically in Figure 2.1 
under the assumption of fixed supply.
Exchange Rate Impacts
Calculating reference prices in domestic 
currency for the MPS and PSEs requires the 
use of an exchange rate. Most PSE studies 
utilize the nominal exchange rate prevail-
ing each year. Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés 
(1991), in contrast, accounted for the effects 
of exchange rate misalignment through a de-
composition method in their seminal analysis 
of agricultural pricing policies in develop-
ing countries. Harley (1996) used a different 
type of decomposition analysis to provide a 
measurement of the contribution of annual 
variation in different PSE components, in-
cluding the exchange rate, to the overall an-
nual PSE change. Others have used the ad-
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justed (shadow) exchange rates, mostly based 
on purchasing power parity (PPP), in PSE 
calculations. For example, Liefert et al. 
(1996) show that the 1994 PSE estimates for 
Russia change from negative to positive if a 
PPP exchange rate is used instead of a nom-
inal one. Doyon, Paillat, and Guion (2001) 
contend that, in the context of comparing 
support levels across countries, PPP adjust-
ments would provide a better conversion 
factor than nominal exchange rates.
 More generally, modern econometric 
models can be used to estimate equilibrium 
exchange rates and the effects of any ex-
change rate misalignment on PSEs can be 
evaluated, as we report for India and China 
in Chapter 6. Exchange rate adjustments 
can be particularly important for developing 
countries where exchange rate disequilib-
rium can be large and persistent. 
Figure 2.1 Computing the MPS under alternative price scenarios
The relevant reference price depends on the relationship between P* and  P
m
 and P
e
. In the three panels, P1–P4 are possible prices set by do-
mestic policy. As shown in panel c, if P
m 
> P* > P
e
, then P* is the relevant reference price. Whether the domestic policy supports agriculture 
(at P4) or disprotects agriculture (at P1), when the policy is removed the price becomes P*. Likewise in panels a and b, regardless of the level 
of the domestic price set by policy or the corresponding trade pattern, P
m
 and P
e
 are the relevant reference prices under the price relation-
ships specified. In the figure and in our empirical calculations, we treat annual production as predetermined (consistent with interpretation 
of PSEs as transfers to farmers given an observed fixed supply) but allow demand to adjust to clear the market in our counterfactual annual 
determinations of P*. If we let the supply also adjust, the P* obviously would be different.
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a. If P* > Pm, then Pm is the relevant Par. b. If Pe > P*, then Pe is the relevant Par. c. If Pm > P* > Pe, then P* is the relevant Par.
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10See Josling, Tangermann, and Warley (1996) for a history of the GATT negotiations on agriculture and the 
evolution of the concepts of the PSE and the AMS. 
Relation of the PSE to the 
WTO Aggregate Measure 
of Support
The preceding sections focus largely on ad-
justments relevant to PSEs within the frame-
work laid by the OECD. It is also useful to 
compare the PSE to the estimates of AMS 
submitted to the WTO by member countries 
to indicate their trade-distorting domestic 
policies, to the agreed-upon WTO tariff 
bindings and export subsidy limits, and to 
other categories of support reported to the 
WTO, including its de minimis, blue box, 
and green box categories. The emergence 
of the AMS and the concept of the PSE are 
related.10 However, the final definition for 
the AMS embodied in the URAA as part of 
the WTO legal framework is clearly differ-
ent from the PSEs calculated by the OECD. 
The main differences between the two 
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measures are summarized in Table 2.1. PSEs 
provide a different and more complete char-
acterization of border and domestic support 
policies affecting agriculture than does the 
AMS or any other single category reported 
to the WTO.
 Though useful for negotiations and bind-
ing commitments to reduce market distor-
tions, the WTO measures often do not reflect 
the changing levels of support to agriculture 
over time. For example, the AMS keeps the 
world reference prices frozen at the 1986–88 
base, as agreed by the member countries in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations with a view 
to making reduction commitments from that 
fixed base. But these estimates lose much of 
their economic relevance in a dynamic world 
in which prices are continuously changing, 
as are exchange rates and price and other 
support policies. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the AMS is basically a legal concept 
resulting from the political compromises 
of the negotiation process. It is not a useful 
economic tool to understand the degree and 
impact of distortions in agriculture. Simi-
larly, applied tariffs can be different from 
Table 2.1 Comparison of PSE to the WTO AMS
Category WTO AMS PSE
General Includes domestic support that is considered to 
be trade distorting. This includes output price 
support if granted through an administered 
price and certain domestic subsidies.
Includes all gross transfers from consumers and tax-
payers to agricultural producers, regardless of their 
nature, objectives, and impacts on farm production 
or income.
Excludes support provided only through trade 
policies such as tariffs and export subsidies.
Includes support provided through trade policies such 
as tariffs and export subsidies. 
Excludes trade-distorting policies when the 
level of product-specific or non-product-
specific domestic support falls below a 
specified de minimis level.
Includes product-specific and non-product-specific 
support regardless of level. 
Excludes certain types of budgetary payments. Includes all budgetary payments to agricultural 
producers.
Market price support (MPS) Defined as the gap between the official admin-
istered price and the fixed external reference 
price multiplied by eligible production.
Defined as transfers from consumers and taxpayers to 
agricultural producers arising from policies that cre-
ate a gap between the domestic market price and the 
equivalent border price.
Uses administered prices, fixed external refer-
ence price (average 1986–88), and eligible 
production.
Uses current observed domestic prices and observed ex-
ternal prices adjusted to the farmgate level multiplied 
by the level of production.
Only calculated when an administered support 
price exists. If border measures also exist, 
it is possible that the AMS support will be 
redundant with the protection provided at the 
border.
One estimate of support calculated regardless of 
whether or not there is an administered price, border 
measures, or both.
Budgetary payments to 
producers (BP)
Excludes payments granted under production-
limiting programs and exempt from reduction 
commitments (blue box).
Includes those measures that generate direct budgetary 
transfers to producers.
Excludes domestic support policies considered 
minimally trade distorting and exempt from 
reduction commitments (green box).
Includes the portion of green box payments that create 
direct payments to producers.
Excludes certain policies that are categorized 
under special and differential treatment for 
developing countries.
Includes some policies that are categorized under spe-
cial and differential treatment for developing countries, 
such as investment and input subsidies available to low-
income or resource-poor producers. 
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bound tariff rates (or export subsidies below 
bound levels). In some cases, neither the 
applied nor the bound level has economic 
meaning (for example, for tariffs, when a 
certain product is exported rather than 
imported).
 The PSEs are indicators that capture the 
nature and degree of multiple policies, in-
cluding production-stimulating border pro-
tection and amber box price supports. The 
PSEs also include support associated with 
production-limiting programs (the WTO 
blue box) and some policies affecting pro-
duction and regional growth that are exempt 
from the amber box under de minimis ex-
emptions or under special and differential 
treatment for developing countries.
 In addition the PSEs include measures 
in categories that under the WTO are classi-
fied as “non– or minimally trade distorting.” 
These WTO green box policies are exempt 
from reduction commitments. The green 
box includes such general services as agri-
cultural research and extension, which are 
excluded from the PSE but are included by 
the OECD in its GSSE. The WTO green 
box mixes these general service expendi-
tures with other more controversial policy 
interventions—such as decoupled income 
support (used primarily in developed coun-
tries), insurance schemes, environmental 
payments, and some regional development 
expenditures—whose possible distorting im-
pacts on production and trade are being de-
bated. The latter payments are included in 
the PSE.
Economic Critiques 
of the PSE
PSEs are widely utilized measures of agri-
cultural subsidies and protection, along with 
the support measures reported to the WTO. 
With an understanding of the assumptions 
on which they are based, and the context in 
which they should be interpreted, MPS and 
PSEs provide very useful summary statistics 
for comparison of support across commodi-
ties and countries over different time periods. 
For this reason, application of the PSEs to 
developing countries and analysis of the re-
sults is informative.
 Before turning to this analysis for India, 
Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, however, it 
is useful to also summarize a few of the 
broader conceptual critiques that have arisen 
over the use of PSEs. The concerns fall 
broadly into two categories, those related 
to the assumptions of the PSE concept and 
those related to its interpretation.
 Silvis and van der Hamsvoort (1996) 
argue that the assumption that the domestic 
price and quantity and international prices 
are independent (that all countries are small 
and therefore cannot individually affect 
world prices) is unrealistic. On this basis 
alone, PSEs may overstate agricultural sup-
port in OECD and other countries, because 
they are based on current world prices in-
stead of long-term equilibrium (free trade) 
prices. Although long-term equilibrium prices 
are difficult to estimate, they are expected 
to be higher than current world prices that 
are depressed by subsidies and trade barriers, 
so using equilibrium prices would result in 
a PSE that is smaller than the OECD’s esti-
mates for its member countries (Oskam and 
Meester 2003). For developing countries, the 
subsidies and border protection of OECD 
countries with protected agriculture drive 
down world prices, resulting in disprotec-
tion to their farmers being implicit in the 
adjusted reference price from world mar-
kets. Beierle and Diaz-Bonilla (2003) re-
view numerous studies of these price effects 
and conclude that a common estimate of 
the extent to which OECD policies depress 
prices is 10 percent, with larger effects on 
commodities such as sugar, sheep meat, and 
milk. This external effect tempers the inter-
pretation of PSE for developing countries 
calculated on the basis of observed world 
prices.
 On technical grounds, the PSE implic-
itly assumes that domestic and internation-
ally produced goods are perfect substitutes 
or that a quality adjustment can be intro-
duced to make them such. This is a departure 
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from the Armington assumption often em-
ployed in computable general equilibrium 
(CGE), and some partial equilibrium,  models. 
Under the Armington assumption, similar 
goods from different countries are imper-
fect substitutes for which equilibrium prices 
will not be equal even when adjustments are 
made for arbitrage. In these models, various 
elasticities of substitution in production and 
consumption are assumed between domestic 
and traded goods. Changes in output quan-
tities affect prices in the models, and effects 
of policy change can be evaluated at the 
resulting equilibrium prices under each 
scenario.
 The assumption in measurement of MPS 
and PSEs that the price elasticity of supply 
is zero may be consistent with an ex post 
measurement of the gross transfers to pro-
ducers, yet it cannot substitute for a model-
ing approach to measuring the price, pro-
duction, consumption, trade, income, or 
welfare effects of agricultural policies either 
ex ante or over time (Herrmann et al. 1992). 
PSEs cannot be used directly to predict the 
trade effects of policy changes. For exam-
ple, the liberalization of a production quota 
and price guarantee policy with equivalent 
PSE values would have very different effects 
on trade (Silvis and van der Hamsvoort 
1996).11 Herrmann et al. (1992) argue that 
the PSE, as an income-oriented measure, is 
not well suited to capture the trade effect of 
agricultural policies. Instead they propose a 
“trade distortion equivalent” based on the 
difference between the quantity traded with 
policy interventions in place and a hypo-
thetical quantity traded under free trade.
 It is particularly important to realize that 
PSEs are not the same as producer surplus, 
though sometimes they are misinterpreted 
as such (Oskam and Meester 2003). PSEs 
based on current prices and fixed quantities 
are neither linked with the welfare economic 
theories of producer surplus nor comparable 
to the estimated benefits of agricultural lib-
eralization derived from partial equilib-
rium or CGE models, when there is a supply 
response. Oskam and Meester (2003) dem-
onstrate, for example, with a stylized, one-
commodity, three-country model, that the 
MPS and producer surplus effects not only 
differ in magnitude but also can be of the 
opposite sign. Moreover, the authors argue 
that it is difficult to interpret the total PSE, 
because of the simple aggregation of MPS 
and budgetary expenditures whose mea-
surement is not related to general welfare 
economics.
 Based on the strong assumptions on 
which the PSE is computed, its interpreta-
tion must be taken somewhat narrowly. The 
OECD originally adopted the PSE frame-
work because it “incorporates explicitly all 
domestic agricultural policies directly or 
indirectly affecting trade” (Cahill and Legg 
1990, p. 14). The PSE does provide a com-
prehensive measure of the support to farmers. 
But it is not feasible to interpret each dollar 
of PSE support as having the same effects 
on production or trade as any other dollar of 
support.
 The ultimate beneficiaries of support to 
agriculture are also an issue in the measure-
ment and interpretation of PSEs for devel-
oped and developing countries. PSEs may 
overestimate the policy benefits to farmers 
if others capture a significant portion of the 
benefits. Several studies have demonstrated 
that a large share of the transfers from tax-
payers and consumers to agricultural pro-
ducers goes to other parts of the production 
chain or to fixed factors of production such 
as land. Dewbre, Antón, and Thompson 
(2001) find that subsidies on purchased in-
puts, on which many developing countries 
rely to transfer support to producers, are the 
least efficient in providing income to farmers. 
Burfisher and Hopkins (2003) calculate that 
farm operators may retain as little as 40 per-
11Oskam and Meester (2003) also show that, if a quota system is in place, the PSE methodology may under-
estimate its effects on producers.
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cent of the benefits of the decoupled direct 
payments in the United States because the 
majority of the payments are capitalized into 
land values, resulting in higher rental rates.
 A comparison of two simple magnitudes 
illustrates these points. While most CGE 
models indicate that full agricultural liber-
alization would increase world agricultural 
gross domestic product by $40–80 billion per 
year (Oskam and Meester 2003), the aver-
age 2000–02 sum of total PSEs for OECD 
countries was $235 billion (OECD 2003a). 
The sum of total PSEs is sometimes mis-
interpreted as the benefits that would accrue 
to nonsubsidized agricultural producers under 
reform of agricultural policies, when those 
benefits are much smaller.
 Even with this greater breadth of the 
PSE, it must be noted, especially concern-
ing developing countries, that neither the 
AMS nor the PSE as usually reported takes 
into account a wide range of structural, 
institutional, and macroeconomic factors. 
Among these factors are more general trade 
policies, such as industrial protection, which 
can operate as a tax on agriculture, and 
macro economic measures, such as different 
combinations of exchange rate regimes and 
monetary, fiscal, financial, and labor policies, 
which may lead to overvalued exchange 
rates or otherwise higher costs for the agri-
cultural sector.12 Josling and Valdés (2004) 
characterize these important forces on agri-
culture in a number of dimensions, and we 
address the important issue of exchange rate 
effects in particular in Chapter 6.
12Specific exchange rate arrangements only for the agricultural sector in general, or for some products within 
it, are considered as part of domestic subsidies or taxes.
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C H A P T E R  3
The Four Economies and 
Their Agricultural Sectors
India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam are major developing economies, and changes in their agricultural trade and domestic support policies will have significant implications not only internally but also on world agricultural markets. India and China are the world’s two most 
populous countries, with 1.1 and 1.3 billion inhabitants, respectively. Together with Indonesia 
and Vietnam, the four countries comprise over 40 percent of the world’s total population and 
20 percent of global agricultural GDP. The economies of India and Indonesia have tradition-
ally been based on private markets with significant state activity and regulation, while China 
and Vietnam formerly had Soviet-style centrally planned economies. Despite their differing 
political histories, the governments of all four countries have played significant roles by hold-
ing a tight rein over several major agricultural sectors.
 The four countries began to undertake economic reforms in the late 1970s (China) and 
mid-1980s (India, Indonesia, and Vietnam). The primary goal of these reforms has been to 
seek globalization of their relatively closed economies by opening up both trade and financial 
channels. Changes in both channels were slow and uneven during the early stages of the re-
forms, though some tentative steps toward liberalization were taken. Major progress took 
place in the 1990s, and the past fifteen years have witnessed a series of market-oriented de-
velopments in trade and finance. Concurrent with these later developments was the increased 
incidence of financial crises in some Asian countries, including Indonesia (1997–98). Not-
withstanding uncertainty these events raised about the linkages between liberalization and 
economic instability, the four countries have continued to make progress in dismantling trade 
and financial market restrictions to further liberalize their economies, albeit sometimes more 
cautiously than in the precrisis period.
 In all four countries, liberalization has stimulated rapid economic growth but has also 
imposed structural adjustment pressures on the agricultural sector. With further industrializa-
tion and urbanization, the governments of these countries are facing the similar questions of 
whether and by how much to assist their farmers relative to other producers. Fiscal limitations 
and commitments to the WTO are likely to constrain the governments from fully following 
the experiences of the developed countries regarding levels of agricultural support. Within 
each country, however, major reforms in sectoral and economywide policies have been imple-
mented, often to address a past bias against agriculture. This chapter reviews the broad policy 
outline and economic growth for each country and provides key indicators of agricultural 
production and trade. The agricultural policy reform processes that were implemented during 
1985–2002 are described further in Chapter 4.
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Broad Reforms and 
Economic Growth
Since achieving independence fifty years 
ago, the Indian democracy has implemented 
a mixed economic system with a socialistic 
bent and extensive central planning (USDA-
ERS 2004). Basic economic activities are 
market driven but are dominated by the 
public sector and government controls. His-
torically India’s economy has been impaired 
by chronic large fiscal deficits, high infla-
tion, and poor performance of the external 
sectors. India’s GDP grew more strongly in 
the 1980s than during the 1970s following 
the initial reform efforts, with growth rates 
higher in industry and service than in agri-
culture (Table 3.1). GDP has registered 
similar impressive economic growth in the 
1990s, particularly in the period just after 
a 1991 financial crisis and the subsequent 
economic restructuring.
 The relatively slow process of Indian 
trade and financial liberalization in the 1980s 
was characterized by deterioration of the cur-
rent account and gradual losses of foreign 
exchange reserves, which reached $7 billion 
annually (more than 2 percent of GDP) in 
1990. The subsequent postcrisis adjustment 
program featured macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and structural reforms, and the effects 
of these measures became evident in India’s 
external accounts. Trade liberalization in-
troduced reductions in government inter-
ventions, trade restrictions, tariff rates, and 
public sector dominance. Total trade flows 
(imports and exports) increased from 
$50.1 billion in 1991 to $161.5 billion in 
2002. Capital inflows reached record high 
levels in 1994 and 1996, and the current 
account turned into surpluses in the years 
2001 and 2002.
 During the immediate postreform period, 
the GDP of India grew at an annual rate of 
6.5 percent. Growth was slightly lower sub-
sequently than immediately following the 
1991 reforms, a result, among other factors, 
of a slowdown in public sector investments, 
falling world prices of most agricultural 
products, and poor monsoon rains, especially 
in 2002 (Mullen, Orden, and Gulati 2005). 
Despite its growth over the past two de-
cades, India has lagged behind some of its 
neighbors in economic performance. India’s 
per capita GDP was roughly equal to that of 
China in 1970 ($213 in real 1995 value). But 
by 2000 its per capita GDP ($477 in real 
1995 value) was only a little over half that 
achieved by China ($878) (Mullen, Orden, 
and Gulati 2005).
 Indonesia has also experienced rapid 
growth. For nearly thirty years, under the 
New Order regime of President Suharto, 
Indonesia underwent a transformation in 
performance (Temple 2003). The economy 
grew, benefiting from two oil booms as well 
as from policies aimed at stabilizing the 
macroeconomic environment and develop-
ment of the agricultural sector. In the period 
from 1965 until the 1997–98 crisis, GDP 
per capita rose more than fourfold. The in-
cidence of poverty declined, life expectancy 
improved from 43 to 68 years, and progress 
was made in raising the adult literacy rate 
of the population from 60 percent in 1970 
to 90 percent in 2001 (Thomas and Orden 
2004). In spite of its performance, Indone-
sia remains a lower middle-income country 
with a GDP per capita after the financial 
crisis of $678 in 2001 (just above half of its 
1997 level of $1,110).
 From the 1970s through 1990, the aver-
age growth rate of the overall Indonesian 
GDP was above 6 percent, again with more 
rapid growth in industry and services than 
in agriculture. The macroeconomic man-
agement of the economy was thought to be 
among the best of the developing econo-
mies (Barichello 2000; Hill 2000; Temple 
2003). Suharto focused on economic de-
velopment, and the government undertook 
major reforms, outlined in a series of five-
year plans (Repelita I–VI) starting in 
1969–70 (Indonesia 1995). In agriculture, 
Indonesia made significant progress in in-
creasing domestic food production, stabi-
lizing food prices, reducing poverty, and 
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increasing food security.13 The government 
also invested in broad-based rural develop-
ment, including infrastructure, health, and 
education (BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI 1999; 
Magiera 2003).
 The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis led 
Indonesia into a deep recession, evidenced 
by a GDP drop of 13.1 percent, an inflation 
rate of more than 77 percent, and an increase 
in the unemployment rate to 17 percent 
(WTO 2003). The crisis resulted in a short-
age of foreign exchange and the deprecia-
tion of the rupiah, affecting mostly the 
manufacturing sector and employment in 
urban areas. The rupiah depreciated by over 
50 percent. During the same period, Indo-
nesia experienced the worst drought in 50 
years, brought on by El Niño weather con-
ditions, putting additional pressure on agri-
culture, more specifically on the production 
of food crops (EEAU 2000). Trade suffered 
from the crisis, with merchandise export 
and imports declining by 10.5 and 31 per-
cent, respectively, in 1998. Indonesia also 
experienced a political crisis, which forced 
Suharto to step down and led to general 
elections in 1999.14 The economy started to 
recover in 1999 and grew at an average rate 
of 3.2 percent between 1999 and 2002, but 
the unemployment rate remained at about 
8 percent.
 China has a larger economy than India, 
and it has undergone more dramatic changes. 
Its economy has witnessed considerable 
achievements in the past two decades and 
has become the second largest economy in 
the world after the United States (in terms 
of GDP at PPP exchange rates). Starting in 
1978, the government of China began a pro-
cess of liberalization of agriculture, trade, 
investment, and financial markets. The de-
centralization of government control and 
the creation of special economic zones to 
attract foreign investment led to consider-
able industrial growth, especially in light 
industries that produce consumer goods 
along China’s costal areas. In the 1990s a 
program of private shareholding and greater 
market orientation went into effect that in-
creased the capitalization of the economy. 
However, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
continued to dominate several key indus-
tries in China’s “socialist market economy,” 
including the automotive, pharmaceutical, 
electronics, and petrochemical industries 
(Nolan 2002). Despite its progress, China’s 
economy also suffers from a series of social 
and economic problems, including income 
disparities, unemployment, excessive bureau-
cracy and corruption, and environmental 
deterioration. 
 Even facing these constraints, from 1980 
to 2004 the average annual GDP growth 
rate in China was over 9 percent. The aver-
age GDP growth rate was highest during 
1985–95, increasing substantially compared 
to the prereform years 1970–78. During the 
Asian financial crisis, the average growth 
rate was sustained at 7–8 percent. As in 
India and Indonesia, the industry and ser-
vice sectors in China have grown faster than 
the agricultural sector during the past two 
decades, but since 1980 agricultural GDP in 
China has mostly grown at a faster rate than 
in India or Indonesia.
 Foreign trade and investment remain 
strong elements of China’s remarkable 
economic growth. Export growth was 
rapid owing to deregulation measures, 
duty drawbacks on imported inputs used 
13The Third Plan, which covered the period 1979–80 to 1984–85, was called the Trilogy of Development be-
cause it included three government objectives: the equitable distribution of development gains, economic growth, 
and the maintenance of political and economic stability (Indonesia 1995).
14Suharto’s authoritarian regime lasted from 1965 to 1998. He stepped down before his seventh consecutive five-
year term in office had ended and following the mid-1997 financial crisis. The presidential election in October 
1999 brought Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency, and Megawati Soekarnoputri was appointed president in 
a special session on July 23, 2001. 
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in the production of exports, and strong 
competitiveness associated with low labor 
costs. The value of imports increased, but 
at a slower rate, so the current account 
has been in surplus for most of the 1980s 
and 1990s. The surpluses peaked in the 
mid-1990s but decreased sharply in the fol-
lowing years, due largely to the Asian 
 financial crisis and the collapse of the 
technology boom in the developed econo-
mies. China’s capital account during the 
same period also experienced continuous 
surpluses. By the end of 2002, a year after 
joining the WTO, China had overtaken 
the United States in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) capital inflows. It has become 
the most attractive FDI destination in the 
world and received about $49 billion in 
net investment during 2002 (IMF 2004).
 The modern era in Vietnam began with 
the reunification of North and South Viet-
nam in 1975. The economy of the reunited 
country was at first largely centrally planned. 
Production and the trading of goods were 
carried out by the SOEs or cooperatives 
following decisions by the government. In 
1986 the government started to move toward 
a market-oriented system. An economic re-
form, Doi Moi, was launched, promoting 
agriculture as well as the production of ex-
port products and consumer goods such as 
textiles (Politburo 1987). The contractual 
quota system that had been established in 
the agricultural sector in 1981 was revised 
to promote production. The reforms also 
included liberalizing domestic and inter-
national trade, opening the economy to for-
eign investment, acknowledging the impor-
tance of the private sector, and developing a 
two-tier banking system. During the initial 
years of reform, the economy experienced 
moderate growth at an average rate of 4.6 
percent.
 In 1989 the government launched a 
comprehensive stabilization program based 
on tight fiscal and monetary policies to end 
rampant inflation. Subsidies to the SOEs 
were reduced, government spending was 
tightened, the tax system was restructured, 
and inflationary financing by the state bank 
was ended. In addition the reform included 
almost complete removal of price controls 
and encouragement of the private sector. The 
results of the economic reform process were 
evident by the early 1990s: lowering of in-
flation rates to around 10 percent per year 
throughout the decade, attracting increased 
foreign direct investment, and expanding 
overall private investment and exports 
(World Bank 2004). The growth rate in-
creased in each sector of the economy and 
the overall GDP growth rate averaged more 
than 7 percent during the period 1990–2004. 
Per capita GDP increased from $170 in the 
mid-1980s to $480 in 2000. Poverty, mea-
sured as the share of poor households in the 
total population, declined from 58 percent 
in 1993 to 29 percent in 2002 (Nguyen and 
Grote 2004).
 Until March 1989, the exchange rate of 
the Vietnamese dong had been fixed, and it 
became substantially overvalued during two 
years of superinflation in 1986–88. From 
1989 to 1991 the dong was depreciated sev-
eral times as part of the stabilization program 
(Vo et al. 2000). Between 1991 and 1997 the 
exchange rate was kept rather stable through 
strict controls over capital outflows, but the 
dong was depreciated again in 1997 because 
of balance of payments pressures resulting 
from declined foreign direct investments and 
export earnings. Since February 1999 the 
exchange rate has followed a crawling peg.
The Pivotal Role 
of Agriculture
There have been significant changes in the 
structure of the economies of India, Indo-
nesia, China, and Vietnam as agriculture has 
grown more slowly than other sectors over 
the past two decades. Between 1980 and 
2001 agriculture declined from 38 percent 
to 25 percent of total GDP in India (Mullen, 
Orden, and Gulati 2005). In Indonesia agri-
culture represented just 17 percent of GDP by 
2002 (Thomas and Orden 2004). In China 
the agricultural share of GDP dropped from 
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30 percent in 1979 to 16 percent in 2000 
(Sun 2003). And in Vietnam agriculture ac-
counted for 31 percent of GDP in 1991, but 
by 2001 its share was 24 percent (World 
Bank 2004).
 Even as these growing economies con-
tinue to undergo a relative shift of resources 
out of agriculture, the agricultural sector 
plays a pivotal role in each country. Agri-
culture still employs nearly two-thirds of 
the total work force and contributes about 
15 percent of the foreign export earnings in 
India (Mullen, Orden, and Gulati 2005). In 
Indonesia agriculture employs 45 percent of 
the labor force, and it is home to 57 percent 
of the poor (FAO 2002). In China half of 
the workforce remains in agriculture (Sun 
2003). And in Vietnam in 2000, the agricul-
tural sector created employment for 61 per-
cent of the labor force (Nguyen and Grote 
2004). Agriculture is also a changing and 
dynamic sector in each economy.
India
India has a large and diverse agriculture 
sector. It is one of the world’s leading pro-
ducers of rice, wheat, coarse grains, pulses, 
and cotton, among other crops. It has the 
highest level of bovine herd and milk pro-
duction in the world. Table 3.2 gives levels 
of production of India’s top ten agricultural 
products in 2003 (ranked by value of pro-
duction at international commodity prices). 
For eight of the ten products, India is also 
the first or second largest producer in the 
world. It ranks lower for only indigenous 
cattle meat (ninth in the world) and cotton 
lint (third in the world).
 Traditional crops and livestock products 
remain dominant in Indian agriculture, but 
the output mix is changing rapidly. The com-
position of the production mix has changed 
in favor of high-value commodities (Joshi 
and Gulati 2003). During the 1990s high-
value agriculture—including fruits and veg-
etables, dairy products, poultry, eggs, and 
meat, as well as fishery products—grew by 
more than double the rate registered by the 
cereal sector. The growth rates (measured 
by the gross value of output) for fruits and 
vegetables, in particular, increased to over 
6 percent per year during the 1990s (Figure 
3.1). Thus Indian agriculture is undergoing 
a significant structural transformation from 
cereal-led to high-value product–led growth, 
which is being driven by increased domestic 
and export demand for noncereal foods and 
by improved supply capacity for high-value 
products.
 Within India, rising incomes, urbaniza-
tion, and changing relative prices of cere-
als and noncereal foods are leading to diet 
Table 3.2 Production of major agricultural commodities in India, 2003
Rank in
India production 
Rank in
world production Product
Production
(metric tons)
 1 2 Rice, paddy 132,013,000
 2 1 Buffalo milk 47,850,000
 3 2 Wheat 65,129,300
 4 2 Cow milk, whole, fresh 36,500,000
 5 2 Vegetables, fresh nesa 37,000,000
 6 2 Sugarcane 289,630,016
 7 2 Groundnuts in shell 7,500,000
 8 1 Chickpeas 4,130,000
 9 9 Indigenous cattle meat 1,489,929
10 3 Cotton lint 2,100,000
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to value of production at international commodity prices.
anes, not specified elsewhere.
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diversification away from cereals and to-
ward high-value agriculture. Preferences are 
shifting toward high-value products at all 
income levels. By contrast, growth in de-
mand for staple foods—such as wheat, rice, 
and coarse grains, which have been the focus 
of agricultural development policy, institu-
tional initiatives, and public spending—has 
slowed, as shown in Figure 3.2.
 India’s top ten exports of agricultural 
commodities in 2003 are shown in Table 
3.3, and its annual agricultural trade bal-
ance from 1990 through 2004 is illustrated 
in Figure 3.3. India has been a net agricul-
tural exporter since 1990. Agricultural ex-
ports grew at an annual rate of 8.1 percent 
during the 1990s, compared to an annual rate 
of 3.3 percent during the 1980s. Although 
the share of agriculture in total exports de-
clined from 24 percent during the 1980s to 
18 percent in the 1990s, the diversification 
in agricultural production has promoted 
exports of many nontraditional items. His-
torically there were virtually no exports 
of fruits and vegetables or of livestock and 
fish products. The export shipments of these 
commodities more than doubled during the 
1990s (Figure 3.4). Nevertheless the tradi-
tional commodities are still dominant among 
India’s top agricultural export products. (An 
exception is fish, exports of which have 
reached a value over $1.1 billion, as shown 
in Figure 3.4.)15 Overall exports of basic 
agricultural commodities are only a small 
proportion of domestic production (for ex-
ample, negligible amounts of rice or buffalo 
meat, but 6.3 percent of wheat, among the 
top ten commodities in production and ex-
ports in 2003).
 Agricultural imports make up a relatively 
small portion of total merchandise trade. In 
the period 1996/97–1999/2000, agriculture 
accounted for 4–7 percent of merchandise 
imports (WTO 2002). Palm oil and soy-
bean oil are India’s top agricultural imports, 
and India is also the world’s first and second 
Figure 3.1 Growth in value of high-value agricultural output in India, 1990–2000
Source: Gulati and Bathla (2002).
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15Some data sources include fishery products among agricultural products, while others exclude this sector. The 
FAO ranking of major agricultural commodities does not consider fish.
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largest importer of these products, respec-
tively (Table 3.4). In recent years imports 
of edible oils have accounted for over 50 
percent of the total value of agricultural 
imports.
Indonesia
Indonesia is the world largest producer of 
coconuts; the second largest producer of palm 
kernels, palm oil, copra, and natural rubber; 
and the third largest producer of paddy rice, 
cassava, and fresh tropical fruit (Table 3.5; 
EEAU 2000). Production is concentrated in 
the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi. 
Smallholder farms (average size 1 hectare) 
occupy the largest share of cultivated land 
(87 percent) and grow mostly food crops 
(90 percent of total rice and maize output). 
Large-scale plantations, privately or state-
owned, account for a small share of agricul-
tural output but the larger share of exports 
of agricultural products, such as rubber, palm 
oil, coffee, and cocoa (EEAU 2000). Agri-
cultural GDP is still dominated by food crops 
Table 3.3 Exports of major agricultural commodities by India, 2003
Rank in
India exports
Rank in
world exports Product
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1  2 Milled paddy rice 3,371,818 888,592 264
 2  5 Soya bean cake 2,749,268 653,689 238
 3  9 Wheat 4,093,081 513,620 125
 4  1 Cashew nuts, shelled 98,546 360,994 3,663
 5  3 Tea 174,246 333,408 1,913
 6  1 Buffalo meat 319,087 305,870 959
 7  6 Sugar, refined 882,775 191,300 217
 8 11 Tobacco leaves 120,637 172,143 1,427
 9  9 Cotton lint 159,379 163,047 1,023
10 12 Coffee, green 167,495 157,295 939
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.
Figure 3.2 Growth in food consumption in India, 1970s–1990s
Source: Landes and Gulati (2003).
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(51.7 percent), and rice dominates among 
these crops. Livestock accounts for only 
about 12 percent of agricultural GDP, given 
Indonesia’s climatic conditions and topog-
raphy, while fisheries have increased in im-
portance, rising to about 15 percent during 
1999–2002 (Thomas and Orden 2004).
 Indonesia has maintained surpluses in 
agricultural trade during the past two de-
cades. Agricultural exports grew at an aver-
Figure 3.3 Agricultural imports and exports of India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1990–2004
Source: FAO (2006).
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Figure 3.4 India’s exports of nontraditional agricultural products, 1980s and 1990s
Source: Joshi and Gulati (2003).
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age rate of 6.5 percent per year during 
1985–2004, increasing from $3.2 billion in 
1985 to $9.5 billion in 2004. Although 
manufactured products and fuels continue 
to dominate Indonesia’s foreign trade, diver-
sification beyond its traditional dependence 
on oil and gas exports has improved the 
country’s international financial status. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, trade in ag-
ricultural commodities accounted for about 
15 percent of Indonesia’s total merchandise 
trade. Crude palm oil and natural rubber are 
Indonesia’s top exports in agriculture (it is 
the second largest exporter of both in the 
world), and in 2003 the export value of these 
two products reached $3.9 billion, account-
ing for about 40 percent of total agricultural 
exports (Table 3.6). Other major exports in-
clude cocoa beans, coffee and tea, and coco-
nut oil. Among agricultural imports, Indo-
nesia’s domestic textile and wheat milling 
industries have made cotton and wheat first 
and second in value. Indonesia is the world’s 
largest importer of feed supplement and a 
major importer of rice and sugar (Table 3.7).
China
China has only 9 percent of the world’s ar-
able cropland but 20 percent of the world’s 
population. China is a leading producer of 
Table 3.4 Imports of major agricultural commodities by India, 2003
Rank in
India imports
Rank in
world imports Product
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1 1 Palm oil 4,026,436 1,808,277 449
 2 2 Soya bean oil 993,498 565,440 569
 3 8 Cotton lint 241,787 333,282 1,378
 4 1 Cashew nuts 441,500 293,884 666
 5 1 Peas, dry 700,017 161,851 231
 6 1 Beans, dry 486,039 154,071 317
 7 1 Pulses nesa 470,588 136,421 290
 8 1 Silk, raw and waste 9,258 134,983 14,580
 9 4 Fatty acids, oils 338,991 118,437 349
10 5 Wool, greasy 25,728 94,308 3,666
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
Table 3.5 Production of major agricultural commodities in Indonesia, 2003
Rank in
Indonesia production 
Rank in
world production Product
Production
(metric tons)
 1  3 Rice, paddy 52,078,832
 2 11 Sugarcane 24,500,000
 3  3 Cassava 18,473,960
 4  1 Coconuts 15,630,000
 5  8 Maize 10,910,104
 6  2 Palm oil 10,200,000
 7  6 Bananas 4,311,959
 8  3 Fruit, tropical, fresh nesa 2,832,366
 9  2 Palm kernels 2,186,777
10  4 Sweet potatoes 1,997,787
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to value of production at international commodity prices.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
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many agricultural commodities and has 
remained largely self-sufficient. Table 3.8 
shows the levels of production of China’s 
top ten agricultural commodities in 2003. 
For eight of the ten commodities, China is 
also the largest producer in the world. It 
ranks lower only for maize (after the United 
States) and sugarcane (after Brazil and India). 
Apart from the commodities listed in Table 
3.8, China is also a major producer of sor-
ghum, millet, barley, peanuts, and soybeans. 
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in 
cotton and tobacco and is an important pro-
ducer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, and 
hemp. The high levels of production for cer-
tain food commodities correspond to China’s 
domestic consumer preferences and income 
levels. About 70 percent of per capita food 
consumption expenditure has been allocated 
to grains (mostly rice and wheat) and vege-
tables, but consumption patterns are chang-
ing, especially in urban areas.
 As in India, strong income growth in 
China has recently boosted the demand for 
foods that are high in protein and nutrients 
relative to those high in carbohydrates (An-
derson 2003). Within agriculture, such shift 
in demand has stimulated significant struc-
tural changes. Livestock and fish increased 
their share of agricultural output from less 
Table 3.6 Exports of major agricultural commodities by Indonesia, 2003
Rank in
Indonesia exports
Rank in
world exports Product
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value 
($)
 1  2 Palm oil 6,386,410 2,454,626 384
 2  2 Rubber, natural, dry 1,648,394 1,482,523 899
 3  4 Cocoa beans 265,838 410,278 1,543
 4  2 Palm kernel oil 659,895 264,678 401
 5  6 Coffee, green 321,180 251,250 782
 6  2 Coconut oil 364,820 153,608 421
 7 17 Cigarettes 22,651 136,139 6,010
 8  5 Cocoa butter 43,354 118,340 2,730
 9  7 Tea 88,176 95,816 1,087
10  5 Fatty acids, oils 283,851 94,746 334
Source:  FAO (2006).
Note:  Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.
Table 3.7 Imports of major agricultural commodities by Indonesia, 2003
Rank in
Indonesia imports
Rank in
world imports Product
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1  3 Cotton lint 523,124 644,483 1,232
 2  8 Wheat 3,502,373 579,925 166
 3  8 Soya bean cake 1,558,558 362,161 232
 4 11 Soybeans 1,192,717 330,497 277
 5  9 Sugar, centrifugal, raw 911,677 215,766 237
 6  7 Milled paddy rice 829,000 173,300 209
 7 17 Maize 1,345,452 168,658 125
 8  1 Feed supplements 412,028 146,896 357
 9  2 Rice, broken 671,433 132,027 197
10  5 Dry skim cow milk 71,600 122,000 1,704
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices. 
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than 20 percent in the late 1970s to 40 per-
cent by the late 1990s, while within the crop 
subsector fruit and vegetable production grew 
much faster than grain output, as shown in 
Table 3.9. Prices and marketing of grain 
and oilseed products continued to be highly 
regulated through the 1990s, whereas mar-
kets for horticultural, livestock, and fish 
products were mostly liberalized. This trend 
has accentuated growth in output of the lat-
ter group relative to grain and oilseed. The 
direct consumption of grain by rural as well 
as urban households has remained virtually 
unchanged, a consequence not only of rising 
incomes and shifting food preferences but 
also of population growth having slowed to 
less than 1 percent per year and of reduc-
tions in the implicit consumption subsidy 
for food grains (Anderson 2003).
 China is a major player in world agricul-
tural markets. Agricultural exports have been 
more stable in terms of aggregate value than 
imports, with two dramatic changes in net 
trade due largely to sharp changes in do-
Table 3.8 Production of major agricultural commodities in China, 2003
Rank in
China production 
Rank in
world production Product
Production
(metric tons)
 1 1 Rice, paddy 160,656,000
 2 1 Vegetables, fresh nesa 137,000,000
 3 2 Maize 115,830,000
 4 1 Sweet potatoes 103,643,000
 5 3 Sugarcane 90,235,000
 6 1 Wheat 86,488,000
 7 1 Potatoes 72,022,000
 8 1 Watermelons 66,000,000
 9 1 Indigenous pig meat 45,313,844
10 1 Cabbages 30,000,000
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to  value of production at international commodity prices.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
Table 3.9 Composition and growth of China’s agricultural production, 1970–2000 
(percent) 
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Value share of agricultural output
 Crops 82 76 69 65 58 56
 Livestock 14 18 22 26 30 30
 Fish  2  2  3  5  8 10
 Forestry  2  4  5  4  3  4
1979–84 1985–95 1996–2000
Output volume growth
 Grain 4.7 1.7  0.03
 Oilseed crops 14.9 4.4  5.6
 Fruits and vegetables 7.2 12.7  8.6
 Red meat 9.1 8.8  6.5
 Fish 7.9 13.7 10.2
Source: Anderson (2003).
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mestic production and sudden policy shifts. 
The first one occurred in 1995, when China 
abruptly increased its grain imports and cut 
off maize exports owing to concerns about 
domestic grain shortages and rising prices. 
The spike in China’s imports helped push 
world grain prices near historical highs. Sub-
sequently several consecutive years of good 
weather combined with changes in domestic 
agricultural policy to boost China’s grain 
production, and this caused imports to fall. 
In crop year 1996/97, wheat imports fell by 
nearly 10 million tons, representing roughly 
10 percent of average annual world wheat 
trade (USDA-ERS 2005).
 The second sharp drop in net exports 
occurred in 2003, followed by a large deficit 
in 2004. China’s agricultural exports in-
creased immediately after its accession to 
the WTO in December 2001 and have con-
tinued to grow moderately during the post-
accession years. However, delays in finaliz-
ing the rules for administration of imports, 
such as its tariff rate quota (TRQ) system, 
contributed to a delay in the expected in-
crease in agricultural imports relative to 
exports (OECD 2005b). As problems imple-
menting the new trade rules were overcome, 
agricultural imports increased in 2003 and 
2004. Moreover, rising grain prices on do-
mestic markets at the end of 2003 led the 
government to import nearly 8 million tons 
of soft and durum wheat to replenish its 
strategic stocks. Combined with continued 
rapid growth in imports of soybeans and 
cotton, this increase contributed to record 
net imports of agricultural products in 2004, 
even as agricultural exports also reached 
their highest level.
 China’s leading agricultural exports and 
imports of agricultural commodities in 
2003 are shown in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. The 
trade patterns in agricultural products have 
shifted to its comparative advantage: China 
tends to export labor-intensive commodities 
(fruits, vegetables, poultry, and processed ag-
ricultural goods) and import land-intensive 
commodities (grains, soybeans, cotton). 
China is also a major exporter of maize. 
Most of its exports go to neighboring coun-
tries in Asia.
Vietnam
Vietnam’s topography and climatic condi-
tions are favorable for growing tropical as 
well as subtropical crops. About 2.8 million 
hectares of land are being cultivated, of 
which 1 million hectares are irrigated. Ag-
ricultural development since its economic 
reforms is largely due to an increase in crop 
output, whereas the production and export 
of livestock products is constrained by qual-
Table 3.10 Exports of major agricultural commodities by China, 2003
Rank in
China exports
Rank in
world exports Producta
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1 2 Maize 16,399,453 1,766,830 108
 2 1 Crude organic materials 8,326 1,255,210 150,758
 3 7 Food, prepared nes 619,743 805,975 1,300
 4 1 Fruit, prepared nes 688,093 520,336 756
 5 2 Meat, canned chicken 158,701 463,987 2,924
 6 6 Milled paddy rice 2,456,496 449,268 183
 7 1 Vegetables, prepared nes 578,249 431,001 745
 8 2 Tea 259,914 367,187 1,413
 9 1 Garlic 1,142,237 354,903 311
10 1 Beans, dry 946,455 332,740 352
Source:  FAO (2006).
Note:  Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
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ity problems in livestock rearing and pro-
cessing technologies (Nuguyen and Grote 
2004). Food crops accounted for 60 percent 
of the total value of agricultural plant out-
put, while industrial and perennial crops and 
fruits and vegetables accounted for 24 per-
cent and 14 percent, respectively (Figure 3.5). 
Vietnam has also become a major exporter 
of fish and fish products.
 In 2003 Vietnam ranked second and 
third in the world’s fresh fruit and vegetable 
production and fifth in production of rice 
and sweet potatoes (Table 3.12). Among food 
crops, rice accounted for 85 percent of total 
cultivated land and 43 percent of total out-
put value in 2003. Other important food 
crops include cassava and maize. Coffee is 
the most important industrial crop in Viet-
nam (it ranked 11th in total Vietnamese 
agricultural production in 2003 and so is 
not shown in Table 3.12). Ninety-five per-
cent of Vietnamese coffee is of the robusta 
type, produced since 1975 mainly on small-
scale farms with diverse levels of processing 
knowledge and technology. Thus the quality 
of Vietnamese coffee varies. But the coun-
try’s yield of nearly 1,300 kilograms of cof-
fee per hectare is twice the world average. 
Apart from coffee, other important indus-
trial and perennial crops are rubber, sugar-
cane, groundnut, soybean, tea, and pepper.
 At the beginning of the 1980s, Vietnam 
went from being an importer to a net ex-
porter of agricultural products. Its agricul-
tural import value since 1990 is only about 
half the value of its exports in agriculture. 
Stimulated by trade liberalization and agri-
cultural reforms as it moved toward a mar-
ket-oriented economy (described further in 
Chapter 4), agricultural export revenues rose 
from around $100 million in 1985 to nearly 
$2.4 billion in 1999, then declined in 2000–
02 before reaching record levels in 2003 and 
2004.
 Exports of agricultural products, together 
with exports of crude oil, seafood, textiles, 
and footwear, represent the main sources 
of foreign exchange earnings for Vietnam, 
with rice being the primary agricultural ex-
port commodity. The top ten agricultural 
exports in 2003 are shown in Table 3.13. Ag-
ricultural exports other than rice are mainly 
semiprocessed products (shelled coffee, dry 
rubber latex, and shelled groundnut). Pro-
cessed items account for a very small part 
of the total export volume. Its poor technolo-
gies prevent Vietnam from being competitive 
for processed products; for example, there 
are only a few factories, with limited capac-
ity, that polish rice or process tea and coffee 
(Nguyen et al. 1997). The high share of rela-
tively low-grade unprocessed commodities 
Table 3.11 Imports of major agricultural commodities by China, 2003
Rank in
China imports
Rank in
world imports Product
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1 1 Soybeans 20,741,007 5,416,861 261
 2 2 Palm oil 3,324,757 1,443,173 434
 3 1 Cotton lint 870,059 1,162,801 1,336
 4 1 Rubber, natural, dry 1,073,460 1,050,335 978
 5 1 Soya bean oil 1,884,320 1,014,970 539
 6 1 Hides, wet: salted cattle 532,023 711,741 1,338
 7 1 Wool, greasy 116,913 613,264 5,245
 8 1 Fish meal 802,843 518,409 646
 9 1 Crude organic materials 29,233 488,890 16,724
10 6 Chicken meat 565,082 412,121 729
Source: FAO (2006).
Note: Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.
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in total agricultural exports has also con-
tributed to a gap between Vietnamese export 
prices and international prices, although this 
gap has declined with improvements in the 
quality of Vietnamese agricultural exports 
(UNDP 2004). Import values of agricultural 
products have also increased but at a lower 
rate. In 2003 the main imported agricultural 
commodities were soybean cake, wheat, 
milk, palm oil, and cotton (Table 3.14).
Figure 3.5 Share of agricultural crops in total value of Vietnam plant output, 2000
Source: GSO (2000).
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Table 3.12 Production of major agricultural commodities in Vietnam, 2003
Rank in
Vietnam production 
Rank in
world production Producta
Production
(metric tons)
 1  5 Rice, paddy 34,518,600
 2 16 Sugarcane 16,524,900
 3  3 Vegetables, fresh nes 6,326,274
 4 12 Cassava 5,228,500
 5 — Maize 2,933,700
 6  2 Fruit, fresh nes 2,620,000
 7 10 Indigenous pig meat 1,800,295
 8  5 Sweet potatoes 1,592,100
 9 12 Bananas 1,221,300
10  8 Coconuts 920,000
Source: FAO (2006).
Notes: Ranked according to value of production at international commodity prices. —, not ranked.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
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Table 3.13 Exports of major agricultural commodities by Vietnam, 2003
Rank in
Vietnam exports
Rank in
world exports Producta
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1 3 Milled paddy rice 3,813,000 727,000 191
 2 3 Coffee, green 749,200 330,000 440
 3 4 Rubber, natural, dry 345,000 265,000 768
 4 2 Cashew nuts, shelled 83,900 260,000 3,099
 5 1 Pepper 74,100 127,680 1,723
 6 8 Tea 59,800 70,000 1,171
 7 2 Cassava, dried 632,006 52,795 84
 8 6 Groundnuts, shelled 82,700 52,000 629
 9 3 Fruit, fresh nes 96,359 45,781 475
10 — Food, prepared nes 56,579 41,873 740
Source: FAO (2006).
Notes: Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.  —, not ranked.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
Table 3.14 Imports of major agricultural commodities by Vietnam, 2003
Rank in
Vietnam imports
Rank in
world imports Producta
Quantity
(metric tons)
Value
(thousands of $)
Unit value
($)
 1 15 Soya bean cake 990,000 240,000 242
 2 19 Cigarettes 6,706 123,982 18,488
 3 — Wheat 794,257 112,700 142
 4 — Food, prepared nes 18,995 81,149 4,272
 5  6 Tobacco products nes 13,889 77,776 5,600
 6 — Beverages, distilled, alcoholic 3,298 71,047 21,542
 7 19 Dry whole cow milk 39,296 59,664 1,518
 8 — Palm oil 148,500 57,500 387
 9 — Cotton lint 43,745 55,403 1,266
10 18 Dry skim cow milk 29,776 53,299 1,790
Source:  FAO (2006).
Notes:  Ranked according to value of trade at international commodity prices.  —, not ranked.
anes, not elsewhere specified.
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C H A P T E R  4
Agricultural Policy Reforms and 
Recent Policy Settings
There are many similarities in the prereform domestic market and agricultural trade poli-cies in India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, and in the reform paths they have pursued within their agricultural sectors. As in many other developing countries with small-
holder-dominated agricultural sectors and poorly developed market infrastructure and institu-
tions, government interventions were initially pursued, in lieu of reliance on market forces, to 
achieve the twin goals of self-sufficiency and low food prices for consumers. While similarities 
in the countries’ prereform agricultural policies should not be overstated, a few basic patterns 
emerge:
• India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam all pursued a series of closed-economy policies 
and created an autarkic environment for agriculture. Self-sufficiency was believed to be 
essential for the nations’ food security. In Indonesia oil export revenues provided an ad-
ditional basis for supporting agriculture.
• All four countries heavily restricted the market’s role in balancing supply of and demand 
for agricultural products. In India and Indonesia a set of complicated agricultural price, 
procurement, distribution, storage, and subsidy (mainly on inputs) policies was em-
ployed. The initial government interventions in the market in China and Vietnam were 
quite similar to those the Indian government pursued; mistrust of the market, combined 
with communist orthodoxy, resulted in the entire economy being almost fully planned by 
the government.
• In India, China, and Vietnam, agricultural trade policies served as complementary in-
struments to effectively close the economy. Trade in major agricultural products, often 
called strategic commodities, was highly restricted, although exports of some agricul-
tural products were encouraged to earn foreign exchange to cover imports of capital 
equipment and industrial intermediates.
• India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam have utilized many trade policy instruments—such 
as import tariffs, quantitative restrictions, import and export licensing, and marketing 
restrictions—to limit foreign trade in agriculture, and all these policies had to be imple-
mented by the state trading enterprises (STEs), which were extensions of the government 
bureaucratic system. To encourage the development of domestic processing industries, 
export taxes were levied or quotas imposed on primary products.
 The policy reform processes in India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam display a gradual 
transition from an autarkic and state-led setting to a more deregulated market environment with 
greater integration into the world economy and a new and larger role for the private sector. The 
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reform process has not been uniform over 
time or across the countries, and has been 
marked by frequent policy reversals and 
setbacks. These reversals plague the reform 
processes of all four countries, particularly 
their external trade regimes, with intermit-
tent bans and the imposition of license re-
quirements on imports and exports of stra-
tegic commodities depending on domestic 
food availability, prices, and foreign exchange 
concerns. More recently strong growth in 
the nonagricultural economy has motivated 
the governments to offer subsidies to agri-
culture, a practice that was not possible in 
the past. The reforms and recent policy set-
tings in these countries are described in the 
sections that follow. The section on India 
draws heavily on Hoda and Gulati (2007), 
who provide an insightful and comprehen-
sive policy review. We also draw on an ear-
lier draft manuscript of their book. Further 
discussion is provided in the other refer-
ences cited herein and the five background 
papers for this study. 
India
Indian agricultural policy has long been 
characterized by border and domestic inter-
ventions aimed at protecting farmers from 
international price volatility. To achieve this 
goal the government of India (GOI) has im-
plemented myriad policies, including tariffs, 
quantitative import restrictions (QRs), im-
port licensing, domestic marketing controls, 
and export restrictions. These controls have 
been implemented with a view toward bal-
ancing domestic demand and supply, ex-
port potential, and the national balance-of-
payments situation (WTO 2002). Sweeping 
reforms in exchange rate and industrial poli-
cies were adopted after a financial crisis in 
1991, but it was not until later in the decade 
that direct reforms began in agriculture. 
These reforms have to a large extent been a 
consequence of unilateral policy initiatives, 
but WTO commitments have also played 
a role.
Trade Policies
Throughout much of the 1980s, restrictive 
import policies, direct export restrictions, 
and an overvalued exchange rate imparted a 
considerable antitrade bias to the Indian 
economy. The economic reforms introduced 
in 1991 included currency devaluation (dis-
cussed further in Chapter 6) and initiated a 
partial liberalization of India’s trade regime, 
but progress in phasing out QRs on con-
sumer products, including agricultural prod-
ucts, was slow. Only in 1997, after consider-
able improvement in its balance-of-payments 
situation, did India agree to phase out its 
QRs over a nine-year period. Under a dis-
pute settlement ruling by the WTO Appel-
late Body, India had to accelerate the lifting 
of these measures to April 2001.16 India also 
reduced the number of products for which 
trade was controlled by SOEs after 1991 
and modified its tariff structure as part of 
the reform process. This lowered applied 
agricultural tariffs while generally retaining 
the overall structure of high bound rates no-
tified after the WTO Uruguay Round. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows average bound and applied 
tariffs (in 1997) for 46 agricultural commod-
ity groups. Of these, 33 had average bound 
tariffs at or above 100 percent, and 7 had 
average bound tariffs at or above 150 per-
cent. Thus an important feature of India’s 
post–Uruguay Round tariff structure is that 
there is often a wide gap between the bound 
and applied levels. Hoda and Gulati (2007) 
calculate that the average applied tariff rate 
(as of April 1, 2002) was 37 percent com-
pared to a simple average bound tariff rate 
of 115 percent.
 The gap between bound and applied 
rates, as maintained by India, has two key 
implications. First, policymakers have room 
to make their own tariff adjustments as an 
16See Hoda and Gulati (2007) for further discussion of these developments.
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Figure 4.1 WTO URAA bound and applied agricultural tariffs for India, 1997 
Source: USDA-ERS (2004).
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instrument of agricultural policy while re-
maining within their WTO commitments. 
Second, this gap in principle offers the coun-
try considerable flexibility to negotiate for 
more open markets in other countries in ex-
change for reducing its own tariffs bindings 
(Magiera 2003).
 Exports of agricultural goods from India 
have been restricted through controls that 
have included prohibitions, licenses, quotas, 
marketing controls, and minimum export 
prices (MEPs). The quantitative controls on 
exports were often administered through 
trading enterprises in the public and coop-
erative sectors, and they were maintained, 
it was argued, for the sake of domestic food 
security (WTO 2002). Hoda and Gulati 
(2007) describe policies by which “a limited 
number of items, such as wheat and wheat 
products; barley, maize, and other coarse 
cereals and their flours; ghee (butter oil); and 
hydrogenated vegetable oils were allowed 
for export against a limited ceiling.” In ad-
dition, exports of milk powder, butter, and 
certain oilseeds and edible oils were prohib-
ited. Simultaneously, with a view to improv-
ing export competitiveness, the GOI provided 
support for exports through three instru-
ments: cash incentives to manufacturers of 
export-oriented processed foods (eliminated 
after the 1991 economic reforms), subsidi-
zation of freight costs, and income tax ex-
emptions on export earnings (Hoda and 
Gulati 2007).
 India’s agricultural export policies began 
to show signs of change with the opening up 
of exports of rice in 1994. Export policies 
have been progressively liberalized since 
then, but with some reversals. Procedurally 
the Ministry of Commerce, through the Di-
rector General of Foreign Trade, announces 
the imposition or elimination of restrictions 
in order to promote exports while ensuring 
an “adequate” domestic supply of essential 
commodities at “reasonable” prices (WTO 
2002). The policy reforms leading to the 
liberalization of exports included reductions 
in the list of products subject to state trad-
ing, the relaxation of export quotas, the abo-
lition of MEPs, and increased credit avail-
ability for exports (Hoda and Gulati 2007). 
However, the GOI retains the authority to 
reimpose minimum export prices, and sup-
port was provided to promote exports of 
wheat and rice when world prices fell in the 
late 1990s.
Domestic Policies
In India domestic support for agriculture 
has been provided mainly through two 
channels: minimum support price (MSP) 
guarantees for basic staple commodities and 
provision of input subsidies. A complex array 
of other policy instruments has also been 
employed.
 India has achieved only limited progress 
in domestic market liberalization in the agri-
cultural sector since economic reforms were 
launched in 1991. It was only since 2001 
that steps were taken to remove some of its 
numerous marketing restrictions. For exam-
ple, India’s Milk and Milk Products Order 
was reformed in 2002 to eliminate restric-
tions on investments in new processing ca-
pacity (Hoda and Gulati 2007). Among other 
notable developments discussed by Hoda 
and Gulati (2007) are the removal in Febru-
ary 2003 of licensing requirements, stocking 
limits, and movement restrictions on wheat, 
paddy rice, coarse grains, edible oilseeds, 
and edible oils under the Essential Com-
modities Act of 1955.
Price Support Policies. Basic staples in 
India have been subject to MSP guarantees. 
These commodities included in the mid 
1980s paddy rice, wheat, coarse cereals (in-
cluding maize and barley), various pulses 
(gram, moong, urad, tur), various oilseeds, 
sugarcane, cotton, and tobacco (Hoda and 
Gulati 2007). The stated objectives of the 
agricultural price policy are to ensure remu-
nerative prices to farmers, smooth out the 
effects of seasonality, and promote agricul-
tural diversification (GOI 2001b). Never-
theless, the guaranteed prices can be below 
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those prevailing in the market.17 India reports 
its MSP policies as part of the product-
specific AMS in domestic support notifica-
tions to the WTO. In its AMS base period 
and its 1995–97 notifications (still the latest 
available), the product-specific support is 
negative because the MSPs are less than the 
external reference prices for all commodities 
except sugarcane (Table 4.1)18
 For horticultural and other agricultural 
commodities not covered by the MSP, there 
is a Market Intervention Scheme (MIS) of 
somewhat ad hoc support measures. Under 
the MIS, if the price of a commodity falls 
below a specific “economic” level the GOI 
can intervene, at the request of the state gov-
ernments, by purchasing the product at in-
tervention prices that do not exceed the cost 
of production (WTO 2002). Losses incurred 
in implementing the MIS are shared equally 
between the central and state governments. 
Since 1998 the MIS has been used to sup-
port a number of horticultural products, in-
cluding oranges, coriander seed, apples, oil 
palm, potatoes, red chilies, areca nut, ginger, 
and onions (WTO 2002).
Input Subsidies. Key subsidies to farmers 
result from interventions in fertilizers, elec-
trical power, and irrigation. These subsidies 
began to increase in the mid-1980s, and 
they have continued to climb in current and 
constant (real) value (Table 4.2).19 By 2002 
they were being cited as fiscally unsustain-
able and also environmentally harmful (GOI 
2002b). The GOI argued that it was grad-
ually moving toward a more deregulated 
regime while emphasizing the need for in-
vestment in power, irrigation, and rural in-
frastructure. In the budget speech for 2002–
03, for example, the minister of finance 
highlighted, inter alia, an increased alloca-
tion of resources for rural roads, irrigation, 
and credit; electrification of villages; rural 
employment (including through payment 
in the form of food grain); and measures to 
improve diversification of crops.20
 India initially reported input subsidies 
to the WTO under its non-product-specific 
support commitments (Table 4.2). Despite 
high levels of recent expenditures, India’s 
support has been less than the de minimis 
binding for developing countries of 10 per-
cent of total value of agricultural production. 
India’s non-product-specific AMS decreased 
from $5.77 billion in 1995 to $0.93 billion 
in 1997, because of a shift in the accounting 
of input subsidies from non-product-specific 
support to special and differential treatment.21 
India’s green box payments in 1995–97 are 
17Hoda and Gulati (2007) discuss the decisionmaking process of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and 
Prices (CACP). In formulating its recommendations, the CACP considers a number of factors, including input-
output price parity, trends in market prices, demand and supply, intercrop price parity, effects on industrial cost 
structure, effects on general prices, cost of living international market prices, and the terms of trade.
18See Hoda and Gulati (2007) for discussion of calculation of the AMS and recalculation of some of the price 
support.
19In addition to the fertilizer, electrical power, and irrigation interventions, there are a number of other input 
subsidy programs. Preferential agricultural credit provided through concessional interest rates, once a substan-
tial input subsidy, has been progressively phased out. There are also several different kinds of subsidies on 
seeds. In the area of broader rural development, a Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) has a cumula-
tive value from its inception in 1995–96 to January 3, 2003, of Rs 285 billion (GOI 2003). In the budget speech 
for 2002–03, it was announced that assistance to states provided through the RIDF would be linked to reforms 
in the agriculture and rural sectors. Yet at least 60 percent of the RIDF for 2003–04 will be directed toward 
irrigation, flood control, agriculture, and allied activities and power systems (NABARD 2003).
20To encourage capital investments by farmers, the 2002–03 budget also proposes a reduction in import duties 
on agricultural machinery and implements from 25 percent to 15 percent (GOI 2002a, Part A, paragraphs 20–26, 
and Part B, paragraph 143).
21See Hoda and Gulati (2007) for details and further discussion.
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Table 4.1 India’s WTO domestic support notifications, 1995–97 (million$)
Category 1995 1996 1997
Green box payments
 General services 397.6 239.3 264.6
 Public stockholding for food security 1,569.7 1,708.7 2,018.2
 Domestic food aid — — —
 Decoupled income support — — —
 Income insurance and safety net programs 10.9 — —
 Payments for relief from natural disasters 125.0 444.3 443.8
 Structural adjustment through producer retirement programs — — —
 Structural adjustment through resource retirement programs — — —
 Structural adjustment through investment aids 59.2 36.3 76.1
 Environment payments 33.2 73.7 70.2
 Payments under regional assistance programs — — —
 Other — — —
 Total 2,195.6 2,502.3 2,872.9
Special and differential treatment
 Investment subsidies generally available to agriculture 104.8 1,117.3 1,142.5
 Input subsidies to low-income or resource-poor producers 149.5 3,737.8 4,029.3
 Total 254.3 4,855.1 5,171.8
Product-specific AMS
 Rice –7,577.0 –1,321.3 –1,479.9
 Wheat –9,625.0 –1,280.8 –1,266.4
 Coarse cereals –4,530.4 –1.5 –2.9
 Pulses –1,705.8 — —
 Groundnut –1,809.3 — —
 Rapeseed and mustard –1,688.7 — —
 Cotton –2,106.4 — —
 Soya bean –191.7 — —
 Tobacco –181.4 — —
 Jute –387.6 — —
 Sugarcane 184.4 — —
 Total –29,618.9 –2,603.6 –2,749.2
Non-product-specific AMS
 Fertilizer subsidy 1,864.1 413.6 515.9
 Credit subsidy 102.0 — —
 Subsidy on electricity 2,436.6 373.6 342.5
 Irrigation subsidy 1,345.4 143.1 144.9
 Subsidy on average supply of seeds 23.9 0.1 0.1
 Total 5,772.1 930.3 1,003.5
 As percentage of value of production 7.5% 1.1% 1.2%
Value of agricultural production 76,736.0 85,280.0 84,972.0
Source:  WTO notifications.
Note: —, no expenditure.
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dominated by expenditures on public stock-
holding for food security and totaled $2,872.9 
million in 1997.
Fertilizer. A retention price system for fer-
tilizers was introduced in 1977 to insulate 
farmers from rising prices and to ensure the 
availability of fertilizers. The difference be-
tween the “retention price” (the normal cost 
of production, including a 12 percent after-
tax return on investment) and the “notified 
sales price” (minus a distribution margin) 
was paid to manufacturers based on specific 
plants. A subsidy was also paid to cover the 
cost of transportation to the farming areas 
where fertilizer utilization is heaviest. Since 
there is a uniform issue (sales) price for 
domestic and imported fertilizers, the gov-
ernment also bore the net cost between the 
delivery cost of imported fertilizers and the 
price paid by farmers (GOI 2002b).
 Nitrogenous (urea), phosphatic, and po-
tassic fertilizers were included under the 
initial price control subsidy program, but 
phosphatic and potassic fertilizers were 
decontrolled in 1992. Their prices rose dra-
matically, leading to a decline in usage. As 
a result the central government has contin-
ued to provide a subsidy for decontrolled 
phosphatic and potassic fertilizers (GOI 
2002b). The total fertilizer subsidy in 2002–
03 was estimated at Rs 112 billion, equal to 
about 3.8 percent of agricultural GDP (GOI 
2003). Budgetary provision for the conces-
Table 4.2 Estimated input subsidies in India, 1980/81–2002/03 (billion Rs) 
Total
Years Fertilizer Power Irrigation At current prices At 2000–01 prices
1980/81 — 3.68 4.12 7.8 43.9
1981/82 2.33 4.47 4.58 11.4 58.2
1982/83 0.82 5.83 5.42 12.1 57.4
1983/84 2.15 7.67 6.32 16.1 70.8
1984/85 12.12 9.97 7.25 29.3 119.7
1985/86 14.22 13.04 7.44 34.7 131.7
1986/87 –0.72 17.06 10.78 27.1 96.6
1987/88 5.27 25.35 19.72 50.3 165.2
1988/89 18.97 30.07 23.54 72.6 187.8
1989/90 28.58 35.94 23.09 87.6 208.4
1990/91 45.58 46.21 25.71 117.5 253.0
1991/92 35.07 58.84 28.68 122.6 231.9
1992/93 32.61 73.44 32.88 138.9 241.7
1993/94 33.52 89.57 34.41 157.5 250.1
1994/95 78.89 112.00 39.54 230.4 334.3
1995/96 96.94 138.38 44.12 279.4 371.8
1996/97 96.32 155.85 44.39 296.6 367.3
1997/98 81.59 190.21 46.56 318.4 369.6
1998/99 83.14 224.96 49.37 357.5 384.5
1999/2000 62.07 262.71 52.18 377.0 390.1
2000/01 72.61 288.14 54.95 415.7 415.7
2001/02 67.34 319.79 57.76 444.9 428.3
2002/03 69.97 356.75 60.56 487.3 453.4
Source: Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for 1980/81–2000/01. Later years are authors’ trend projections. 
Note: —, not available.
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sion scheme for decontrolled fertilizer had 
increased significantly, and for 2002–03 it 
was Rs 42 billion.22
 While the budgetary expenditure on fer-
tilizer subsidies is large, a portion of the 
subsidy supports an inefficient fertilizer in-
dustry, rather than providing farmers with 
low-cost inputs. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
calculate the implicit fertilizer subsidy ac-
cruing to farmers via an import parity price 
method. The price farmers would have to 
pay for imported fertilizer assuming free 
trade is estimated based on the c.i.f. price 
plus internal marketing and transportation 
costs. Comparing this price with the price 
that farmers actually pay gives an estimate 
of the implicit subsidy. Table 4.3 shows the 
actual budgetary outlays and the share of 
fertilizer subsidies to farmers estimated by 
Gulati and Narayanan (2003). Overall the 
average portion of the subsidy accruing to 
farmers over the period 1981/82–2002/03 is 
nearly 70 percent.
Electrical Power. Underpricing of power 
to agricultural users is estimated to provide 
the largest input subsidy to the sector (Table 
4.2). In most states, power to agriculture is 
offered at a very low price, and in a few 
cases it is free. Industrial and commercial 
power consumers, in contrast, pay prices 
that exceed the unit cost of supply to com-
pensate for the losses on agricultural power 
supply (Gulati and Narayanan 2003).
 Because agricultural power consump-
tion is not metered and is determined on a 
22The GOI subsequently committed to undertake modest reforms in urea pricing policy. A multistage, group-
wise concession scheme was to be established in place of the plant-specific RPS (GOI 2003). 
Table 4.3 Farmers’ share of fertilizer subsidies in India, 1981/82–2002/03 
Years
Import parity measure of subsidy
(billion Rs)
Budgetary subsidy
(billion Rs)
Farmers’ share of budgetary subsidy
(%)
1981/82 2.33 3.75 62.27
1982/83 0.82 6.05 13.48
1983/84 2.15 10.42 20.66
1984/85 12.12 19.27 62.91
1985/86 14.22 19.24 73.89
1986/87 –0.72 18.97 –3.81
1987/88 5.27 21.64 24.37
1988/89 18.97 32.50 58.37
1989/90 28.58 45.42 62.93
1990/91 45.58 43.89 103.86
1991/92 35.07 48.00 73.05
1992/93 32.61 57.96 56.27
1993/94 33.52 44.00 76.19
1994/95 78.89 52.41 150.52
1995/96 96.94 67.35 143.93
1996/97 96.32 75.78 127.10
1997/98 81.59 99.18 82.26
1998/99 83.14 115.96 71.70
1999/2000 62.07 132.44 46.87
2000/01 72.61
2001/02 67.34
2002/03 69.97   
Source: Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for 1981/82–2000/01. Later years are authors’ trend projections. 
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residual basis, power to agricultural users 
can be siphoned off to other uses. Gulati and 
Narayanan (2003) emphasize that agricul-
tural power consumption is overstated by as 
much as 40 percent in some cases. As with 
fertilizer subsidies, a portion of the budget-
ary subsidy for electricity supports the inef-
ficient supplier, in this case the state elec-
tricity boards. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
estimate the per-unit subsidy on power going 
to the agricultural sector as the difference 
between the cost of supplying electricity 
to all sectors and the tariff charged to the 
agricultural sector. Using this approach, and 
with the caveats that agricultural use may 
be overstated and electricity suppliers in-
efficient, they find that the estimated sub-
sidy in 2000/01 was Rs 288.1 billion, nearly 
19 times greater at constant prices than in 
1980/81.
Irrigation. Irrigation subsidies, charged 
against states’ budgets, remain a mainstay of 
Indian agricultural input subsidies despite 
repeated attempts at reform. In most states, 
the pricing of canal water does not cover 
more than 20 percent of the operation and 
maintenance costs, nor does it recover cap-
ital costs. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
compare several methods for calculating ir-
rigation subsidies (Table 4.4). The first is 
the GOI’s method, drawn from the National 
Accounts Statistics and used to estimate 
India’s irrigation subsidy in its domestic 
support notification submitted to the WTO. 
It is calculated as the difference between the 
cost of supplying water for irrigation and the 
revenue received as payment from irrigation 
water users. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
propose instead to follow suggestions by the 
Vaidyanathan Committee (GOI 1992) that 
Table 4.4 Comparison of estimates of irrigation subsidies in India, 
1980/81–2002/03 (million Rs)
Years
Government
estimates
Vaidyanathan
Committee method
Operations and
maintenance method
1980/81 5,810 4,121 2,744
1981/82 6,360 4,578 2,996
1982/83 7,420 5,424 3,589
1983/84 7,930 6,320 4,173
1984/85 10,800 7,255 4,724
1985/86 11,440 7,440 4,656
1986/87 15,200 10,779 7,682
1987/88 16,280 19,715 16,234
1988/89 22,300 23,544 19,588
1989/90 24,390 23,088 18,547
1990/91 24,680 25,713 20,828
1991/92 31,470 28,681 23,429
1992/93 34,890 32,876 27,220
1993/94 39,490 34,414 28,296
1994/95 45,790 39,542 32,889
1995/96 53,990 44,118 36,894
1996/97 62,750 44,394 36,290
1997/98 70,940 46,557 38,692
1998/99 49,367 41,093
1999/2000  52,177 43,495
2000/01 54,954
2001/02 57,758
2002/03  60,563  
Source: Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for 1980/81–1999/2000. Later years are authors’ calculations. 
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pricing of canal water should cover opera-
tion and maintenance expenses plus 1 per-
cent of cumulative capital expenditures.
Indonesia
Indonesia is an oil-exporting country, and 
the direction of its economic and develop-
ment policies, including its agricultural sup-
port and trade policies, often follows the 
significant exogenous shocks to international 
petroleum prices (Hill 2000).23 A period of 
significant growth is attributed to the two 
oil price booms in the 1970s (1971–74 and 
1978–80). The early 1980s marked a de-
cline in GDP growth, as oil prices fell. Thus 
Bautista et al. (1997) refer to the mid-1980s 
as a watershed in economic policymaking 
in Indonesia. From 1985 to 1998, Indonesia 
initiated a series of domestic and trade re-
forms emanating from a combination of uni-
lateral undertakings, the country’s commit-
ments to the WTO, and the government’s 
agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) following the financial crisis 
(APEC 2002; Magiera 2003).
Trade Policies
Agricultural trade in Indonesia has been 
heavily regulated by tariffs, import licenses, 
export taxes and bans, and informal export 
quotas. To encourage industrial production, 
export taxes were levied on primary products 
that provide inputs to the domestic process-
ing sector. Processed agricultural products 
were subjected to import restrictions (Bau-
tista et al. 1997). Reforms undertaken in the 
mid-1980s reduced the number of tariff rates, 
lowered the tariff ceiling, and raised the 
number of import items with very low tariffs. 
In spite of these reforms, products corre-
sponding to 54 percent of domestic agricul-
tural production remained on the Restricted 
Goods List. Import monopolies for most of 
these commodities were under the control 
of BULOG and other STEs (Bautista et al. 
1997). Three categories of commodities were 
subject to export controls: certain items were 
banned, others were controlled by the De-
partment of Trade, and some were restricted 
to licensed exporters. The majority of these 
items originated in the agricultural sector; 
they included rice, soybean flour, and vege-
table oils (Piggot et al. 1993).
 Although agriculture was mostly left out 
of the trade reforms of the 1980s, further 
reforms in 1991 reduced the share of agri-
cultural products under import licensing re-
striction to 30 percent (Bautista et al. 1997). 
Key measures are summarized in Table 4.5. 
Commitments under the 1995 URAA were 
not very constraining on Indonesia’s trade 
policies because the country had unilaterally 
committed to a tariff reduction schedule 
(the Pakmei schedule, 1995–2003), which 
reduced the average tariffs below its WTO 
tariff bindings (Table 4.6; Magiera 2003).
 The 1998 agreement with the IMF fol-
lowing the financial crisis put further pres-
sure on Indonesia to reduce its applied tar-
iffs on agriculture: all food tariffs were to 
be reduced to 5 percent and nonfood agri-
cultural tariffs to a maximum of 10 percent 
by 2003 (Magiera 2003). On this basis, the 
average applied import tariff for agriculture 
was 8.3 percent in 2002 (Table 4.7). By the 
end of 1998, Indonesia had also agreed to 
liberalize rice trade to include private trad-
ers, removing BULOG’s monopoly (Wailes 
2003). But with the end of the IMF program 
in 2003 the trend toward protectionist and 
other interventionist measures in agriculture 
reemerged (Ray 2003; Wailes 2003). As in 
India, there is considerable room for tariff 
increases by Indonesia within its WTO bind-
ing commitments.
 Indonesia notified the WTO of TRQs for 
rice and milk and cream fats and products. 
Yet, after the implementation of the WTO 
agreements, Indonesia’s imports of these 
23In the 1980s crude oil and petroleum products contributed about two-thirds of total exports, a fourth of GNP, 
and 70 percent of government revenue (Bautista et al. 1997).
46   CHAPTER 4
products exceeded the quotas and applied 
tariff rates were lower than the in-quota 
bound rates. TRQs for milk and cream were 
abolished in 1998. The current tariff for 
these products is 5 percent with no quota.
 The 1990s trade reforms also relaxed 
export controls, which had been used exten-
sively in Indonesia, especially affecting non-
food products. Under the 1998 IMF agree-
ment, Indonesia agreed to eliminate export 
restrictions but maintained its export taxes 
on palm oil, crude palm oil, and their deriv-
ative products; wood; and rattan. Indonesia 
also continues to regulate exports of certain 
Table 4.5 Indonesia pre- and postcrisis (1997–98) international trade and agriculture policies: Commitments 
and reforms
International trade commitments
 Tariff measures (Pakmei 
  schedule and IMF)
Import tariffs of <20% in 1995 reduced to a maximum of 5% in 2000.
Import tariffs of >20% in 1995 reduced to a maximum of 20% in 1998 and to a maximum of 10% 
in 2003.
 Nontariff measures Elimination of restrictions on import licenses:
 Dairy products switched from approved importers (IT) to general importer (IU).
 Cloves switched from the regulation of the Cloves Marketing Agency (BPPC) to IU.
 Importation of sugar and rice, previously imported only by producer-importers, is liberalized.
 Antidumping measures To date Indonesia has investigated 20 cases and has imposed antidumping duties on 7 nonagriculture 
products but none on agricultural products.
 WTO special safeguard measures To date no special safeguard measures have been imposed.
 State trading enterprises  Government of Indonesia notified WTO that both BULOG and BPPC operate as state trading 
 enterprises (STEs).
Reforms following the 1997–98 financial crisis
 Trade September 1998: BULOG import monopoly on rice, sugar, wheat, and wheat flour abolished.
Soybeans:
 1998: Abolition of tariff.
Rice:
 September 1998–December 1999: Import tariff set at 0%.
 January 2000 to present: Specific duty of Rp 430/kg applied to imports (25–30% tariff 
 equivalent).
 May 2002: Import licenses (NPIK) given to private traders.
 January 2004: Ban on rice imports imposed until June 2004 but later extended.
Palm oil:
 1998: Ban on exports of crude palm oil (and its products) followed by export tax rates ranging 
 from 40 to 60 percent. Export tax rate reduced to 10 percent by 1999 and to 3 percent by 2003.
Sugar:
 2000: Import licensing replaced by a 20 percent tariff for raw sugar and a 25 percent tariff for 
 refined sugar.
 2002: Import ad valorum tariffs replaced by specific import duties of Rp 550/kg for raw sugar 
 and Rp 700/kg for white sugar.
Export quotas on coffee and rubber continue to be used.
 Domestic Fertilizer subsidies removed in December 1998 but reinstated in 2003.
Rice:
 Market price support for rice provided through BULOG: It sets the criteria and announces the 
   rice procurement to the public. It buys paddy or rice from farmers or traders on a first come, 
first served basis.
 August 1998–December 2001: GOI replaced its general consumer rice price stabilization through 
 market interventions with a targeted rice distribution program to poor households, called OPK 
 Beras until a change in name to RASKIN in 2002.a
Sources: Casson (2000), Magiera (2003), WTO (2003).
aOPK stands for special market operations; RASKIN stands for rice for the poor.
AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS AND RECENT POLICY SETTINGS   47
commodities (manioc, coffee and its extracts, 
rubber, veneer and plywood, and teak wood), 
using a combination of voluntary export and 
supply management arrangements aimed at 
reducing world supply in order to strengthen 
prices. Voluntary export quotas for coffee 
and rubber were terminated in 2002 (WTO 
2003).
 Starting in 2002 Indonesia, along with 
the other five original members of the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
implemented the final phase of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Indonesia 
has reduced tariffs for all products included 
in its original commitment (7,206 tariff lines) 
to 5 percent or less for products of at least 
65 percent ASEAN origin. Indonesia main-
tains rice and sugar on a list of sensitive 
products that are exempted from tariff re-
ductions (Economic Intelligence Unit 2003; 
USTR 2004).
Domestic Policies
As in other developing countries, during the 
1980s and early 1990s Indonesian policies 
were aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in 
food crops, especially rice. The rice crop is 
grown mostly by small-scale subsistence 
farmers and accounts for 65 percent of the 
country’s harvested area (Bahri, Kustiari, 
and Wittwer 2000). Nearly 80 percent of the 
rice is grown on irrigated lands, making this 
crop the heaviest aggregate user of water 
(Barichello 2003).
 The Indonesian government has com-
bined price interventions and economic in-
centives through subsidized inputs, substan-
tial investment in irrigation, and marketing 
activities in the outer islands to encourage 
agricultural production of staple crops (Pig-
got et al. 1993; Bautista et al. 1997; WTO 
1998). Until 1998 a “nucleus estate” pro-
gram was aimed at integrating smallholders 
into large plantation production. These pro-
grams promoted high-yield varieties together 
with subsidized inputs and credit, and they 
offered farmers technical assistance with 
new cultivation techniques (Fuglie 2001).
 Since the 1970s, fertilizer subsidies in 
Indonesia, used only for urea, have been 
 intended primarily to assist rice and sugar 
farmers. Subsidized fertilizer was provided 
mostly to smallholder farmers; large estate 
users were not targeted. The subsidies 
Table 4.6 Indonesia’s WTO bound 
tariff rates for selected agricultural 
commodities, 1994 and 2004 (percent)
Product 1994 2004
Cloves  75  60
Dairy products 50–238 40–210
Soybean meal  45  40
Garlic  60 40–50
Wheat  30  27
Wheat flour  30  27
Rice 180 160
Sugar 110  95
Soybeans  30  27
Alcoholic beverages 170 150
Source: Magiera (2003).
Table 4.7 Indonesia’s tariff structure, 1998 and 2002 (percent)
Product
Simple average
applied rate
Simple average 
bound rate
1998 2002 1998
Total  9.5  7.2 37.6
Agricultural products (harmonized system classification)  8.6  8.3 47.3
Industrial products (HS classification)  9.7  7.0 35.9
Textiles and clothing 14.6 10.5 29.3
Source: WTO (2003).
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contributed to an increase in fertilizer usage 
from 676,000 tons in 1975 to 4,290,000 tons 
in 1998. But they have imposed a heavy fis-
cal burden on the government, estimated at 
40 percent of the agriculture and irrigation 
development budget (Fuglie 2001) at a cost 
of Rp 2,257 billion in 1997/98 (ADB/
SEARCA/IFPRI/CRESCENT 2004).
 By the late 1990s the fertilizer subsidy 
policy was in flux. The subsidies were elimi-
nated in 1997, reintroduced for food crops 
the same year, and removed again in De-
cember 1998. In 2001 the direct subsidy for 
fertilizer was replaced with a requirement 
that the state-owned petroleum company pro-
vide subsidized gas to the state-owned urea 
fertilizer manufacturers. The gas subsidy 
was eliminated in 2002. In 2003 the direct 
subsidy was reintroduced and applied to 
specific fertilizers. The subsidy was paid to 
the state-owned fertilizer manufacturers, with 
the goal of reducing the urea price to small-
scale rice farmers (as well as horticulture) 
by 15–20 percent (ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/
CRESCENT 2004). Because the subsidies 
did not apply to imported fertilizer and were 
targeted only at small farmers, they created 
a dual pricing structure and opportunities 
for abuse and leakage.
 The relative size of fertilizer and irriga-
tion subsidies has changed over the period 
1985–2002. While in the mid-1980s fer-
tilizer subsidies accounted for nearly two-
thirds of total fertilizer and irrigation 
subsidies, in the 1990s their relative share 
dropped to below 10 percent. Irrigation 
subsidies have been increasing in absolute 
and relative terms, particularly during the 
mid-1990s (Fuglie and Piggot 2003).
 In addition to fertilizer and irrigation 
subsidies, farmers have increasingly bene-
fited from subsidized credit: the coverage of 
crops eligible has increased, as has the ceil-
ing on allocated credit funds. The interest 
rate for farm credit in 1999, 10.5 percent, 
was much lower than market rates, which 
were around 30 percent (Bahri, Kustiari, 
and Wittwer 2000).
 Under conditions set by the IMF, the 
government agreed to structural reforms in 
1998, including restructuring or privatizing 
key SOEs. The government ended BULOG’s 
monopoly on trade and replaced its program 
of general consumer rice price stabilization 
through market interventions with a rice 
distribution program targeted at poor house-
holds (Daly and Fane 2002).
 Because Indonesia did not commit to an 
AMS for agriculture, the developing-country 
commodity-specific and non-commodity-
specific de minimis limits (10 percent of the 
value of production) apply (Magiera 2003). 
However, the Indonesian government has 
notified the WTO of support provided 
through various development programs pri-
marily as green box measures, which are 
exempt from reduction commitments (Fig-
ure 4.2). Measures classified under general 
services constitute more than half of Indo-
nesia’s total green box expenditures. Fol-
lowing the 1997–98 financial crisis, the 
second largest program, nearly a third of 
total support in 2000, was domestic food 
aid. Public stockholding for food security 
increased in 1998 and 1999, also during the 
crisis, but again declined in 2000 to pre-
crisis levels.24 The composition of general 
service expenditures also changed in 2000. 
Total expenditures decreased by 40 percent, 
due mainly to the elimination of expendi-
tures on estate crop development programs. 
Expenditures on agricultural research also 
declined by 40 percent, but expenditures 
on development programs for livestock 
and agribusiness have doubled and tripled, 
respectively.
24These measures include buffer stocks to cover minimum consumption requirements and operational stocks for 
budget group allocation and price stabilization. Budget group allocation is the distribution of rice to military 
personnel and civil servants.
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China
Agricultural policies in China may be di-
vided into two distinct periods since the 
country was founded in 1949. From 1949 to 
1978, agricultural polices were set within 
the Soviet-style centralized command and 
control system. They were affected by a se-
ries of political and ideological campaigns, 
five-year plans, and various ad hoc mea-
sures. Economic reforms initiated in 1978 
brought rapid economic growth, and the 
agricultural sector witnessed major changes 
in policies that gradually shifted from cen-
tral planning to greater reliance on market 
mechanisms. China developed a dual-track 
system of a “socialist market economy” with 
an increasing role for markets and individ-
ual households in the agricultural sector. 
State controls through procurement, distri-
bution, and fixed prices still existed but were 
restricted to only a few core commodities. 
The liberalization process has also featured 
major changes in agricultural trade policies. 
The highly monopolized foreign trade sys-
tem was gradually decentralized, and direct 
trade planning has been replaced by indirect 
trade policy instruments. Trade and domes-
tic agricultural policy reforms under China’s 
WTO accession in 2001 included lowering 
of tariff and nontariff trade barriers, elimi-
nating agricultural export subsidies, and 
capping trade-distorting domestic support. 
Subsequent domestic agricultural policy re-
forms in China focused on direct subsidies 
to farmers, elimination of agricultural taxes, 
large public investments, and development 
of rural financial institutions.
Trade Policies
China’s foreign trade policy reforms have 
involved four key steps: lowering trade bar-
riers, depreciating the exchange rate, decen-
tralizing the trading system, and introducing 
competition into foreign trade so that prices 
can play a role in determining resource al-
location (Martin 2003). China’s agricultural 
trade policies—as part of an agricultural 
policy stance intended to maintain self-
sufficiency in agricultural supply, especially 
in food grain production—have moved more 
slowly in removing restrictions and reduc-
ing protection.
Figure 4.2 General services expenditures in Indonesia, 1995–2000
Source: Data from WTO notifications, various years.
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 The early foreign trade reforms were 
mainly the result of reforms in the domestic 
economy, and hence they also adopted the 
dual-track approach (Martin 2003). Under 
the dual-track pricing system for commodi-
ties, the planned prices continued to operate 
for the quantity of the commodity that pro-
ducers were contracted to supply to SOEs. 
However, producers were allowed to supply 
additional output at a market price. For the 
external sectors, the dual-track approach 
included dual export and import systems, a 
two-tier exchange rate system, and a two-
tier system for foreign exchange retention.
 Under the dual export system, prior to 
reforms in 1984, about 60 percent of exports 
were under the mandatory plan put forth by 
the central government, an additional 20 per-
cent were assigned as value targets to the 
provinces, and the remaining 20 percent were 
nonplan exports. For the mandatory exports, 
the procurement prices were fixed and tar-
get quantities were assigned to the produc-
ing enterprises, similar to the domestic trad-
ing system. For the nonmandatory exports, 
procurement prices faced by decentralized 
foreign trade corporations (FTCs) were much 
more flexible, but they were still not fully 
linked with international prices. Analogous 
policies were applied to imports. The sys-
tem under which the FTCs acted as agents 
of the production enterprises was even more 
prevalent for imports than for exports.
 For agricultural exports, the commodi-
ties in the mandatory categories were those 
that had production quotas, such as grains, 
oil crops, cotton, and other major industrial 
material crops. Various vegetables and fruits 
and other small crops were the first group of 
commodities that could be freely exported 
through the FTCs, a change that signifi-
cantly increased trade in these products.
 The dual-track exchange rate was uni-
fied in January 1994, resulting in a depreci-
ation of the official exchange rate of about 
50 percent. The unification of the exchange 
rate further stimulated China’s exports, as 
prices faced by producers increased in terms 
of the domestic currency. Exchange rate mis-
alignment for China is discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 6.
 Under the dual-track trade regime, be-
cause of distorted domestic pricing, export 
subsidies were common (Huang et al. 2003). 
Since the early 1990s China has progres-
sively taken measures to reduce these sub-
sidies. Initially the country fixed its export 
subsidization for 1988–90 at about 4 per-
cent of the total export value in 1987 (Huang 
et al. 2003). In 1991 it began to phase out 
export subsidies to FTCs. Nevertheless in the 
late 1990s China, like India, provided ex-
port subsidies for a number of commodities, 
including corn, rice, and cotton, as a means 
of easing the downward pressure on domes-
tic prices brought about by large production 
surpluses. China’s corn and cotton exports 
are estimated to have received subsidies on 
the order of 34 percent and 10 percent, re-
spectively, in 2001 (Huang and Rozelle 
2002). In addition China’s value-added tax 
(VAT), introduced in the mid-1990s, is rec-
ognized to have affected agricultural imports 
and exports, but such taxes are allowed under 
WTO rules.
 In its WTO accession protocol, China 
has promised to eliminate export subsidies 
for all agricultural products. However, the 
national government has since implemented 
a transportation subsidy that may benefit 
exporters. Rail shipments of grains, cotton, 
and soybeans were exempted from payment 
of the railway construction fee from April 
2002 through December 2005. While this 
measure did not specifically apply to prod-
ucts destined for export, it provided an in-
centive to export from the northeastern 
provinces. The reduction in the railway 
construction fee resulted in a substantial 
lowering of domestic freight costs for these 
commodities.
Import Tariffs and Quotas. In 1991 Chi-
na’s average tariff rate was 47.2 percent, one 
of the highest average protection rates in 
the world (Huang et al. 2003). During the 
1990s, prior to its accession to the WTO, 
China gradually reduced its import tariff 
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rates. In April 1996 it reduced its tariff rates 
for more than 4,900 items, lowering the 
simple average tariff rate from 35.9 percent 
to 23 percent. In October 1997 China further 
reduced the import tariff rates for more than 
4,800 items and brought down its simple 
average tariff rate to 17 percent. The tariff 
rate for agricultural products followed this 
downward trend, though at a slower pace. In 
2000 China’s average agricultural import 
tariff rates by commodity groups were 21 
percent for live animals and animal prod-
ucts; 7 percent for grains; 17 percent for fats 
and oils; 29 percent for processed foods, 
beverages, and tobacco products; and 27 
percent for textiles and other processed 
agricultural products (Colby, Diao, and Tuan 
2001).
 In WTO accession commitments reached 
in bilateral negotiations with the United 
States, China agreed to substantially cut 
import tariffs for fruits, alcoholic drinks, 
meat, dairy products, and other agricultural 
commodities (USDA-ERS 2005). The aver-
age tariff rate for all agricultural commod-
ities was reduced from 31 percent in 2000 to 
17 percent in 2004. For over 80 agricultural 
products of special interest to the United 
States, the average tariff was lowered from 
31 percent to 14 percent. For some major 
agricultural products, including meat, fruit, 
and dairy products, the tariff cuts are even 
greater (Table 4.8).
 Import quota and licensing measures 
have also been used by China to control do-
mestic prices and the marketing and distri-
bution of agricultural commodities, espe-
cially grains and edible oils (Colby, Diao, 
and Tuan 2001). In general the process for 
determining and allocating import quotas 
and licenses was not transparent. The Na-
tional Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC) was responsible for recom-
mending a quota amount, with its allocation 
to individual provinces determined through 
an unofficial negotiation process between the 
central and provincial governments. After a 
similar negotiation between provincial and 
local governments, the quota was finally al-
located to firms holding import licenses. 
Trade was conducted on behalf of the quota-
holders by STEs. In most cases quota-holder 
firms had no latitude to import directly from 
abroad, to choose their trading partners, or 
to specify the type or characteristics of an 
imported commodity.
 The central government adopted a more 
open system for domestic firms to engage 
in foreign trade in July 2001, immediately 
preceding China’s WTO accession. In April 
2004 China’s Foreign Trade Law was 
amended to further liberalize its strict trad-
ing system. As of July 2004 all Chinese 
domestic enterprises were given the right 
to engage in foreign trade, provided they 
met minimal incorporation, capital, and tax 
criteria.
 Under WTO accession, China also agreed 
to replace its past quota and licensing sys-
tem for basic agricultural products with a 
TRQ regime. Wheat, rice, maize, edible oils, 
sugar, cotton, and wool have in-quota tariff 
rates ranging from 1 percent for grains and 
fibers to 9 percent for vegetable oils to 20 
percent for sugar. The quota volumes were 
set to grow over the period 2002–04 at an-
nual rates ranging from 5 to 19 percent, but 
the over-quota tariffs are prohibitively high, 
remaining at 65 percent for most commod-
ities in 2004 (Table 4.9).
 Despite the liberalization of the import 
regime in the 1990s, there were two broad 
Table 4.8 Selected agricultural tariff 
cuts for China, 2000 and 2004 (percent)
Product 2000 2004
Beef 45 12
Pork 20 12
Poultry 20 10
Citrus 40 12
Grapes 40 13
Apples 30 10
Almonds 30 10
Wine 65 20
Cheese 50 12
Ice cream 45 19
Source: USDA-ERS (2005).
52   CHAPTER 4
groups of commodities for which the num-
ber of firms entitled to engage in trade re-
mained tightly restricted (Martin 2003). One 
of these groups is subject to state trading, 
while the other is subject to designated trad-
ing. The state trading system applies to a 
relatively small number of commodities that 
are asserted to be of particular importance 
for national economic development; the sys-
tem of designated trading applies to a se-
lected range of other commodities (Table 
4.10). State trading and designated trading 
as a share of total trade has fallen substan-
tially since the mid-1990s, with most of the 
imports in 1999 and 2000 consisting of oil in 
the case of state trading and ferrous metals 
in the case of designated trading (Martin 
2003).
 China’s STEs create a layer of economi-
cally inefficient government control (Colby, 
Diao, and Tuan 2001). Yet privileged knowl-
edge of China’s import quotas and monopo-
list position in conducting trade often allows 
state trading companies to extract large 
profits from their international operations. 
State trading is allowed under the WTO, but 
in its accession negotiations China commit-
ted to phase out its STEs (except for those 
trading in tobacco). China’s TRQ system 
stipulates that a predetermined share of the 
within-quota imports be reserved for private 
companies. The share is fixed for some com-
modities but rises in equal increments for 
other commodities over the implementation 
period (Table 4.9). The private-sector provi-
sions for TRQs are geared toward creating 
competition among importers in China and 
incentives for state trading companies to be 
responsive to domestic demand and the needs 
of end users.
 Overall the adjustments in China’s trade 
policy have contributed to a shift in its agri-
cultural trade in a direction consistent with 
its comparative advantages, as described in 
Chapter 3. Huang and Rozelle (2002) cal-
culate that the proportion of grain exports 
fell to 20 percent of total agricultural ex-
ports in the 1990s, from more than 40 per-
cent in the 1980s. Horticultural, animal, and 
aquatic products accounted for more than 
80 percent of agricultural exports in the late 
1990s. By regrouping trade data according 
to factor intensity in production, Huang and 
Rozelle (2002) find that China’s net exports 
of land-intensive bulk commodities, such 
as grains, oilseeds, and sugar crops, have 
fallen, while exports of high-value and more 
labor-intensive commodities have risen.
Domestic Policies
During the prereform era, China’s social-
ized agricultural sector was characterized by 
large-scale production units in which farm-
ers were organized on collectivized land or 
communes. Agriculture was squeezed dur-
ing the early stages of industrialization, with 
Table 4.9 China’s TRQ system for selected commodities, 2002 and 2004
Commodity
Quota amount
(millions of tons)
In-quota tariff
(%)
Over-quota tariff
(%)
Private share
(%)
2002 2004 2002 2004 2002 2004
Wheat 8.45 9.30  1 71 65 10 10
Corn 5.70 7.20  1 71 65 25 40
Rice 3.76 5.30  1 71 65 50 50
Cotton 0.82 0.89  1 54 40 67 67
Vegetable oila 5.69 7.31  9 75 25 60 90
Sugar 1.76 1.94 20 70 65 50 90
Source: Hsu and Gale 2001. 
aThe final year of implementation for vegetable oil is 2005. For 2006 the TRQ is eliminated, converting to 100 
percent private trade with a tariff rate of 9 percent.
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gross fiscal contributions to the sector more 
than outweighed by implicit taxation in the 
form of depressed prices for farm products, 
neglect of public infrastructure in rural rela-
tive to urban areas, and capital outflows via 
the financial system (Huang and Ma 1998). 
Reforms of China’s domestic agricultural 
policy began in the late 1970s with the in-
troduction of family farming, followed by 
gradual liberalization of prices and markets. 
A quarter century of agricultural policy re-
forms in China has reshaped the agricul-
tural sector, increasing the real income of 
those in rural areas, expanding agricultural 
output, and improving the quality and vari-
ety of available food (Johnson 2003).
Land Reform. Domestic agricultural pol-
icy reform in 1981 established the now well-
known Household Responsibility System 
(HRS), which granted production decision-
making power to farm households and al-
lowed them to sell surplus crops at market 
prices after they had fulfilled their obliga-
tions under the state order system. The HRS 
generated incentives for production by giv-
ing farmers land use rights and decision-
making authority, and by linking rewards 
closely with their effort and performance. 
As a result, China’s agriculture dramatically 
revived. Production of grain, the country’s 
most important agricultural product, reached 
407 million tons in 1984, representing a net 
increase of more than 100 million tons 
within only six years.
 Despite its success in transforming Chi-
nese agriculture, the HRS has some limita-
tions in the context of future Chinese devel-
opment (Chen, Wang, and Davis 1999). Tiny, 
fragmented farming units emerged as farm-
land was distributed to individual house-
holds. An early survey indicated that, among 
7,983 sample villages from 29 provinces, 
the average cultivated area per household in 
1986 was only 0.466 hectare (7 mu), frag-
mented into 5.85 plots, each plot consisting 
on average of 0.08 hectare (1.2 mu) (Min-
istry of Agriculture of China 1993). This 
fragmented structure of private farming has 
remained largely unchanged, limiting the 
possibilities for adopting more advanced 
mechanical equipment and agricultural in-
frastructure. Land market transactions are 
minimal, even though the HRS extended to 
farm households the right to rent their land 
to other households. The central government 
continues to realize the need to rationalize 
farms and achieve the benefits of scale 
farming, but land rental transactions have 
been constrained by remaining ambiguity 
over land tenure rights, slowing the natural 
process of concentration of land resources 
into the hands of the most effective farmers 
(Chen, Wang, and Davis 1999).
 Given these problems, further initiatives 
have attempted to reform land use rights 
while retaining collective ownership of farm-
land. As early as 1983, households were 
allowed to exchange their labor with others 
and to employ limited amounts of hired 
labor for farm work. To provide better in-
centives for soil conservation and invest-
ment, leaseholds were extended to 15 years 
in 1984, and then to 30 years in 1995. In the 
Table 4.10 China’s state and designated trading
Type of trading Imports Exports
State trading  Grain, vegetable oils, sugar, 
tobacco, refined oil, chemical 
fertilizer, cotton
Tea, rice, maize, soybeans, tungsten and tung-
sten products, coal, crude oil, refined oil, 
silk,  unbleached silk, cotton, antimony, silver
Designated trading Rubber, timber, plywood, wool, 
acrylics, steel and steel products
Rubber, timber, plywood, wool, acrylics, steel 
and steel products
Source: Martin (2003).
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late 1980s rural households engaged in non-
farm business were allowed to sublease their 
land to other villagers to prevent land from 
remaining idle. The central government also 
encouraged more flexible measures at the 
local level. In 2002 the National People’s 
Congress passed the Rural Land Contract 
Law, effective in March 2003, which was 
intended to establish a comprehensive legal 
framework for land relations between farmers 
and collectives.
Market and Price Liberalization. Although 
early reforms in agriculture centered on de-
collectivization and increasing incentives to 
farmers, later measures have attempted to 
gradually liberalize markets and prices (de 
Brauw, Huang, and Rozelle 2002). Market 
liberalization began with nonstrategic prod-
ucts, including fruits, vegetables, livestock, 
and fish. Market reforms continued inter-
mittently throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
with progress depending on the stability of 
production and food prices. For example, 
on the heels of a bumper crop in 1984, the 
government replaced mandatory procurement 
with voluntary contracts between farmers 
and the government. Despite periodic delays 
in the reform process, markets have gradu-
ally emerged in China’s agricultural sector. 
According to Lardy (2001), the share of ag-
ricultural commodities sold through mar-
kets increased from just 6 percent in 1978 to 
40 percent by 1985, 79 percent by 1995, and 
83 percent by 1999.
 Under its reforms, China has allowed 
most agricultural prices to be set by market 
forces. The state procurement and distri-
bution systems were substantially liberal-
ized in the early 1990s, following several 
years of market stability. However, the gov-
ernment intervenes in various ways to sta-
bilize prices. When food price “inflation” 
appeared in 1994, compulsory grain pro-
curement was reinstated (Huang and Rozelle 
2002). The Governors’ Grain-Bag Re-
sponsibility System (GGBRS), introduced 
in 1995, shifted responsibility for the man-
agement of grain supplies from the central 
government to the provinces. It mandated 
that the provinces maintain an overall bal-
ance of grain supply and demand and use 
local reserves to regulate markets and stabi-
lize prices. In late 1997 the national govern-
ment reinstalled a scheme of so-called pro-
tection prices for grains. These were prices, 
set by the government, at which the state 
guaranteed to purchase output of specific 
commodities.
 While China’s grain supplies have in-
creased under these price policies, such 
price intervention measures also lead to in-
efficiencies. Regional self-sufficiency is pro-
moted over interregional gains from trade. 
By restraining competition, the monopoly 
power of the government-sponsored grain 
bureaus is increased and there is little in-
centive for improvements in grain market-
ing. For these reasons, China has announced 
several additional regulations designed to 
further liberalize grain markets by pro-
moting open competition in domestic grain 
trade and reducing the dominant role played 
by local governments and government-
sponsored enterprises.
 Since 2000 China has also attempted to 
abolish the procurement protection prices 
for most agricultural commodities (Gale, 
Lohmar, and Tuan 2005). By 2003 such 
prices remained for grain only in impor-
tant production areas, and most of those were 
eliminated in 2004. With these changes, 
grain prices are now mostly set in open mar-
kets, and government procurement prices 
appear to be following market prices. In 
2004 China resumed futures trading of 
corn, which had been suspended in the late 
1990s, and added imported soybeans and 
cotton to the list of eligible agricultural 
commodities.
 China has also recently experimented 
with direct subsidy policies. Direct subsidies 
tied to grain acreage were put in place in 
2002 in selected major grain-producing prov-
inces: Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and Jilin (Gale, 
Lohmar, and Tuan 2005). China introduced 
its first nationwide direct subsidies for farm-
ers during 2004. The total grain subsidies 
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reached RMB 11.6 billion ($1.4 billion) ac-
cording to China’s Finance Ministry (Table 
4.11). China can potentially pay amber box 
commodity-specific subsidies up to a maxi-
mum de minimis of 8.5 percent of the value 
of its agricultural production, or, equiva-
lently, as much as $30 billion based on the 
value of agricultural production in 2003. 
Thus there seems to be substantial room for 
China to extend its subsidy measures.
Input Subsidies. China has long supported 
its agriculture by subsidizing agricultural 
inputs, including machinery, fertilizers, 
pesticides, electricity, water, and transporta-
tion. Charges for such inputs as electricity 
and water are significantly lower for farm-
ers than for other users, but the level of sub-
sidy is difficult to assess as the cost of provi-
sion is different across various users (OECD 
2005b). To lower fertilizer prices, domestic 
fertilizer producers have been given access 
to lower-price inputs, such as electricity. 
Since 2002 farmers have been subsidized for 
the cost of purchasing improved-quality seeds 
and machinery, but these subsidies have been 
small, as shown in Table 4.11.
 Between 1990 and 2003, farmers in 
China were required to pay various agricul-
tural taxes either in cash or in kind (Tables 
4.11 and 4.12). They also paid various fees 
to local governments and collectives and 
provided “labor accumulation” for the con-
struction of communal facilities. Agricul-
tural tax reform was initiated in 2000 and 
expanded across rural China in 2004. The 
agricultural taxes to be eliminated included 
an assessment on the normal productive 
value of land, an agricultural specialty 
product tax, and a myriad of additional 
local taxes and fees to fund road construc-
tion, schools, and various other projects and 
services undertaken by village and town-
ship authorities (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 
2005). These taxes are scheduled to be elimi-
nated in five years. The total annual cost of 
planned agricultural tax reductions is esti-
mated at $5–7 billion.
 Investment in agriculture-related projects 
is a major instrument for China to achieve 
rural development targets and is by far the 
largest component in government budgetary 
support for agriculture (Table 4.11). Projects 
include spending on production infrastruc-
ture, such as improved irrigation facilities, 
rural roads, methane production facilities, 
rural hydroelectric plants, pasture enclosures, 
research, and construction of agricultural 
high-technology parks.
 China also boosts farm investment by 
making loans to farm households through 
a system of 35,000 rural credit cooperatives 
Table 4.11 China’s agricultural subsidies, 2004
Policy Estimated cost Description
Grain subsidies $1.4 billion Direct payments of roughly $7.33 per acre planted in 
grain
Agricultural tax reduction $5–7 billion Elimination of agricultural tax within five years. Elimi-
nation of tax on specialty crops (except for tobacco)
Seed subsidies $193 million Subsidies for high-quality grain and soybean seeds of 
$7–10 per acre planted
Machinery subsidies $5 million Subsidies for purchase of machinery in targeted areas
Rural infrastructure spending $18 billion Improvement of irrigation facilities, electricity generation, 
roads, testing facilities, and other rural infrastructure
Source: Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan (2005).
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(RCCs). During the 1990s farm loans were 
frequently squeezed out by loans to state 
enterprises and local governments.25 The 
RCCs have subsequently increased their 
small, short-term loans to farm households 
for input purchases and such modest invest-
ments as well digging, livestock purchases, 
orchard planting, and greenhouse construc-
tion. China’s state-owned policy banks have 
also increased loans to certain agricultural 
processing companies that meet criteria for 
size, management, facilities, and technology 
set by national or provincial governments. 
These “dragon head” enterprises receive 
favorable loan terms from state banks with 
the expectation that they will provide farm-
ers with profitable outlets for farm products. 
The Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC) launched a specialized lending pro-
gram targeted at “dragon head” agricultural 
enterprises in 2002, and lending grew to 
RMB 40 billion ($4.8 billion) in 2003. The 
China Development Bank, the Agricultural 
Bank of China, and the RCCs also make 
preferential loans to these enterprises.
Vietnam
Vietnam, like China, initially had a state-
managed, centrally planned communist econ-
omy. Until 1986 agricultural production in 
Vietnam was organized in cooperatives fol-
lowing annual plans put forth by the state. 
Thus domestic and international trade were 
highly restricted. Agricultural output stag-
nated and starvation occurred in several 
areas. During the period 1976–80 Vietnam 
imported an average of 170,000 tons of rice 
and 1.1 million tons of food crops annually 
(Tran 1994).
 As in China, this poor agricultural per-
formance under state planning called for 
reform. Starting in 1986, agricultural policy 
has been transformed to replace a centrally 
Table 4.12 Agriculture-related taxes in China, 1990–2003 (million yuan)
Year Total
Agricultural tax and
animal husbandry taxa Contract taxb
Tax on special
agricultural products
Tax on use of
cultivated landb
1990 8,786 5,962 118 1,249 1,457
1991 9,065 5,665 189 1,425 1,786
1992 11,917 7,010 361 1,624 2,922
1993 12,574 7,265 621 1,753 2,935
1994 23,149 11,951 1,182 6,369 3,647
1995 27,809 12,812 1,826 9,717 3,454
1996 36,946 18,206 2,520 13,100 3,120
1997 39,748 18,238 3,234 15,027 3,249
1998 39,880 17,867 5,899 12,779 3,335
1999 42,350 16,308 9,596 13,143 3,303
2000 46,531 16,817 13,108 13,074 3,532
2001 48,170 16,432 15,708 12,197 3,833
2002 71,785 32,149 23,907 9,995 5,734
2003 87,177 33,422 35,805 8,960 8,990
Source: OECD (2005b).
aThe animal slaughtering tax is not classified as an agriculture-related tax under the current Chinese taxation 
system, but it is likely to have an impact on meat production.
bThe contract tax and the tax on use of cultivated land are both related to conversion of cultivated land to non-
agricultural uses. The contract tax has minimal impact on the agricultural sector.
25Until the end of the 1990s, preferential loans were provided mostly to state marketing organizations to fund 
the purchase and storage of key agricultural products. In the 2000s most of these programs were discontinued, 
but those for grains were continued.
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planned and autarkic system with a more 
open and market-oriented one. The most 
important components of the Vietnamese 
reform process have been agricultural re-
form, trade reform, land reform, market 
and price liberalization, and the adoption of 
policy instruments to assist agricultural pro-
duction (Tran 1994).
Trade Policies
Until 1989 the state tightly controlled for-
eign trade. Vietnam’s main trade partners 
were the former Soviet Union and central 
and eastern European countries. The Min-
istry of Foreign Trade initially established 
import and export companies, and only these 
companies were allowed to conduct trade. 
Foreign trade was decentralized somewhat 
during the period 1981–88: Not only com-
panies established by the Ministry of For-
eign Trade but also those STEs set up by 
other ministries or local governments were 
allowed to import and export (Nguyen et al. 
1996).
 In 1989 the monopoly of the STEs was 
broken. Private trading companies were al-
lowed to engage in trade, but their activities 
were initially impeded by import and export 
license requirements. By 1991 all private 
companies could obtain licenses to export 
directly. In 1998 the licensing requirements 
for trading were largely abolished, and since 
2001 private companies as well as STEs 
have been allowed to export most products 
without a license. In agriculture, after 1998 
export licenses were applied only to produc-
tion inputs for seeds, breeding stock, and 
insects. Import licenses are required for raw 
and refined sugar and alcohol (GOV 1998).
 Agricultural imports were protected by 
an average tariff rate of 24 percent in 1998. 
Import tariffs have been set at zero for seeds, 
breeding stock, animal furs and skins, and 
cotton, which are inputs for agricultural and 
industrial production but are unavailable in 
Vietnam (Table 4.13). Tariff rates of 1–10 
percent are applied to other inputs for the 
processing industry that cannot be sourced 
wholly within the country. Tariff rates of 
15–30 percent are applied to processed 
products for which domestic competitive-
ness is relatively high, such as meat, milk, 
fresh fruits and vegetables, spices, and semi-
processed coffee. The tariff on sugar im-
ports ranges between 30 and 45 percent. 
Higher tariff rates (40–50 percent) are ap-
plied to processed products for which domes-
tic competitiveness is relatively low, such as 
refined vegetable oil, tea, coffee, vegetables, 
meat, and cakes and breads. Very high tariff 
rates of 80–100 percent are applied to wine, 
beer, soft drinks, tobacco products, and lux-
ury goods. Livestock and cereals are subject 
to lower import tariffs than industrial crops 
(Nin et al. 2003). Quantitative restrictions 
on imports were retained for fertilizer, to-
bacco, sugar, and vegetable oil.
 Through 1990 key agricultural products, 
namely rice, tea, and coffee, were subject to 
export quotas. Since 1991, however, export 
quotas have been gradually abolished (Tran 
2002). In 1995 export quotas on all agricul-
tural commodities except rice were elimi-
nated (Martin 2001). The rice export quota 
increased over time, from less than 1 million 
metric tons in 1992 to 4.5 million metric 
tons in 1998. In 2001 the rice export quota 
was abolished (Decision No. 46/2001/QD/
TTg), except for an exemption allowing its 
use in emergency circumstances. Never-
theless, exporting of important agricultural 
commodities largely remained in the hands 
of SOEs (Auffret 2003).
 Export taxes on agricultural products 
have also been gradually removed. In 1989 
export tax rates were reduced from 10 per-
cent to 5 percent on rice, 4 percent on rub-
ber, and 3 percent on cashew nuts, tea, 
coffee, and pepper (GOV 1989). A cus-
toms surcharge of 10 percent was applied 
after 1995 to unprocessed cashew nuts 
(GOV 1995), and a surcharge of 5 percent 
was applied to the export of rubber latex 
after 2001 (GOV 2001). The taxes on raw 
exports were used to promote the domestic 
cashew nut processing industry, and the 
share of unprocessed cashew nuts in total 
exports declined.
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 The Vietnamese government did not 
provide any export subsidies to agricultural 
products before 1998, when subsidies were 
offered for canned pineapple (ISG 2001). 
An Export Reward Fund, later renamed the 
Export Support Fund, was established to 
provide financial support and preferential 
loans to enterprises exporting fruits and 
vegetables as well as meat products. The 
total amount of subsidies amounted to $9.2 
million in 2000 (Schmidt 2003). In WTO 
accession negotiations during 2004, Viet-
nam committed to eliminate its export sub-
sidies for coffee on the date it joins the WTO, 
and for rice, pork, and vegetables three 
years after its entrance. As a new member of 
WTO (January, 11, 2007), Vietnam is com-
mitted to lowering its average tariff rate to 
18 percent. As a member of AFTA, Viet-
nam is to achieve a tariff range of 0–5 per-
cent by 2006 for goods imported from other 
ASEAN countries and to eliminate non-
tariff trade barriers in accordance with 
the ASEAN Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff scheme. 
 Since 1991 Vietnam has also sought to 
strengthen its economic and diplomatic re-
lations with other countries through various 
trade agreements. In February 1994 the 
United States lifted a trade embargo that 
had been in place since the Vietnam War. 
The Framework Cooperation Agreement be-
tween the European Commission and Viet-
nam entered into force in June 1996, and 
Vietnam joined the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation in November 1998. In 2000 
a U.S.-Vietnamese Trade Agreement was 
signed, helping to almost double Vietnam’s 
annual United States–bound exports (Fu-
kase and Martin 1999). Prior to this agree-
ment, Vietnam was one of the few countries 
on which the United States had imposed 
tariffs, generally much higher than the nor-
mal-trading-status tariffs accorded to WTO 
members. 
 Roland-Holst et al. (2002) assess the 
long-term effects of Vietnam’s deepening 
integration into world markets. They con-
clude that the most benefits accrue to Viet-
nam when it participates in various bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral trade agreements 
and at the same time allows extensive capi-
tal market liberalization, promotes FDI, and 
proceeds with its domestic reform process. 
Jensen and Tarp (2005) conclude that rural 
areas are more vulnerable than urban areas 
Table 4.13 Tariffs on selected agricultural importables in Vietnam
Product
Tariff
(%)
Seed and breed, animal furs and skin, cotton 0
Rattan, live animals, maize 5
Paddy, sorghum, millet and other cereals, oil seeds, sugarcane 10
Meat (fresh or frozen), milk (fresh or skim), cinnamon, ginger, starch 20
Vegetables (fresh or frozen), fruit, spices (pepper, chilis, garlic, onion), raw sugar 30
Cooking oil, refined sugar 40
Processed coffee, tea, sausage and other processed meat, processed vegetables and fruit, cake and 
 candy, flour
50
Wine and alcohol, cigarettes 100
Source: Decision No. 1803/QD/BTC, December 11, 1998, as cited by Nguyen and Grote (2004).
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to world market integration, and that farming 
households are more affected than wage-
earning and self-employed households.
Domestic Policies
The agricultural sector in Vietnam was ini-
tially disprotected compared to other eco-
nomic sectors. The policy reform process 
affecting trade restrictions, land tenure, and 
market and price liberalization has modi-
fied this disprotection. Policy instruments 
recently adopted to assist agriculture include 
price supports, linking agricultural produc-
tion and agroindustries, and promoting off-
farm activities to reduce underemployment 
in agriculture and rural areas (Nguyen and 
Grote 2004).
Land Reform. Land reform was initiated in 
1981. Cooperatives were allowed to assign 
parcels of land to farm households based 
on annual production contracts. While the 
farmers were responsible for planting, weed-
ing, and harvesting, the cooperative was in 
charge of harrowing, plowing, irrigation, 
drainage, and pest control (Tran 1994). The 
cooperatives still acted as a planning agency 
for households’ farming activities, but the 
assignment of land use to households en-
couraged farmers to make labor and other 
investments, resulting in higher agricultural 
output. Most of the harvest had to be deliv-
ered to the cooperatives, but they no longer 
strictly controlled its sale. Farmers were al-
lowed to sell their excess products in free 
markets provided they fulfilled their pro-
duction contracts with the cooperatives.
 Despite the reforms in 1981, no legal base 
existed for the transfer of land from cooper-
atives to households. It was not until 1988 
that farmers were given the right to use their 
land for 10–15 years, to fully control the pro-
duction process, and to privately utilize about 
40 percent of their output. A key measure 
was the Land Law of 1993, which granted 
long-term land use rights to farming house-
holds as well as the rights to exchange, trans-
fer, lease, inherit, and mortgage. Long-term 
use rights are for 20 years when the land is 
used for annual crops and for 50 years in the 
case of perennial crops. The Land Law, how-
ever, also put a ceiling on the amount of land 
allocated per household: for annual crops, 
the limit was 2 hectares in the central and 
northern provinces and 3 hectares in the 
southern provinces, and for perennials the 
limit was 10 hectares.
Market and Price Liberalization. Domes-
tic trade in agricultural products has also 
been liberalized since 1986. Prices were 
deregulated internally, taxes on agricultural 
trading activities across regions were elimi-
nated, and checkpoints at interprovincial 
borders were dismantled. Before 1986 prices 
were specified by the state. Prices based on 
negotiation between sellers and buyers were 
introduced next, but these were still set 
within state guidelines. In May 1989 prices 
were allowed to be negotiated by producers 
and customers with the state no longer inter-
vening directly in agricultural price determi-
nation. Nevertheless, to support the market 
prices of crucial items, a Price Stabilization 
Fund was established to (1) provide funds 
for stockholding of crucial commodities, 
of which foods, important industrial crops, 
and agricultural inputs were considered a 
priority, and (2) assist the fund’s contribu-
tors whenever international or domestic 
prices underwent sharp fluctuations (GOV 
1993).
Input Subsidies. The main input subsidies 
in Vietnam are for irrigation and fertilizer. 
Approximately half of the cultivated land in 
Vietnam is irrigated. Farmers pay a subsi-
dized fee for irrigation water. The irrigation 
fee is set by each province under the guide-
lines of the Ministry of Water Resources. 
The amount collected accounts for 4–8 per-
cent of the normal crop yield (GOV 1984; 
Barker et al. 2001). This is estimated to be 
about one-sixth of the funds needed to pro-
vide adequate operation and maintenance of 
the irrigation system. The remaining five-
sixths of the irrigation maintenance and op-
eration costs are subsidized.
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 In Vietnam the use of fertilizer has grown 
significantly since 1980. Its consumption, 
amounting to 263 kilograms per hectare of 
cropland in 1999, is high compared to the 
Asian average consumption (149 kilograms 
per hectare) or the worldwide average (94 
kilograms per hectare). A large part of the 
fertilizer used is imported. Fertilizer im-
porters have access to subsidized credits 
(Goletti 1998), and companies that produce 
fertilizer and pesticides can obtain conces-
sional loans. In 1998 fertilizer SOEs re-
ceived an interest rate subsidy of VND 21.6 
billion (Kherallah and Goletti 2000). Still 
the question arises of whether farmers have 
benefited from fertilizer subsidies. A simple 
comparison shows that domestic prices of 
fertilizer were higher than international 
prices. Only in the case in which the gap 
between domestic and border prices is less 
than the transportation costs and marketing 
margin of the trading companies has the 
indirect support trickled down to farmers 
(Goletti 1998).
 In addition to the irrigation and fertil-
izer subsidies, there are small subsidies for 
electricity, credit, and seeds. A summary of 
input subsidies in the Vietnamese agricul-
tural sector is shown in Figure 4.3. Input 
subsidies have increased noticeably since 
the mid-1990s. The irrigation subsidy is the 
most important, followed by the fertilizer 
subsidy. The fertilizer subsidy is, however, 
quite variable from year to year.
 In addition to the subsidies described 
above, there are general support policies 
aimed at facilitating agriculture. These ex-
penditures differ from input subsidy policies 
in that they cannot easily be disaggregated 
among individual commodities. In Vietnam 
these policies account for 7.2 percent of total 
domestic support (ISG 2001) and include 
expenditures for scientific research, train-
ing, development of agricultural infrastruc-
ture, food stockpiling (rice and maize), and 
environmental programs.
Figure 4.3 Agricultural input subsidies in Vietnam, 1987–2001
Sources: GSO, MARD, Bank for the Poor, and Institute for Energy, as cited by Nguyen and Grote (2004).
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Producer Support Estimates
PSEs provide an indicator of agricultural support that is a useful yardstick to measure whether reforms undertaken under the dynamic policy settings in India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam since the mid-1980s have reduced or even reversed the direction 
of past market distortions. To obtain precise estimates of producer support requires data for 
all of the variables in equations (1) and (2) on page 9 along with budgetary payment informa-
tion by commodity and in the aggregate. The empirical estimation of relatively accurate PSEs 
relies on the available data and the judgment of researchers to minimize measurement errors. 
As a result, our analyses follow a common basic structure across the four countries, yet details 
of the analysis differ among the countries.
Overview of Data and Calculations
India
Our calculation of PSEs for India draws heavily on previous studies by Gulati, Hanson, and 
Pursell (1990), Gulati and Kelley (1999), Gulati and Pursell (2000), Gulati and Narayanan 
(2003), and Hoda and Gulati (2007) and is described in depth in Mullen et al. (2004) and 
Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005). PSEs are computed from 1985 to 2002 for 11 commo-
dities: rice, wheat (through 2003), maize, sorghum, sugar, oilseeds (groundnut, rapeseed, 
soybean, and sunflower), pulses (chickpeas), and cotton. These crops accounted for an aver-
age of 45 percent of the total value of agricultural production in India during the years 
1985–2002.
 Data for computing the MPS are taken from the detailed database for 1964/65–2001/02 of 
Gulati and Pursell (2002). An updated version of this dataset is described in Hoda and Gulati 
(2007: Appendix 4.1). The data include international reference prices and transportation costs 
for all major Indian crops, exchange rates, and domestic port charges. They also include pro-
duction quantities, farmgate or wholesale domestic prices, domestic transport costs, and mar-
keting and processing margins for important producing states. Sources for international prices 
in the database vary by commodity. Exchange rates are market rates taken from the IMF. 
International freight for wheat is drawn from an annual series in the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Trade Yearbook for 1999 and adjusted for subse-
quent years. International freight for other commodities is determined by adjusting the wheat 
freight rate if specific rates are not available.
 Estimates of port charges and domestic transportation costs in the data for India are based 
on an earlier study by Sharma (1991) and are projected forward using the procedure described 
in Pursell and Gupta (1996). Marketing costs are taken as a percentage of the domestic price, 
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Pd, of each commodity and vary from 5 to 
10 percent. For products requiring substan-
tial processing, the domestic prices included 
are at the wholesale (processed) level. For 
these commodities, the subsequent MPS cal-
culations are made with price comparisons 
to wholesale, not farm-level, adjusted refer-
ence prices of equivalent commodities.
 For domestic farmgate prices, we used 
average harvest season prices for India 
where available, and in these cases inter-
national prices and exchange rates pertain 
to the same time frame. The harvest season 
prices are the best indicators of the incen-
tives to farmers when the large majority of 
farmers sell their products during this sea-
son. We calculate the MPS based on all do-
mestic production, rather than marketable 
surplus, thereby making the assumption that 
producers value all of their production at the 
domestic price, even if some is consumed 
on-farm. Aggregate estimates of subsidies 
for fertilizer, power, and irrigation are from 
Gulati and Narayanan (2003) and are trend-
projected for 2001/02 and 2002/03 (see 
Table 4.2). Fertilizer subsidies are allocated 
across commodities based on the com-
modity’s share of fertilizer usage, while ir-
rigation and power subsides are distributed 
based on the share of irrigated area, as re-
ported in USDA-ERS (1994). We have not 
included seed or credit subsidies in our anal-
ysis because their values have been small in 
recent years.
 In the case of importables, the major 
consumption region is assumed to be the 
port cities, for example, Mumbai. Unadjusted 
reference prices at the border for imported 
commodities are the international prices for 
commodities with quality levels that most 
closely resemble those of the commodities 
produced in India.26 Unadjusted reference 
prices at the border for export commodities 
are taken as the export prices of major com-
petitors for an equivalent quality level. This 
represents a slight departure for exports 
from equation (4) on page 10 and implic-
itly assumes that the international freights 
from the competing exporter country to a 
third-country importer and from India to 
a third-country importer are equal.
 Farmers in various Indian states receive 
different levels of protection or disprotection 
from agricultural policy owing to differ-
ences in transportation and other costs, the 
interstate movement restrictions that were in 
place until 2002, and some state-level agri-
cultural policies. For most of the major 
commodities in India, the Gulati-Pursell 
data base (2002) allow representative analy-
sis at the state level. Important producing 
states or regions are divided into net sur-
plus and net deficit areas. In calculating the 
MPS, the adjusted reference price for a defi-
cit region is computed following the proce-
dure of Gulati, Hanson, and Pursell (1990) 
and Pursell and Gupta (1996). The calcula-
tion utilizes whichever is lower between the 
adjusted reference price for imports coming 
directly to the deficit region or the adjusted 
reference price of a nearby domestic surplus 
region plus the transportation, handling, 
and marketing costs from the surplus region 
to the deficit region. If the commodity is an 
export, only surplus-producing regions are 
included in the analysis. For both imports 
and exports, once state-level adjusted refer-
ence prices are derived, state-level nominal 
MPS can be computed. These results are 
then aggregated for the included states and 
the total expanded to an estimate of the na-
tional MPS.
26Given the small trade volumes of the major commodities in India, there is substantial variation between import 
and export unit values and the commonly applied international price series (for example, U.S. hard red winter 
wheat f.o.b. U.S. Gulf, U.S. number 2 yellow corn f.o.b. U.S. Gulf, or Thai rice f.o.b. Bangkok). See Cheng 
(2004) for comparisons between unit values and international prices. Instead of using unit values, we follow 
Gulati, Hanson, and Pursell (1990) and, except in the case of chickpeas, select international prices for the qual-
ity level that is comparable to that of the commodity as produced domestically. 
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 Another consideration in our analysis for 
India is that the direction of net trade varies 
across years for some commodities. For seven 
commodities (rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, 
sugar, groundnuts, and cotton), we compute 
and compare the MPS and %MPS under the 
assumptions that the commodities are both 
imported (“importable hypothesis”) and ex-
ported (“exportable hypothesis”). This com-
parison is made to demonstrate the effects 
of various reference price adjustments. We 
also compute a domestic market-clearing 
price P* at the national level for six of these 
commodities (except cotton) and report 
MPS and %MPS (labeled “modified pro-
cedure”) following the approach of Byerlee 
and Morris (1993). In this latter case, the 
relevant adjusted reference price is chosen 
based on whether P* is above, below, or be-
tween P
m
 and P
e
, as discussed in Chapter 2.27 
Using the various MPS results, PSEs and 
%PSE can be calculated under any of the 
adjusted reference price assumptions.
 In calculating the annual (postharvest) 
domestic market-clearing price, we assume 
that ex post supply is fixed within the year. 
With supply fixed, computing P* requires 
information on the price elasticity of de-
mand and domestic consumption quantity 
and prices paid. The demand elasticity esti-
mates available in the literature vary depen-
ding on the model and data used, and cal-
culation of P* will vary depending on the 
elasticity assumed. Not binding ourselves to 
any particular estimate, we use −0.5 as an 
illustrative value, as in Gulati and Kelley 
(1999).28 We supplement the Gulati and 
Pursell database (2002) with total national 
domestic consumption for 1985–2003 from 
the USDA-FAS (2004d) Production, Supply 
and Demand database. Wholesale prices in 
our dataset are used to approximate con-
sumer prices.
Indonesia
Our analysis for Indonesia covers six crops. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 describe the definitions 
and sources of the various components of 
the MPS calculations (Thomas and Orden 
2004). Indonesia has been a net importer of 
rice and maize in the 1990s (except for 1993 
for rice and 1998 for maize). This was some-
what less true in the 1980s, but the trade 
fluctuations at the beginning of the period 
are small. Our MPS estimates for rice and 
maize for Indonesia assume that both com-
modities are imported. The other commodi-
ties have consistently been net imports, in 
the case of sugar and soybeans, or net ex-
ports, in the case of palm oil and rubber.
 Reference prices at the border are either 
the c.i.f. world price for imports (f.o.b. for 
exports) or alternatively the import unit value 
(or export unit value for exports). The ad-
vantage of selecting the import unit value as 
the reference price is not having to estimate 
international freight to derive a c.i.f. equiva-
lent. However, for Indonesia the import unit 
value often deviates from the more general 
world price for rice, maize, and sugar. For 
these commodities the world price is selected 
and adjusted by international freight esti-
mates. In the case of soybeans, the import 
unit value is judged to be a better reference 
price than c.i.f. Rotterdam, although both 
series move similarly over time. In the case 
of exports (crude palm oil and natural rub-
ber), the export unit values are used.
 In terms of adjustments to the reference 
and domestic prices, estimates of international 
27From the state-level analysis, a national average P
m
 and P
e
 are computed using the values of production in the 
included states as the weights. The national average import- and export-adjusted reference prices are compared 
to a P* estimated at the national level to determine the adjusted reference price in applying the MPS modified 
procedure.
28See Dev et al. (2004) for discussion of demand being even more inelastic, about –0.2. As a sensitivity analysis 
we also computed results for this more inelastic demand parameter.
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transport and processing costs for 1986 by 
Gonzales et al. (1993) are extrapolated for 
the period 1985–2003 using a price deflator. 
Domestic transport costs and adjustments 
from port to wholesale are assumed to be a 
fixed proportion of the world price, and do-
mestic adjustments from farmgate to whole-
sale are assumed to be a fixed proportion of 
the producer price. Rice quantities and prices 
are adjusted to convert the price and pro-
duction of paddy rice (Gabah Kering) to the 
milled rice equivalent. In the case of sugar, 
the only available domestic price data to es-
timate the MPS are for refined sugar, so no 
processing cost adjustment was made.
 For the imported commodities, the mea-
surements are first estimated at the regional 
level and then aggregated to give a national 
measure using the shares of regional pro-
duction in total production as weights. The 
calculations cover eight regions for rice and 
two (Java and off-Java) for maize, soybeans, 
and sugar. For export commodities, crude 
palm oil and natural rubber, data were not 
available at the regional level, and MPS and 
PSEs are estimated directly at the national 
level.
 In the PSE calculations, the fertilizer sub-
sidy by crop is estimated from the govern-
ment’s development budget. Rice is allocated 
70 percent of the subsidies and the remain-
der is allocated to the other commodities 
according to their share in total crop pro-
duction. The available data series is inter-
rupted for 2000–02, but the budgetary cost 
of the subsidy for 2003 was estimated to be 
Table 5.2 Components of MPS estimates for Indonesia: Definitions and sources for export crops
Category Crude palm oil (1991–2003) Natural rubber (1985–2002)
Trade status Exportable Exportable
Reference domestic market Wholesale Wholesale
Border price
 World price F.o.b., export unit value of crude palm oil (CPO) F.o.b., export unit value of natural rubber
  Source USDA-FAS (2003b),  FAO (2006) FAO (2006)
International freight Not applicable Not applicable
 Exchange rate Monthly average for each year Monthly average for each year
  Source Bank of Indonesia (2003), USDA-FAS (2004a) Bank of Indonesia (2003), USDA-FAS (2004a)
Internal cost adjustments for
 exporters (TC:  port charges, 
 handling, transport from 
 wholesale market to port)a
4 percent of the border price 4 percent of the border price
 Source Gonzales et al. (1993)b Gonzales et al. (1993)b
Domestic price (farmgate or other) Producer price of CPO Wholesale price of natural rubber in Jakarta
 Source USDA-FAS (2003b), FAO (2006) BPS (1998, 2002), FAO (2006) 
Internal cost adjustments for 
 domestic output (MM)a
5 percent of the producer price No adjustment
 Source Larson (1996) Larson (1996)
Regional coverage Country level Country level
Source: Thomas and Orden (2004).
aThese margins are computed as a fixed share of the corresponding price.
bThe rates are the same as those for sugar in Gonzales et al. (1993).
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Rp 1,315 billion (Ross 1990; ADB/SEARCA/
IFPRI/CRESCENT 2004).29 To estimate the 
irrigation subsidies, it is assumed that 85 
percent of irrigation expenditures from the 
government budget are subsidies and that 
80 percent of this subsidy is allotted to rice 
(Ross 1990). The remaining estimated sub-
sidy is allocated according to shares in total 
crop production. The credit subsidy is not 
included herein because of lack of access to 
consistent time series data for the period 
covered, an omission that underestimates the 
budgetary payments component of the PSEs.
China
Our data for China are not as detailed as 
those for India or Indonesia. For China we 
use unadjusted reference prices at the border 
primarily computed based on import or ex-
port unit values. We consider nine commodi-
ties, based on an analysis by Sun (2003) for 
the period 1995–2001. Thus our results for 
China are limited.30 Earlier studies of PSEs 
in China have mostly found that agricultural 
producers were disprotected prior to 1995, 
though the level of reported disprotection 
differs across studies (Tian, Zhang, and Zhou 
2002).
 For rice, corn, sorghum, and peanuts an 
export price is assumed to be the relevant 
international reference price. For wheat, cot-
ton, soybeans, rapeseed, and sugar an import 
price is assumed to be appropriate. Budget-
ary payments include input subsidies, relief 
payments and regional assistance programs, 
agricultural taxes, and forgone agricultural 
taxes (Sun 2003). Budgetary payments are 
negative in 1995, when the agricultural taxes 
dominate the subsidy payments. Over the 
period 1995–2001, the share of the nine com-
modities in the total value of agricultural 
production decreases from 50 percent to 39 
percent, and on average accounts for about 
45 percent of the total value of production.
Vietnam
For Vietnam our analysis includes nine com-
modities that account for more than 70 per-
cent of the value of agricultural production 
(Nguyen and Grote 2004). Data on the out-
put of paddy rice, coffee, tea, groundnuts, 
rubber, pepper, sugarcane, and cotton are 
from the Statistical Yearbook of the General 
Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam (various 
years); data on cashew nut output are from 
the Institute for Agricultural Economics 
(IAE); and data on pig meat production are 
from the FAO database. Domestic prices of 
agricultural commodities are producer (or 
farm) prices, taken from the Department of 
Trade and Prices of the GSO for the period 
1986–2003. Domestic prices are annual av-
erage prices. All of the commodities except 
sugar are exported, and border prices are unit 
values of exports (imports for sugar) com-
puted from the FAO database. Exchange 
rates are annual average rates obtained from 
the IMF. An overview of the data sources 
and adjustments to reference prices and their 
respective sources is given in Table 5.3.
 Transportation costs, port charges, and 
marketing margins for export and/or import 
enterprises, as well as the quality difference 
between domestically produced commodi-
ties and corresponding exports or imports, 
are derived from various existing studies. 
For example, adjustments of prices for rice 
and sugar have been made based on the anal-
ysis by X. N. Nguyen et al. (1995), Khiem 
et al. (1996), and Nguyen et al. (1997). Qual-
ity adjustments for rice have been made based 
on information from Goletti, Minot, and 
29The budgeted figure is usually different for the realized expenditure, and it may overestimate the actual 
subsidy.
30Our analysis includes a subset of the 21 commodities covered by Sun (2003). However, by including only 
the major agricultural commodities, we avoid the difficulties of computing an appropriate adjusted reference 
price for some highly differentiated horticulture and livestock products, for which only very limited data are 
available. 
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Table 5.3 Components of MPS estimates for Vietnam: Definitions and sources 
Category Rice Coffee Tea Cashew nuts  
Period coverage 
 (calendar years)
1986–2002 1986–2000 1986–2002 1990–2002
Trade status Exportable Exportable Exportable Exportable
Reference domestic 
market
Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale
Border price f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port
f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port
f.o.b. Vietnam-
ese port
f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port
 Source FAO database FAO database FAO database FAO database
Exchange rate Annual average Annual average Annual average Annual average
 Source IMF (2004) IMF (2004) IMF (2004) IMF (2004)
Internal cost 
adjustments 
19.1% of the 
f.o.b. price
39.8% of the f.o.b. 
price 
4.1% of the f.o.b. 
price
49% of the 
f.o.b. price of 
un processed 
cashew nuts
 Port charges 2% of the f.o.b. 
price
— — —
 Handling and 
  transport from 
port to wholesale
7.3% of the f.o.b. 
price
10% of the f.o.b. 
price
3.6% of the f.o.b 
price.
23% of the 
f.o.b. price of 
un processed 
cashew nuts
 Marketing margin 
 of traders
9.8% of the f.o.b. 
price
4% of the f.o.b. 
price
0.5% of the f.o.b 
price
26% of the 
f.o.b. price of 
un processed 
cashew nuts
 Transportation 
  costs and mar-
keting margin of 
assemblers
— 30% of the sell-
ing price to 
exporters
— 0.8% of the sell-
ing price to 
exporters
 Source X. N. Nguyen 
et al. (1995), 
Khiem et al. 
(1996), Nguyen 
et al. (1997)
Nguyen et al. 
(1997)
Le et al. (1990) Nguyen et al. 
(2002)
Domestic price (farm 
price)
Farm prices of 
paddy con-
verted to pro-
ducer prices of 
milled rice
Farm price Farm price Farm price
 Source GSO, X. N. Ngu-
yen et al. (1995)
GSO GSO GSO
Internal cost adjust-
ments for domestic 
output (MM) 
 Conversion factor  0.70 1.645 (1990–92)
4.225 (1993–95)
6.805 
(1996–2002)
 Source Nguyen et al. 
(1995)
IAPP (2001), 
Nguyen et al. 
(1997)
Quality and process 
level adjustments
 3% 
 Source  IAE (2001)     
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Berry (1997), data on the quality of exported 
rice provided by the Ministry of Trade 
each year, and information on the quality 
of domestically consumed rice for the year 
2000 as assessed in an IAE study (2001).
 Budgetary payments include input subsi-
dies for fertilizer, irrigation, electricity used in 
agricultural production, seeds, and agricultural 
credit. The fertilizer subsidy is calculated based 
on the amount of fertilizer utilized, taken from 
Table 5.3—Continued 
Category Groundnuts Rubber Black pepper Sugar Pig meat
Period coverage 
(calendar years)
1986–2002 1996–2002 1986–2000 1986–2001 1986–2002
Trade status Exportable Exportable Exportable Importable Exportable
Reference domestic 
market
Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale
Border price f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port
f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port
f.o.b. Vietnam-
ese port
c.i.f. Vietnamese 
port
f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port
 Source FAO database FAO database FAO database FAO database FAO database
Exchange rate Annual average Annual average Annual average Annual average Annual average
 Source IMF (2004) IMF (2004) IMF (2004) IMF (2004) IMF (2004)
Internal cost 
adjustments 
11% of f.o.b. 
price
6.2% of f.o.b. 
price
6.4% of f.o.b. 
price
6% of c.i.f. price 21.5% of f.o.b. price
  Port charges and 
 loading fees
— — — 1% of the c.i.f. 
price
 Handling and 
  transport from 
port to wholesale
8.5% 5.9% 5.3% 2% of the port 
price
20.8%
 Marketing margin 
 of traders
2.5% 0.3% 1.1% 3% of the port 
price
0.7%
 Source Nguyen et al. 
(1997) 
Nguyen et al. 
(1997)
Nguyen et al. 
(2002)
Nguyen et al. 
(1997)
Nguyen et al. (1997)
Domestic price (farm-
gate or other)
Farm price Farm price Farm price Farm prices of 
sugarcane 
converted 
into producer 
prices of sugar
Farm price
 Source GSO GSO GSO GSO GSO
Internal cost adjust-
ments for domestic 
output 
 Conversion factor 0.89 9.74
  Source Nguyen et al. 
(1997)
IAPP (2001), 
Nguyen et al. 
(1997)
Quality and process 
level adjustments
 16% 16%
  Source
 
N. A. Nguyen 
et al. (1995)
  
Interview with 
Trong Ngu 
Nguyen, College 
of Agriculture, 
Cantho Univer-
sity, Vietnam 
(2004)
Source: Nguyen and Grote (2004).
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the GSO, and the difference between the retail 
price in the Vietnamese market and the ad-
justed c.i.f. price of urea (from the GSO and 
the Department of Agriculture of the Minis-
try of Agriculture and Rural Development 
[MARD]). The quantity of fertilizer utilized 
annually is assumed to be equal to the sum of 
imported and domestically produced fertilizer 
since annual changes in stocks are negligible. 
The price gap is measured for urea, while the 
quantity of fertilizer is the sum for different 
kinds of fertilizer, implicitly assuming that the 
urea subsidy also holds for these others. The 
irrigation subsidy is computed from fees paid 
by farmers and government costs, as described 
in Chapter 4. The electricity subsidy is com-
puted by the amount of electricity provided for 
agriculture multiplied by the difference be-
tween the prices to the agricultural and indus-
trial sectors. This provides an estimate of sub-
sidies provided to farmers as compared with 
industrial enterprises, although ideally the elec-
tricity subsidy would be estimated as the dif-
ference between the price charged to the agri-
cultural sector and the price fully reflecting 
depreciation and operational costs in the elec-
tricity sector. The credit subsidy is computed 
using data on credit from the Bank for the Poor 
and does not take into account the preferential 
credit to minorities from the Bank for Agricul-
ture and Rural Development. This omission will 
not affect the result significantly, as the amount 
of lending to minorities has been small. Seed 
subsidies are taken from the MARD.
A Comparison of Market 
Price Support and 
Commodity-Specific 
PSEs for Rice
Similarities and dissimilarities among some 
of the forces driving agricultural policy within 
the four countries are illustrated by comparing 
the MPS and commodity-specific PSEs of two 
commodities that are important in each coun-
try, rice and sugar. Rice MPS and commodity-
specific PSEs are evaluated in this section. The 
MPS and PSEs for sugar are evaluated in the 
following section.
India
India is the world’s second largest producer, 
consumer, and exporter of rice, as described in 
Chapter 3. Exports of common rice from India 
were tightly regulated until 1994. Since then 
India has become a substantial supplier of com-
mon as well as basmati rice (Figure 5.1).
 The government actively intervenes in the 
domestic rice market through price support 
and procurement operations.31 As described by 
Hoda and Gulati (2007) these are both “pur-
chase operations to extend price support to 
farmers for paddy rice,” and procurement of 
rice “under the statutory levy system imposed 
under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955.” 
Support prices for food grains increased steadily 
during the period 1996–2002, and large stocks 
accumulated under the procurement policies 
(Figure 5.2).
 Export subsidization by India was not an 
issue in the 1980s or early 1990s. However, 
when world cereal prices fell to low levels in 
the late 1990s, while increases in domestic 
support prices for wheat and rice in India led 
to increased production and procurement, 
the GOI initiated a policy of subsidies for 
export cereals. In November 2000 it offered 
wheat for export at a price “equal to the 
economic cost minus two years carrying cost 
but not lower than the central issue price for 
[those below the poverty line]” (GOI 2001a, 
as cited in Hoda and Gulati 2007). The sub-
sidy was expanded to include rice the fol-
lowing year.
 Although still small in relation to total 
domestic production, India’s exports of food 
grains rose to levels previously unseen under 
the export price policy decisions (Figure 5.1 
and Table 5.4). Hoda and Gulati (2007) ex-
plain that the GOI justified its export support 
under an exemption for developing coun-
tries in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
31The discussion of rice and sugar policies in this chapter again draws heavily on Hoda and Gulati (2007).
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Figure 5.1 Net rice trade of India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1985–2003
Source: FAO (2006).
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Figure 5.2 Food grain stocks in India, April 2000–December 2002 
Source: GOI (2003).
Millions of tons
0
75
50
21.7
42.2 40.1
45.7 44.7
61.7 63.0
58.3 58.0
50.9 51.4 48.2
25
Actual stock
0002
 lirp
A
yl
uJ
02
00
reb
otcO
02
00
yra
u
naJ
02
10
yra
u
naJ
02
20
yra
u
naJ
02
30
lirp
A
02
10
yl
uJ
02
10
reb
otcO
02
10
lirp
A
02
20
yl
uJ
02
20
reb
otcO
02
20
Minimum buffer norms
72   CHAPTER 5
for subsidies to offset marketing costs and 
provide internal transport charges on export 
shipments. Wailes (2003) estimated that sub-
sidies to promote exports reached 50 percent 
of procurement prices for rice.
 Our price comparisons and annual esti-
mates of the rice %MPS and commodity-
specific %PSE for 1985 to 2002 under sev-
eral alternative assumptions are shown in 
Table 5.5. In these calculations the MPS is 
computed based on the difference between 
the weighted average procurement price 
(wholesale level) of rice (Pd) during the peak 
paddy harvest season (October–January) and 
the adjusted reference prices for the same 
time period. The reference prices for ex-
ports (P
exporterfob in Table 5.5) are taken in 
dollars as the price of Thai 15 percent bro-
ken rice. Adding the international transpor-
tation costs to India from the source at Thai 
ports gives P
cif, a dollar reference price for 
imports. The unadjusted reference prices in 
rupees per ton for Indian exports and im-
ports, respectively, are obtained by multi-
plying these prices by the nominal exchange 
rate. The unadjusted reference prices are not 
shown in the table. Instead the average ad-
justed reference prices (P
m
 and P
e
) are given. 
These prices include adjustments for inter-
nal marketing and transportation costs. This 
follows equations (1) and (2), as modified 
for the state-level analysis and aggregation 
along the lines of Gulati, Hanson, and Pur-
sell (1990), Gulati and Kelley (1999), and 
Gulati and Pursell (2000).32 Estimates of 
the national-level market-clearing autarky 
prices (P*) are also shown.
 For comparative purposes, we compute 
the MPS for rice in India under several as-
sumptions. Under the exportable hypothesis, 
our calculations are based on two major 
producing and net surplus states (Andhra 
Pradesh and Punjab). Under the importable 
hypothesis, we compute the MPS for Andhra 
Pradesh and Punjab and for one major pro-
ducing but net deficit state (Uttar Pradesh). 
The national estimates for the %MPS are 
reported under the importable and export-
able hypotheses using adjusted reference 
prices. A simplified %MPS, based on the 
difference between the procurement price 
and a reference price at the border without 
internal adjustments (c.i.f. for imports and 
f.o.b. for exports) is shown for comparison. 
The relevant adjusted reference prices cho-
sen under our modified procedure for refer-
ence price selection are shown in bold in 
Table 5.5. The %MPS are also reported 
under this assumption.33
 The %MPS results shown in Table 5.5 
under the importable hypothesis are quite 
similar with and without internal adjustments 
to the reference price. Internal adjustments 
add some costs to the unadjusted reference 
price to account for bringing imports to the 
domestic wholesale markets, while the costs 
of bringing domestic farm output to the 
wholesale level are subtracted to make 
farmgate-level price comparisons. The net 
adjustment is small for rice for India when 
aggregated across regions.
 There is a greater difference between un-
adjusted and adjusted reference prices under 
the exportable hypothesis than under the 
importable hypothesis, and thus in the re-
Table 5.4 India’s wheat and rice 
exports, 2000/01–2002/03 
(million metric tons)
Year (April–March) Wheat Rice Total
2000/01 0.81 1.53 2.34
2001/02 2.65 2.21 4.86
2002/03 3.57 4.67 8.24
Source: www.indiastat.com.
32See the references cited, Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005), and Hoda and Gulati (2007) for additional discus-
sion of the data and these and related adjustments for India. 
33To recall, when P* > P
m
, then P
m
 is the relevant P
ar
; when P
e 
> P*, then P
e
 is the relevant P
ar
; and when P
m 
> 
P* > P
e
, then P* is the relevant P
ar
.
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spective %MPS. For exports, all internal 
costs have to be subtracted from the unad-
justed reference price to make a comparison 
to the domestic farmgate price. In this case 
the MPS based on a comparison of domes-
tic prices and unadjusted reference prices 
has a systematic downward bias. The %MPS 
results with the adjusted reference price under 
the exportable hypothesis are greater than for 
the unadjusted reference price by 4.9 per-
cent (in 1996) to 29.2 percent (in 1987).
 We next focus our evaluation on the es-
timates of the %MPS with adjusted refer-
ence prices to assess the substantive issue of 
levels of protection or disprotection. The re-
sults under the exportable hypothesis are 
greater than those under the importable hy-
pothesis because P
e
 is always less than P
m
. 
There are large fluctuations in the %MPS 
over time, partly countercyclical to inter-
national price movements and partly reflect-
ing exchange rate devaluation and changes 
in the domestic support price. Overall the 
%MPS results shown in Table 5.5 and illus-
trated (using the adjusted reference prices 
from the modified procedure) in Figure 5.3 
show that rice has been substantially dispro-
tected in India except in the mid-1980s and 
in 2000–02. Domestic prices of rice in India 
were lower than the adjusted reference price 
of exports from 1988 through 1999. World 
prices were relatively strong during this pe-
riod, and a nominal depreciation of the In-
dian currency of 80 percent between 1990 
and 1993 raised the adjusted reference price 
in domestic currency. (See Chapter 6 for 
further discussion of the effects of exchange 
rate alignment.)
 Under the modified procedure, P
e
 is the 
relevant adjusted reference price from 1988 
through 2000, meaning that if policy inter-
ventions had been removed it is estimated 
that India would have been a net exporter 
of rice. The relevant P
ar
 is P* in 1985, P
m
 in 
1987, and P* again in 2001 and 2002. The 
three years when P* was the relevant refer-
ence price imply, in principle, that without 
policy interventions India would have been 
self-sufficient in rice production, but would 
not have imported or exported (or experi-
enced changes in intervention stock levels). 
P
m
 was “too high” for imports to be competi-
tive in these years, while P
e
 was “too low” 
relative to P* for exports to be profitable in 
the world market.
 As international prices fell in the late 
1990s, India’s rice exports turned sluggish. 
The MPS becomes positive under the ex-
port hypothesis, with domestic prices higher 
than the adjusted reference export prices in 
2000–02. Stocks accumulated and, because 
the domestic price was greater than the ad-
justed international price for exports, the 
government had to introduce subsidies in 
order for rice shipments abroad to continue. 
Our estimates of the necessary export sub-
sidies (the difference between the domestic 
price and the adjusted reference price under 
the exportable hypothesis) are on the order 
of 35–40 percent in 2001 and 2002. Under 
the modified procedure the %MPS remains 
negative in 2001, compared to positive sup-
port under the export hypothesis and the need 
for export subsidies given actual domestic 
and world prices. In 2002 the %MPS from 
the modified procedure is positive, but the 
estimated level (20.3 percent) is less than 
under the conventional exportable assump-
tion (35.6 percent).
 To calculate the commodity-specific 
%PSE for rice, we take the MPS based on 
the modified procedure as our estimate for 
each year and compute the nominal MPS 
value for total rice production. To the MPS 
we add the budgetary payments allocated to 
rice producers, which include 34.7 percent 
of the total fertilizer subsidies and 30.9 per-
cent of the power and irrigation subsidies. 
Adding the nominal MPS for rice and the 
budgetary payments allocated to rice gives 
the nominal rice PSE.
 In Table 5.5 we have computed the rice 
%PSE under both the “trade economist” and 
OECD approaches to choosing the denomi-
nator. The trade economist %PSE is always 
less negative or more positive than the %MPS 
because of the addition of positive budgetary 
expenditures. The %PSE estimates broadly 
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follow the same pattern and sign as the 
%MPS, but in 1998 and 2001 positive bud-
getary expenditures exceed MPS disprotec-
tion. The %PSE based on the trade econo-
mist approach is always greater than the 
OECD approach (labeled “OECD denomi-
nator” in the table) when the PSE is positive 
and smaller (in absolute value) when the PSE 
is negative. These results follow from the re-
lationship between the two denominators.34 
Table 5.5 India rice prices, %MPS, and %PSE under various assumptions, 1985–2002
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Price data         
 P
exporterfob (US$/metric ton) 209 200 159 254 258 256 254 254 
 P
cif (US$/metric ton) 228 220 175 271 286 284 281 281 
 Exchange rate (Rs/$) 12.3 12.1 13.0 13.0 15.0 16.9 18.1 25.9 
         
 Pd (Rs/metric ton) 2,245 2,320 2,386 2,239 2,613 3,005 3,375 3,861 
         
 P
m 
(Rs/metric ton) 2,726 2,586 2,199 3,453 4,234 4,714 5,013 7,179 
 P
e
 (Rs/metric ton) 2,206 2,051 1,656 2,879 3,381 3,777 3,996 5,858 
 P* (Rs/metric ton) 2,515 2,030 2,285 2,841 2,659 2,965 3,402 3,920 
         
Rice %MPS estimates         
 Importable hypothesis         
  Adjusted reference price –17.7 –10.3 8.5 –35.2 –38.3 –36.3 –32.7 –46.2 
   Unadjusted border price  –19.9 –12.9 4.5 –36.6 –39.0 –37.4 –33.8 –46.8 
   (c.i.f.)
  Difference 2.2 2.6 4.0 1.4 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.6 
         
 Exportable hypothesis         
  Adjusted reference price 3.7 15.4 46.9 –22.2 –21.0 –18.8 –14.4 –33.2 
   Unadjusted border price  –10.6 –2.4 17.7 –32.4 –30.7 –29.2 –25.8 –40.4 
   (f.o.b.)
  Difference 14.3 17.8 29.2 10.1 9.7 10.3 11.3 7.1 
         
 Modified procedure –10.8 15.4 8.5 –22.2 –21.0 –18.8 –14.4 –33.2 
         
Rice PSE under modified 
 procedure (billion Rs)         
 MPS –15.8 17.2 11.3 –36.4 –54.2 –56.8 –46.2 –149.1 
 Budgetary payments 9.5 11.3 8.3 15.7 23.1 28.1 38.0 39.2 
 Nominal PSE –6.3 28.5 19.7 –20.6 –31.0 –28.7 –8.1 –109.9 
         
 %PSE          
   Trade economist 
 denominator –4.3 21.7 14.8 –12.6 –13.0 –10.3 –2.7 –25.1 
  OECD denominator –4.5 17.9 12.9 –14.4 –15.0 –11.5 –2.8 –33.6 
Source:  Gulati-Purcell database (2002) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  Relevant P
ar 
is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of P
exporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted ref-
erence
 
prices in rupees (P
r
 in equations (1) and (2) on page 9, respectively, which are not shown in the table). P
m
 and P
e
 are the 
 adjusted reference prices from those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments).
34The value of production at domestic prices is its value at adjusted reference prices plus the nominal MPS. 
The subsidy counter denominator is larger when product-specific PSE is positive because (MPS + BP) for the
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The difference in the case of rice in India is 
often small. An exception is when the MPS 
is a large positive or negative number. For 
example, in 1996, with rice disprotected, the 
%PSE with the trade economist denominator 
is –34.4 percent, compared to –52.5 percent 
under the OECD denominator, a difference 
of 18.1 percent. In 1986–87 and 2000–02, 
with protection of rice, this relationship re-
verses and the trade economist commodity-
specific rice %PSE exceeds that with the 
OECD denominator by 40.1 percent, com-
pared to 28.6 percent in 2002.
Indonesia
Indonesia is the world’s third largest pro-
ducer of rice but in contrast to India it was a 
small net importer from 1985 to 1994, and it 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
         
237 278 254 346 304 255 272 216 174 173
264 306 284 375 333 284 300 244 202 201
26.0 31.4 31.4 35.0 35.8 38.0 42.4 43.5 46.6 48.1
         
4,515 5,162 5,665 6,057 6,745 7,734 8,418 8,780 8,535 8,494
         
6,786 9,456 8,763 13,006 11,815 10,699 12,659 10,507 9,353 9,580
5,339 7,809 6,955 11,020 9,708 8,349 10,118 7,873 6,597 6,724
4,890 4,721 5,250 6,689 6,017 7,471 7,724 5,578 9,020 7,059
         
         
         
–33.5 –45.4 –35.4 –53.4 –42.9 –27.7 –33.5 –16.4 –8.7 –11.3
–34.4 –46.2 –36.3 –53.8 –43.3 –28.3 –33.8 –16.9 –9.4 –11.7
0.9 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4
         
         
–14.2 –32.8 –17.6 –44.8 –28.9 –4.0 –14.9 19.5 39.2 35.6
–25.6 –39.8 –28.1 –49.6 –36.5 –17.4 –25.4 0.3 12.7 9.6
11.4 7.0 10.4 4.9 7.6 13.4 10.5 19.3 26.6 26.0
         
–14.2 –32.8 –17.6 –44.8 –28.9 –4.0 –14.9 19.5 –5.4 20.3
         
         
–60.1 –212.6 –105.5 –382.0 –242.2 –50.7 –146.3 81.4 –41.1 130.3
44.1 49.9 74.2 90.0 95.2 101.4 113.5 118.7 131.1 139.9
–15.9 –162.7 –31.3 –292.0 –147.0 50.6 –32.8 200.1 85.5 256.9
         
         
–4.1 –25.9 –5.5 –34.4 –18.5 7.3 –3.8 28.3 11.2 40.1
–4.3 –35.0 –5.8 –52.5 –22.7 6.8 –3.9 22.1 10.0 28.6
commodity is greater than zero. Conversely, when the product-specific PSE is negative, the subsidy counter 
denominator is smaller in absolute value because (MPS + BP) is less than zero.
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has mostly been a substantial importer since 
then (Figure 5.1). Rice is the main dietary 
staple and continues to be at the center of 
Indonesian food policies. In the decade from 
1975 to 1985, the government promoted rice 
through a combination of output price sup-
port and input subsidies, and production 
increased by about 7 percent annually on 
average. Rice self-sufficiency was attained 
in the mid-1980s, a substantial reversal con-
sidering that Indonesia was the world’s larg-
est net importer of rice five years earlier 
(Bautista et al. 1997). In the mid-1990s, un-
expected shortages made large imports nec-
essary to keep domestic prices below a ceil-
ing level. During 1998–99, imports reflected 
decreased production due in part to the 
drought brought on by El Niño weather con-
ditions. Self-sufficiency for rice increased to 
95 percent in 2000 and 2001, but then de-
clined again.
 Prior to 1997 the Suharto government 
stabilized domestic prices of rice by a com-
bination of a price band (a guaranteed floor 
price for producers and a ceiling price for 
consumers) and a monopoly on international 
trade by BULOG. The prices were defended 
through BULOG’s control over international 
trade and the management of stocks. BULOG 
would purchase domestic rice to prevent the 
price from falling below the floor price, and 
it would release stocks or import rice to keep 
the price below the ceiling. In addition, the 
government promoted production through 
the development of new rice varieties, which 
required investment in irrigation and led 
Figure 5.3 Rice %MPS and %PSE for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1985–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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to the provision of subsidized fertilizers. 
BULOG was successful in stabilizing do-
mestic rice prices at supported levels, but 
it kept them somewhat aligned with world 
prices (Timmer 2002). BULOG’s procure-
ments averaged around 10 percent of do-
mestic production, with marketing margins 
wide enough to allow private traders to 
complement and simplify BULOG’s opera-
tions (BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI 2002a; 
Bari chello 2003).
 Reforms to rice policy were undertaken 
in 1998 as part of the IMF structural adjust-
ment program. Corruption in BULOG also 
prompted the government to eliminate its 
import monopoly for rice and to open the 
domestic markets and international trade 
(Magiera 2003). Rice trade was liberalized 
and entrusted to private firms, but control 
was returned to BULOG when private trad-
ers were unable to maintain the floor price 
(Wailes 2003). In January 2000 a rice tariff 
of Rp 430 per kilogram (about 30 percent) 
became effective. BULOG remained autho-
rized by the government to restrict imports 
when domestic prices fell below a certain 
threshold or to prevent a rice glut (WTO 
2003). Oryza (2004) reported that BULOG 
had delayed 400,000 metric tons of rice im-
ports from January to August to prevent the 
price of rice in the domestic market from 
falling. Thus BULOG continued to provide 
support to rice producers and stabilize prices 
through domestic procurement after the re-
forms undertaken in 1998.
 The %MPS and %PSE for rice in Indo-
nesia for the period 1985–2003 are shown in 
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.6. At the beginning 
of the period, protection is high, reflecting 
the government’s efforts to promote rice 
production and attain self-sufficiency. Dur-
ing the following period, 1987–97, the pat-
tern of MPS is consistent with the policy of 
stabilization. The MPS are mostly positive 
except in the late 1980s, when world rice 
prices surge upward (leading to %MPS of
–8.0 and –11.2 in 1988 and 1989). In the 
1990s, domestic prices remained above world 
prices with moderate levels of support pro-
vided. The devaluation in 1998 explains the 
temporarily negative protection (–43.7 per-
cent). Although domestic prices were raised 
in 1998, the border price of rice increased by 
even more owing to the depreciation (Bari-
chello 2003). Since 1998, rice is protected. 
When compared with rates of nominal pro-
tection computed by Barichello, the estimates 
herein show similar movements for the over-
lapping years.
 According to Wailes (2003) nontariff 
barriers imposed by Indonesia resulted in a 
much higher tariff equivalent (75 percent) 
on rice imports than the 30 percent import 
duty. The nontariff barriers include cumber-
some customs regulations requiring imported 
goods to undergo physical examination and 
a check of their declared value (WTO 2003). 
A special importer identification number for 
certain commodities also limited imports 
(BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI 2002b). Com-
paring the actual retail price in Jakarta with 
the import parity price of Indian 15% bro-
ken rice, BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI (2002b) 
estimates that protection was equivalent to 
98.5 percent during January–May 2002.
 In our analysis the %MPS for rice, 
based on annual comparisons with an ad-
justed Thai export price, range from 25.6 to 
57.7 percent in 2001–03. These results are 
more consistent with the 30 percent tariff. 
Still, they indicate that the protection for 
rice has been higher than reflected in the 
import tariff alone. Budgetary expenditures 
for input subsidies are estimated to be rela-
tively low compared to MPS for Indonesia, 
so the %PSE is mostly similar to the %MPS. 
The level of support can vary widely across 
regions within Indonesia, as shown in Table 
5.7. Support for rice has generally been 
much higher in the off-Java regions of Su-
matra and South Sulawesi, and lower in the 
rest of Sulawesi, than in Java, where more 
than half the rice is produced. This pattern 
holds until 2002, when estimated protection 
jumps upward for Java while declining 
elsewhere.
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China
Rice is an important strategic commodity in 
China as well as India and Indonesia, and 
again its production has been managed with 
the use of procurement prices to ensure 
stable supplies (Wailes 2003). The GGBRS 
policies led to large increases in govern-
ment stocks of rice in the late 1990s, which 
reached approximately 100 million tons, or 
73 percent of domestic use. In 1999 the gov-
ernment eliminated the purchase of low-
quality, early-season rice and lowered the 
rice procurement prices. In some coastal 
provinces, the procurement policies were 
completely eliminated (OECD 2002b).
 Rice exports are made by the state trad-
ing enterprise, the China National Cereals, 
Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation, without 
significant export subsidies (Huang and 
Rozelle 2002). China also imports mainly 
premium Thai jasmine rice for high-income 
urban consumers, and rice imports are sub-
ject to TRQs, as described in Chapter 4.
 The %MPS for rice in China for the 
period 1995–2001 shown in Figure 5.3 and 
Table 5.6 suggest an ongoing shift, which 
began in earlier years, from disprotection 
toward protection. Accounting for internal 
transportation costs and marketing margins 
would reduce the adjusted reference price 
for rice exports at the farmgate level and lead 
to a greater computed %MPS. Our results 
are contrary to the average nominal protec-
tion (–3 percent in 2001) calculated on the 
basis of a survey of 100 grain traders and 
officials by Huang and Rozelle (2003) or 
the rice PSE results (–1 percent in 2000) of 
Tian, Zhang, and Zhou (2002), but they are 
consistent with the estimate (9 percent in 
2000–03) reported in a recent study by the 
Table 5.6 Rice %MPS and %PSE for Indonesia (1985–2003), China (1995–2001), and Vietnam (1986–2002)
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Indonesia                 
 MPS (%) 42.3 43.7 2.4 –8.0 –11.2 6.0 4.2 13.6 
 MPS (billion Rp) 2,800 3,054 260 –1,327 –2,169 1,053 822 2,647 
 Budgetary payments (billion Rp) 828 665 489 787 500 537 713 862 
 Nominal PSE  (billion Rp) 3,628 3,719 749 –540 –1,670 1,590 1,535 3,509 
 PSE (%)         
  Trade economist denominator 55.0 52.9 6.6 –3.3 –8.7 8.9 7.6 17.8 
  OECD denominator 35.5 34.6 6.2 –3.4 –9.5 8.1 7.1 15.1 
                  
China         
 MPS (%)         
 MPS (billion yuan)         
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan)         
 Nominal PSE  (billion yuan)         
 PSE (%)         
  Trade economist denominator         
  OECD denominator         
         
Vietnam         
 MPS (%)  –14.3 24.5 209.5 9.1 –38.0 –26.4 –22.1 
 MPS (billion VND)  –33 214 3,812 589 –4,722 –6,033 –5,865 
 Budgetary payments (billion VND)   8 39 47 64 130 176 
 Nominal PSE  (billion VND)  –33 222 3,851 636 –4,658 –5,903 –5,689 
 PSE (%)         
  Trade economist denominator  –14.3 25.5 211.7 9.9 –37.5 –25.9 –21.5 
  OECD denominator  –16.6 20.3 67.9 9.0 –60.0 –34.9 –27.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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OECD (2005b). Our estimated pattern of 
protection of rice in China is similar to that 
for India, with disprotection when world 
prices were high in 1996 turning to protec-
tion when world prices were lower in 2000 
and 2001. The budgetary payments, includ-
ing the taxes and fees, represent only a small 
proportion of total support to farmers in most 
years. Because of the dominance of the MPS 
component in total support, the inclusion of 
small budgetary payments in the calculation 
of %PSE has relatively little impact.
Vietnam
Vietnam has become the fifth largest pro-
ducer of rice worldwide, with most rice pro-
duced by wet cultivation in the Red and 
Mekong river deltas. The dominance of rice 
is again due in part to the government’s pro-
motion of self-sufficiency by policies imple-
mented throughout the first half of the 1980s. 
By the end of the 1980s, Vietnam was still a 
rice importer, but import volumes were de-
creasing. During the 1990s the annual growth 
rate of paddy rice production was 4.4 per-
cent, with rice yields rising from 2.8 tons 
per hectare in 1986 to 4.1 tons per hectare 
in 2000. Incentives for rice production were 
provided by the land reforms, improved and 
subsidized infrastructure (especially for irri-
gation), and easier access to variable inputs 
of fertilizer and pesticides. Vietnam became 
a rice exporter at the beginning of the 1990s, 
with a substantial increase in its export vol-
ume after 1995. Early fluctuations in exports 
at the beginning of the 1990s were partly due 
to lack of experience by Vietnamese trading 
enterprises in accessing foreign markets 
(Nguyen and Grote 2004).
 Low paddy prices during good harvests 
led to state intervention in the 1990s. A 
Council of Ministers decision in April 1992 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
                     
21.6 25.6 16.4 10.9 11.8 –43.7 19.0 25.6 25.1 54.5 57.7
4,002 5,370 4,782 3,549 4,137 –52,112 15,140 17,836 18,278 40,683 41,280
868 950 1,715 1,490 1,702 2,166 4,694 2,346 1,450 1,038 921
4,871 6,320 6,497 5,038 5,839 –49,946 19,834 20,182 19,729 41,721 42,201
          
26.1 29.9 22.2 15.4 16.6 –41.9 25.0 29.2 27.3 55.8 59.2
20.7 23.0 18.1 13.4 14.2 –72.1 20.0 22.6 21.4 35.8 37.2
                     
          
  –12.3 –25.3 –5.1 2.5 –10.4 3.8 11.7  
  –64.4 –163.7 –23.2 10.1 –40.0 11.0 28.7  
  –4.2 1.1 1.2 3.5 2.7 2.3 2.4  
  –68.6 –162.6 –22.1 13.6 –37.3 13.2 31.1  
          
  –13.1 –25.1 –4.9 3.4 –9.7 4.6 12.6  
  –14.9 –33.6 –5.1 3.3 –10.8 4.4 11.3  
          
          
–22.1 –21.8 –20.0 3.9 19.4 21.6 39.5 36.7 43.4 16.4 
–5,779 –6,150 –7,516 1,647 7,779 11,673 20,072 16,587 17,581 9,902 
184 209 339 477 490 636 685 599 664 769 
–5,595 –5,940 –7,177 2,124 8,269 12,309 20,757 17,186 18,245 10,671 
          
–21.4 –21.0 –19.1 5.0 20.7 22.8 40.8 38.0 45.0 17.7 
–27.2 –26.7 –23.7 4.8 17.1 18.6 29.0 27.6 31.0 15.1 
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marks an important change in the policy re-
form process in Vietnam. In this decision 
the state specified a maximum price for rice 
in focal markets, maximum costs for trans-
porting foods from the south to the north 
and to mountainous areas, a minimum price 
for paddy bought from farmers, minimum 
export prices in foreign currencies, and a 
maximum price for imported urea.
 In 1997 the government started to inte-
grate the national rice markets by lifting in-
ternal barriers to trade among regions. Since 
1998 private companies have been allowed 
to export rice. The export quota was ini-
tially retained, ostensibly to ensure domes-
tic food security and price stability, and a 
large portion of the exports was allocated 
to STEs. Specifically, state-owned focal ex-
porters of rice accounted for about 90 per-
cent of the total export quota. In 2001 the 
export quota was eliminated, and since then 
private companies have been able to export 
without restrictions.
 In the MPS calculations for Vietnam, 
conversion factors from paddy to milled rice 
and adjustments for the handling costs and 
the marketing margin are based on Nguyen 
et al. (1995). They report that the paddy 
price accounts for 73.5 percent of the milled 
price.35 The port charges and transportation 
and handling costs of the exporting com-
panies are estimated to be 9.3 percent of the 
export price, and the marketing margins of 
the exporting companies to be 9.8 percent 
(see Table 5.3). This estimate of the market-
ing margin is supported by other studies. 
Khiem et al. (1996), as quoted in Young et al. 
(2002), estimate packaging costs of rice ex-
porters in the Mekong Delta to account for 
about 3 percent, while the profits of the ex-
porting companies are 5.6 percent of the 
export price. Nguyen et al. (1997) estimate 
Table 5.7 Regional estimates of rice %MPS for Indonesia, 1985–2003 
Year
West
Java
Central
Java
East
Java
West
Sumatra
Rest of
Sumatra
South
Sulawesi
Rest of
Sulawesi
Rest of
Indonesia
1985 20 36 30 75 61 40 74 36
1986 39 52 44 70 47 2 38 11
1987 –2 10 6 13 0 –22 –4 –23
1988 –12 0 –7 14 –9 –32 –16 –31
1989 –16 –8 –14 8 –3 –28 –42 –30
1990 2 8 1 20 18 –16 –1 –21
1991 0 6 0 24 20 –24 –8 –24
1992 8 15 10 37 23 –11 7 –11
1993 14 18 17 35 36 2 42 –7
1994 23 31 26 21 28 5 45 –7
1995 14 21 13 25 14 –2 34 –6
1996 7 16 7 15 6 7 –6 –5
1997 8 14 12 23 6 7 –9 –7
1998 –43 –42 –44 –51 –51 –44 –56 –48
1999 18 12 18 –9 11 20 29 13
2000 18 15 19 35 31 9 41 23
2001 21 16 20 23 30 2 45 18
2002 57 62 75 16 35 19 24 34
2003 62 60 49 18 49 44 10 59
Source: Authors’ calculations.
35In addition, there is a conversion factor of 1.43 (= 1/0.7) as each kilogram of paddy gives 0.7 kilogram of rice. 
The price of the rice, Pd, converted from the paddy price, Pf , can thus be calculated as Pd = 1.43(Pf /0.735).
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that advertising and trade fair costs range 
from 0.1 to 1.5 percent of the export price. 
Hence, based on these studies, the total 
marketing margin is within 8.7–10.1 percent 
of the export price.
 An adjustment to account for quality 
differences is also made in order to compare 
domestic with adjusted export prices for rice. 
For domestically consumed rice, the IAE 
(2001) calculated an average quality index, 
based on survey results. For the year 2000, 
the index value is 1.68 (Table 5.8).
 For the exported rice, we construct a 
corresponding quality index. Domestically 
consumed rice in Vietnam is categorized 
into three groups: (i) high-quality (less than 
10 percent broken; short storage time; fra-
grant rice); (ii) medium-quality (more than 
10 percent broken); and (iii) low-quality (very 
high percentage of broken rice; moldy; long 
storage time).
 According to international standards, 
how ever, rice is categorized into the follow-
ing three groups: (a) high-quality (no more 
than 10 percent broken), (b) medium-quality 
(15–20 percent broken), and (c) low-quality 
(more than 20 percent broken).
 Vietnamese medium-quality domestic 
rice (ii) corresponds most closely to the cat-
egory of low-quality exported rice (c). IAE 
(2001) has assigned factors of 1 to the low-
quality domestic rice (iii), 1.4 to the medium-
quality rice (ii), and 2.9 to the high-quality 
domestic rice (i). Hence we assign a factor of 
1.4 to the low-quality export rice (c). Quality 
ratings of the other two export-quality cate-
gories (a and b) were calculated using price 
premiums (35 percent for high-quality and 
25 percent for medium), resulting in indices 
of 1.89 and 1.75, respectively. The result is 
a quality index for exported rice of 1.73, 
slightly higher than that for domestic rice.
 The %MPS for rice in Vietnam based 
on these adjustments show that rice farmers 
were mainly disprotected before 1996 (Fig-
ure 5.3 and Table 5.6). An exception occurs 
at the beginning of the reform process, be-
tween 1987 and 1989. The extremely posi-
tive %MPS in 1988 is due to superinflation 
and a resulting temporarily highly over valued 
exchange rate. Superinflation raised domes-
tic prices for rice, while export prices were 
low when converted into the local currency, 
due to the overvaluation. The effect dissi-
pates within a year as devaluation occurs. 
The subsequent negative %MPS in the early 
1990s can be attributed to the restrictive 
export quota. During these years, the annual 
export quota of rice was kept below 2 mil-
lion tons. The export quota made rice more 
abundant in domestic markets and lowered 
its domestic price.
 Because of the liberalization of the rice 
market and the minimum price policy en-
acted in 1992, producer prices rose in all re-
gions but especially in the south, where the 
implicit tax of the export quota had depressed 
prices the most. This rising price trend was 
accelerated by public stockholding and the in-
creased export quota, increasing the demand 
Table 5.8 Quality indices for domestic and exported rice in Vietnam, 2000
Share in total
of each category (%)
Quality index
of each category
Quality index
of total
Domestic rice 1.68
Exported rice 1.73
By quality category (based on percentage of broken rice)
 10% and less broken 49 1.89 0.93
 15–20% 26 1.75 0.45
 More than 20% 25 1.4 0.35
Sources: IAE (2001), Institute for Trade Research (2001), and authors’ own calculations.
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for rice and pushing up domestic prices. The 
significant increase in the export volume 
since 1996 correlates well with the sharp 
increase in the domestic price, while the 
initial lack of competition in the allocation 
of the export quota contributes to STEs 
maintaining export prices lower than they 
would otherwise have been. The %MPS for 
rice keeps increasing and becomes positive 
in the mid-1990s.
 Since irrigation is used mainly for rice 
production, in our analysis the irrigation sub-
sidy is attributed wholly to rice and not al-
located across commodities. Similarly most 
seed subsidies are for rice. We included only 
the irrigation and seed subsidies in our cal-
culation of budgetary payments to rice. These 
subsidies are small relative to the MPS. Thus 
there is an increasing trend of the %PSE for 
rice, similar to that for the %MPS. In the 
first half of the 1990s, rice was taxed as 
the %PSE was negative. Since 1997 rice has 
been increasingly protected, and the protec-
tion reaches relatively high levels in the years 
1999–2001.
 Our estimates of rice support are partly 
corroborated by the results of a study by the 
GSO (1999). They calculated an effective 
rate of protection for rice of 0.127 for 1996, 
indicating protection in that year. Barker 
(1994) found that the domestic retail price 
of rice was about 10 percent lower than the 
Hochiminh City f.o.b. price at the beginning 
of the 1990s, and they attribute this gap pri-
marily to the monopoly position of public 
trading firms.
 Results from a study by Barker et al. 
(2001) also indicated negative nominal and 
effective protection rates for rice. They 
showed that rice was disprotected during 
the 1985–2000 period, while our estimates 
indicate an increase in protection since 1996. 
Nguyen and Heidhues (2004) report that 
Vietnamese rice farmers were disprotected 
by about 8 percent in 1998. Their result de-
rived from a comparison between the do-
mestic price of rice in Angiang province 
and the “social” price of rice. Angiang is the 
largest rice-producing province, and the sec-
ond largest rice-exporting province, so their 
data are representative of prevailing rice 
prices. However, internal adjustments be-
tween prices of exported and domestically 
consumed rice are not incorporated into their 
calculations. If we compare domestic and 
unadjusted border prices, we also find dis-
protection through 1998 and in 2002, with 
protection ranging from 9 to 13 percent dur-
ing 1999 through 2001 (Nguyen and Grote 
2004). The direction of movement from dis-
protection toward protection during 1985–
2002 remains similar using the unadjusted 
reference prices, with a greater degree of 
disprotection earlier in the period than with 
the adjusted reference prices. With the dif-
ferences between protection measured with 
adjusted price versus unadjusted reference 
prices exceeding 25 percent from 1999 on-
ward, there is quite a lot of room for uncer-
tainty about the levels of the %MPS. Thus 
the absolute levels of %MPS during 1999–
2002 need to be interpreted with caution, 
especially since no explicit subsidies to rice 
farmers are apparent. Transportation and 
marketing costs might have fallen in the late 
1990s as a percentage of the market price of 
rice as Vietnam transformed from a cen-
trally planned to market economy and gained 
experience as an exporter. If so, then our 
adjusted reference prices, which are calcu-
lated assuming these costs as a fixed per-
centage of prices and based on studies in the 
early 1990s, will result in underestimates of 
the later adjusted reference prices, and cor-
responding overstatement of the %MPS. 
A Comparison of Market 
Price Support and 
Commodity-Specific 
PSEs for Sugar
India
India, followed by the European Union and 
Brazil, is the world’s largest sugar producer, 
accounting for about 15 percent of world pro-
duction in 1999–2003, and the largest sugar-
consuming country, with domestic consump-
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tion averaging 19.4 million metric tons (in 
raw sugar equivalents) during this period 
(USDA-FAS 2004d). India’s trade pattern 
has fluctuated, and it is not among the major 
net sugar-importing or -exporting countries. 
Consecutive years of high production led to 
net exports by India of more than 1 million 
tons annually during the period 2000–03 
(Figure 5.4). This amount is a relatively 
small proportion of the 35–45 million 
metric tons of annual world trade, but repre-
sents an important reversal from India’s sta-
tus as a net importer in many previous years.
 Interventions in the sugar market were 
initially specified in 1951, and sugar is in-
cluded under the Essential Commodities Act 
of 1955. Its marketing and distribution by 
state-owned and private mills are highly 
regulated. The sugar policies are intended to 
regulate prices received by producers and 
ensure that specified quantities of sugar are 
available for distribution to consumers at low 
controlled prices (Pursell and Gupta 1996). 
Domestic sugar market policies encompass 
cane and processed sugar pricing rules and 
controls on sugar market releases.36
Figure 5.4 Net sugar trade of India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1985–2003
Source: FAO (2006).
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36Other government policies affecting sugar markets include a new ethanol production program, launched in 
January 2003, and a Sugar Development Fund (SDF). Recently the SDF, supported by a levy of Rs 140 per ton 
of sugar, has been used to pay for maintenance of buffer stocks, internal and international freight subsidies for 
sugar exports, and loans at concessional interest rates for power generation and ethanol production facilities, as 
well as for research and extension directed at sugarcane and sugar production (USDA-FAS 2004c). The central 
government has also recently announced Rs 32.4 billion ($706 million) in low-interest loans to selected state gov-
ernments to enable sugar mills to pay farmers the difference between the SAP and SMP (USDA-FAS 2004c).
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 For sugar the government establishes 
statutory minimum prices (SMPs) for each 
region. State governments have often aug-
mented the SMPs by an additional 20–30 
percent (USDA-FAS 2004c). Sugar mills are 
obliged to pay producers the effective state-
advised price (SAP) for sugarcane, and these 
prices were increasing in the late 1990s. This 
raised India’s cost of sugar production to an 
estimated $270–280 per ton, compared to 
an average of $172 for sugar production 
in the major low-cost producing countries 
(Mitchell 2004; USDA-FAS 2004c).
 The government also regulates the re-
lease of sugar from mills. Mills are required 
to sell a portion of their production, known 
as “levy sugar,” to the government at less 
than market prices. The government then 
sells this sugar to consumers below the pov-
erty line through the Public Distribution Sys-
tem. The levy price of sugar is determined 
based on the SMP in each region, sugar re-
covery rates, and costs. Since mills typically 
have to pay farmers the SAP, which can be 
greater than the SMP on a raw sugar equiv-
alent basis, sales at the levy price represent 
a loss to the mills. They are intended to 
recoup these losses from the sale of “free 
sugar” at market prices (Pursell and Gupta 
1996).37 Figure 5.5 shows the average levy 
and free sale price, and the proportion of 
sugar sold at market prices (the “free sale 
ratio”), for the three large producing states 
of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar 
Pradesh during the period 1985–2002. The 
proportion of free sale sugar has increased 
over time. The government also levies an 
excise tax on free sale sugar and operates a 
quarterly sales quota release program that 
restricts free sugar marketing.38
 India’s sugar imports and exports are 
also highly regulated. There was an import 
duty of 60 percent plus a countervailing duty 
of Rs 850 per ton on raw and refined sugar 
in the early 2000s. Imported sugar is also 
subject to the levy sugar obligation, the sugar 
release quota system, and other domestic 
regulations (USDA-FAS 2004c).
 To encourage sugar exports, the govern-
ment has offered incentives to exporters, in-
cluding an internal freight subsidy, which 
began in July 2002, of up to Rs 1,000 per 
ton to cover freight costs from the mill to 
the port. In February 2003 an ocean freight 
subsidy of Rs 350 per ton was offered, and 
beginning in October 2003 the government 
reimbursed handling and marketing costs up 
to Rs 500 per ton. Exports are also exempt 
from levy requirements, release quotas, cer-
tain taxes, and other domestic regulations. 
State governments also provide export sub-
sidies. For example, Maharashtra provides 
an export subsidy of Rs 2,500 per ton to its 
sugar mills (USDA-FAS 2004c).
 The MPS and PSE measures for sugar in 
India are computed using the three major 
producing states. World prices, international 
freight, and internal transport and marketing 
costs are handled similarly to other commod-
ities, but because of the complex sugar pricing 
policies the domestic price is the weighted 
average of the free sale sugar price and the 
levy sugar price, where the weights reflect the 
proportion of free sale to levy sugar mandated 
by the government. The free sale sugar price 
(quoted in the nearest major city) is adjusted 
by deducting marketing and traders’ margins 
between the mill and the major city and ex-
cise and other taxes, to estimate the price re-
ceived by the mills (Pursell and Gupta 1996).
37Some private sugar mills refused to purchase cane at the SMP at the start of the 2002/03 (October/Septem-
ber) marketing year and filed a case in the Supreme Court of India against the state governments’ policy of 
arbitrarily fixing the SAP. In an interim ruling, the court ordered the mills to pay the central government the 
announced SMP until a final decision is made (USDA-FAS 2004c). State-owned mills continue to pay the SAP, 
although their payment backlogs to farmers are up to two to three times greater than those of the private mills 
(USDA-FAS 2004c).
38Before 2002 the marketing quotas operated on a monthly basis.
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 Table 5.9 and Figure 5.6 present the 
%MPS and %PSE results. Large fluctua-
tions in the %MPS calculations over the pe-
riod 1985–2002 are primarily due to swings 
in the adjusted reference price of sugar. 
Again the sugar %MPS is computed under 
various assumptions. We focus on those from 
the modified procedure. These estimates 
suggest that sugar was highly protected in 
the late 1980s, became slightly disprotected 
in the early to mid-1990s, and reversed to in-
creasing levels of protection in the late 1990s. 
From 1996 to 2002 the estimated %MPS is 
positive and from 1997 to 2002 the relevant 
adjusted reference price under the modified 
procedure is the import price. While it is 
thus estimated that India would have been 
an importer without policy interventions, it 
was a net exporter in 1997 and again in 
2001–02. Our analysis (%MPS under the 
export hypothesis) suggests that export sub-
sidies on the order of 26.7–77.1 percent were 
necessary to make Indian sugar competitive 
on the world market. This is consistent with 
the USDA-FAS (2004c) cost comparisons 
and the policy setting in which internal and 
international freight subsidies and additional 
concessions on sugar exports were given.
 Turning to the %PSE, we capture the 
additional impact of the fertilizer, power, 
and irrigation subsidies on the sugar sector. 
About 85 percent of the total sugarcane area 
is irrigated, and sugarcane uses large quan-
tities of power (Pursell and Gupta 1996). We 
estimate that sugarcane production accounts 
for 7.12 percent of the total fertilizer usage 
and 5.18 percent of the total irrigated area in 
India. The trade economist %PSE exceeds 
the %MPS by an average of 10.5 percentage 
points. As with rice, when protection or dis-
protection is relatively large, the differences 
between the %PSE with the trade econo-
mist and OECD denominators are large 
and the measures differ. For example, during 
1985–87 the two %PSEs average 104.3 and 
50.8 percent, respectively. But the differences 
between these two support measures are not 
as large in recent years, when sugar has been 
protected.
Indonesia
Indonesia is a net sugar importer. Until the 
late 1980s, smallholder farmers accounted 
for almost 80 percent of cane production, 
partly as a result of the government’s sugar-
cane intensification program. This proportion 
has subsequently decreased to 55 percent 
(Rusastra, Suprihatini, and Iqbal 1999). The 
remaining share is split evenly between state-
owned and private large-scale plantations 
Figure 5.5 India levy and free sale sugar prices and ratio of quantities, 1985–2002
Source: Gulati-Pursell database (2002) and Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005).
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(USDA-FAS 2004b). The two major pro-
ducing areas are Java, which accounts for 
around 65 percent of total production, and 
Lampung (Sumatra), which accounts for 30 
percent. In Java sugar has to compete with 
alternative crops, especially rice, which offer 
higher returns, and the share of sugar pro-
duction on irrigated land has thus decreased 
(Rusastra, Suprihatini, and Iqbal 1999).
 Of the 59 sugar mills in Indonesia, 52 
are SOEs, which produce 68 percent of 
Indonesia’s sugar (USDA-FAS 2004b). In 
spite of the government’s support for domes-
tic production, imports continue to be sub-
stantial, and the self-sufficiency index dropped 
from 0.85 in 1970 to 0.63 in 1997 (Rusastra, 
Suprihatini, and Iqbal 1999). Smallholder 
farmers continue to face outdated production 
techniques, high input prices, and limited 
access to credit. These factors make Indone-
sia uncompetitive in world sugar markets.
 Sugar was heavily protected prior to the 
1998 reforms in an attempt, as with rice, to 
reach self-sufficiency. In the early 1970s 
BULOG was given the role of stabilizing 
prices and distributing sugar. In 1981 it was 
given a monopoly on sugar imports and do-
mestic procurement (Rusastra, Suprihatini, 
and Iqbal 1999). The government set the 
price structure for sugar, which consisted of 
Table 5.9 India sugar prices, % MPS, and %PSE under various assumptions, 1985–2002
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Price data
 P
exporterfob (US$/metric ton) 142 182 185 245 343 395 297 275 
 P
cif (US$/metric ton) 153 191 197 262 359 411 313 290 
 Exchange rate (Rs/$) 12.4 12.4 13.0 13.4 15.7 17.2 20.8 25.9 
 Pd (Rs/metric ton) 4,002 4,456 4,570 5,025 5,581 6,086 6,205 6,643 
 P
m 
(Rs/metric ton) 1,902 2,364 2,541 3,517 5,678 7,114 6,530 7,534 
 P
e
 (Rs/metric ton) 1,484 1,949 2,047 2,906 4,959 6,329 5,639 6,473 
 P* (Rs/metric ton) 6,612 6,782 6,205 6,665 8,199 6,663 6,483 6,206 
Sugar %MPS estimates
 Importable hypothesis
  Adjusted reference prices 110.5 88.5 79.8 42.9 –1.7 –14.5 –5.0 –11.8 
  Unadjusted border price (c.i.f.) 111.6 89.2 79.2 42.8 –1.2 –14.0 –4.5 –11.5 
  Difference –1.1 –0.6 0.6 0.1 –0.5 –0.5 –0.4 –0.3 
 Exportable hypothesis
  Adjusted reference prices 169.6 128.6 123.2 72.9 12.5 –3.8 10.0 2.6 
  Unadjusted border price (f.o.b.) 127.5 98.5 90.9 52.7 3.4 –10.5 0.6 –6.5 
  Difference 42.2 30.1 32.3 20.2 9.1 6.7 9.5 9.2 
 Modified procedure 110.5 88.5 79.8 42.9 –1.7 –8.7 –4.3 2.6 
Sugar PSE under modified procedure
 MPS (billion Rs) 12.9 14.7 17.2 13.7 –0.8 –6.3 –3.3 2.3 
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 1.8 2.1 1.4 2.7 4.1 5.1 7.0 7.0 
 Nominal PSE  (billion Rs) 14.7 16.8 18.6 16.5 3.3 –1.2 3.6 9.3 
 PSE (%)
  Trade economist denominator 125.5 101.0 86.3 51.4 6.6 –1.7 4.6 10.7 
  OECD denominator 55.7 50.3 46.3 33.9 6.2 –1.7 4.4 9.7 
Source: Gulati-Purcell database (2002) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Relevant P
ar 
is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of P
exporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference 
prices in rupees (P
r
 in equations (1) and (2) on page 9, respectively, which are not shown in the table). P
m
 and P
e
 are the adjusted 
reference prices from those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments).
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a provenue (manufactured primary price) 
and an ex-factory price. Farmers shared the 
set price with the mills, receiving 62–70 
percent of the sugar extraction value of the 
cane while the mills received the remaining 
share (USDA-FAS 1995).
 Starting in 1997 the government under-
took a series of deregulation steps that re-
moved BULOG’s monopoly control and al-
lowed private traders to import sugar and 
market it domestically. Farmers were released 
from earlier formal and informal require-
ments for planting sugarcane, and consumer 
price subsidies for sugar were eliminated. 
BULOG effectively maintained its full mo-
nopoly over sugar imports and distribution 
(owing to exclusive access to a subsidized 
exchange rate) until the end of 1998, when its 
monopoly control over sugar was eliminated 
(USDA-FAS 1998).
 Import licensing (to sugar millers) con-
tinued until 2000, when it was replaced by 
20 and 25 percent tariffs for raw and refined 
sugar, respectively. In 2002 the government 
started restricting imports of raw and refined 
sugar for processing at three state-owned 
sugar mills. Registered importers could im-
port semi-refined sugar only when farm-
gate prices of local sugar were higher than 
Rp 3,100 per kilogram, a level considered a 
break even point for domestic producers. The 
government also notified the WTO of new 
standards for raw sugar to be applied to do-
mestic production and imports. Ad valorem 
import tariffs were replaced by specific im-
port duties of Rp 550 per kilogram for raw 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
270 318 390 301 276 250 177 190 237 181 
288 332 406 316 291 265 193 206 252 196 
29.1 31.4 31.6 35.2 35.9 40.1 42.8 44.1 46.8 48.5 
7,930 10,116 9,590 10,341 11,186 11,993 11,971 12,474 13,135 13,137 
8,429 10,449 12,927 11,242 10,538 10,761 8,476 9,318 12,049 9,725 
7,145 9,172 11,477 9,643 8,831 8,908 6,421 7,194 9,828 7,419 
11,597 16,035 8,479 8,065 15,166 17,515 13,996 11,170 12,155 15,078 
–5.9 –3.2 –25.8 –8.0 6.1 11.5 41.2 33.9 9.0 35.1 
–5.5 –2.7 –25.2 –7.1 7.1 12.8 45.3 37.4 11.1 37.8
–0.5 –0.5 –0.7 –0.9 –1.0 –1.4 –4.1 –3.6 –2.1 –2.7
11.0 10.3 –16.4 7.2 26.7 34.6 86.4 73.4 33.6 77.1
0.8 1.5 –22.2 –2.3 13.1 19.8 58.0 48.6 18.4 49.6
10.2 8.8 5.7 9.5 13.5 14.8 28.4 24.8 15.3 27.5
–5.9 –3.2 –16.4 7.2 6.1 11.5 41.2 33.9 9.0 35.1 
–5.3 –3.3 –27.6 11.5 8.4 15.8 54.3 57.4 20.1 62.4 
7.8 8.8 13.5 16.4 17.2 18.1 20.1 20.7 22.9 24.4 
2.5 5.5 –14.2 27.8 25.6 33.9 74.4 78.2 43.0 86.8 
2.8 5.4 –8.4 17.5 18.8 24.5 56.5 46.1 19.3 48.8 
2.7 5.1 –9.2 14.9 15.8 19.7 36.1 31.6 16.2 32.8
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sugar and Rp 700 per kilogram for refined 
white sugar (Haley and Suarez 2003).
 The %MPS and %PSE for sugar in In-
donesia, shown in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.6, 
reflect these policies. For the MPS the price 
comparison is between an adjusted reference 
price of imported sugar, which is mostly 
refined and of better quality than the domes-
tically produced sugar, and the wholesale 
price in Jakarta of domestically produced 
sugar, which is an average price of refined 
and centrifugal raw sugar. Thus the MPS is 
computed ex-factory and expresses the sub-
sidies to the millers and farmers jointly while 
underestimating protection because of qual-
ity differences. Rising world sugar prices 
in the late 1980s meant that the domestic 
industry was disprotected because it faced a 
fixed domestic price. Price incentives to in-
crease sugar production have subsequently 
resulted in protection, with a %PSE esti-
mated at between 24.7 and 73.2 percent in 
the 1990s, except during 1997 and 1998 due 
to devaluation of the rupiah. By 2003 pro-
tection peaked at 101.3 percent. Substantial 
imports continued owing to poor perfor-
mance by the Indonesia sugar industry and 
falling world prices (Haley and Suarez 2003). 
The official import figures do not include 
illegal imports estimated in 2003/04 to be 
as high as 500,000 metric tons, a third of 
total imports. The rising trend in protection 
reflects the import restrictions established 
after 2002 and the high breakeven point sup-
ported for sugar production relative to fall-
ing world prices.
China
In 1999–2001 China was the third largest 
sugarcane producer after Brazil and India 
Figure 5.6 Sugar %MPS and %PSE for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1985–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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and the tenth largest sugar beet producer. 
Nevertheless, in most years China has been 
a net sugar importer, although it was a net 
exporter in 1992–93 (Figure 5.4). Ninety 
percent of China’s sugar production comes 
from sugarcane, while the remainder is from 
sugar beets (Mitchell 2004). Most imports 
come from Cuba under a long-term trade 
agreement. When China joined the WTO in 
2001, it agreed to a TRQ for sugar reaching 
1.945 million tons in 2004 with an in-quota 
tariff rate of 15 percent and an over-quota 
rate of 65 percent (see Table 4.9).
 In the 1990s China also pursued sugar 
policies aimed at raising farm incomes 
and achieving self-sufficiency (USDA-ERS 
2003b; Mitchell 2004). These included set-
ting minimum procurement prices for sug-
arcane in major producing provinces and 
linking increases in these cane prices to in-
creases in sugar prices. In 2002 sugarcane 
prices were required to increase $0.60 per 
ton for every $12 per ton increase in the 
market price for sugar above a set base of 
$325 per ton (USDA-ERS 2003b).
 The estimated %MPS for sugar for China 
is positive throughout the period 1995–2001, 
reflecting the protective sugar policies in 
place (Table 5.10 and Figure 5.6). The %MPS 
decreases from 44.6 percent in 1995 to 11.2 
percent in 1999, consistent with falling do-
mestic prices as a result of a record crop 
harvested in 1998/99 (Mitchell 2004). Ris-
ing domestic prices in 2000 and 2001 lead 
to an estimated %MPS of 16–18 percent in 
these years, which is slightly less than the 
in-quota tariff rate of 20 percent. The MPS 
may underestimate the level of protection 
compared with the tariff because of the 
assumptions that we use to compute sugar 
prices from sugarcane prices. The domestic 
sugarcane price is converted to a domestic 
sugar price by dividing the cane price by the 
product of the recovery rate and the farmer’s 
share of the sugar price. If we have over-
estimated the recovery rate or farmer’s share 
of the sugar price, the imputed sugar price 
will be lower than it otherwise should be. 
For comparison, Huang and Rozelle (2002) 
find that the nominal protection rate for 
sugar is about 40 percent in 2001, while Tian, 
Zhang, and Zhou (2002) find the %PSE for 
sugar to vary between –4 and –8 percent 
in 1995–2000. The OECD (2005b) reported 
that the %PSE for sugar averaged 39 per-
cent during 2000–03. 
Vietnam
Vietnam was also a net sugar importer 
through the 1990s (Figure 5.4). In 1994 
a “one-million-ton” sugar program was 
launched, with the aim of creating em-
ployment for farmers and achieving self-
sufficiency in sugar by 2000. Since 1998 
sugar has been on the list of commodities 
whose imports are administered by the gov-
ernment and have been restricted. Based 
on these interventions, sugarcane output in-
creased steadily, largely due to planted area 
expansion. Yields remained low, and there 
has been considerable fluctuation in annual 
output, but Vietnam became a slight net 
sugar exporter during 1999–2001.
 The processing industry in the sugar sec-
tor also changed substantially in the 1990s. 
Within the one-million-ton sugar program, 
over $1 billion was spent to build sugar pro-
cessing factories, improve the infrastructure 
in cane-producing areas, and grant preferen-
tial credit to the sugar processing sector. In 
addition, local policies gave priority to the 
conversion of land for growing sugarcane.
 Before 1996 industrial sugar refineries 
absorbed only 20 percent of domestically 
produced cane. Most of the cane, nearly 5 
million tons, was still processed in tradi-
tional mills with an extraction rate amount-
ing to only 50 percent of that of industrial 
mills, producing only low-quality sugar. By 
2000 Vietnam produced around 1 million 
tons of sugar, of which about 75 percent was 
refined in factories and only the remaining 
25 percent was processed in traditional 
sugar mills. Nevertheless, Vietnamese sugar 
refining remains inefficient. Low conver-
sion rates from sugarcane to raw sugar in 
refineries stem largely from outdated technol-
ogy and small-scale plants. Of the 44 sugar 
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refineries in Vietnam, all but 6 are small by 
international standards. Of these, 8 mills 
operated at 80 percent of their capacity by 
2001, had no overdue debt, and are located 
in stable sugarcane areas; 14 factories oper-
ated at 60–80 percent of their capacity and 
could not pay overdue debt; and the remain-
ing 22 operated at less than 50 percent of 
their capacity and had outdated technology, 
leading to high production costs and annual 
losses (Nguyen and Grote 2004). Even for 
the first 8 factories, the state had to write off 
their VAT of VND 260 billion from 2001–
03. With respect to the next 14 factories, the 
state provided VND 1,100 billion for the 
period 2003–05, including writing off their 
taxes in 2001–03 and injecting working 
capital. For the last 22 factories, the state 
provided VND 5,000 billion, of which VND 
3,277 billion was used to pay their overdue 
debt and VND 1,689 billion was used to 
cover their losses (Vietnam Electronic News-
paper 2004).
 In the %MPS for sugar, shown in Table 
5.9 and Figure 5.6, cane prices are first con-
verted into sugar prices using cost estimates 
from X. N. Nguyen et al. (1995) and then com-
pared with an adjusted reference import 
price.39 The results suggest that sugar was 
disprotected in the early 1990s. The %MPS 
for sugar is positive and high after 1996, 
reflecting the protective policies toward 
domestic production following initiation of 
the one-million-ton sugar program. We did 
not calculate budget expenditures and a %PSE 
for sugar for Vietnam, but at the prevailing 
domestic cane prices it is clear that subsides 
to the refineries have been necessary. With-
Table 5.10 Sugar % MPS and %PSE for Indonesia (1987–2003), China (1995–2001), and Vietnam (1986–2001)
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Indonesia          
 MPS (%)   13.0 –23.8 –36.2 –31.1 –6.7 64.5 50.8 
 MPS (billion Rp)   106 –314 –647 –581 –97 961 913 
 Budgetary payments (billion Rp)   57 91 45 51 62 77 72 
 Nominal PSE  (billion Rp)   163 –223 –602 –530 –35 1,038 985 
 PSE (%)          
  Trade economist denominator   19.9 –17.0 –33.8 –28.4 –2.5 69.6 54.7 
  OECD denominator   16.6 –20.4 –51.0 –39.7 –2.5 41.0 35.3 
China          
 MPS (%)          
 MPS (billion yuan)          
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan)          
 Nominal PSE  (billion yuan)          
 PSE (%)          
  Trade economist denominator          
  OECD denominator          
Vietnam          
 MPS (%)  30.2 42.6 76.9 –13.9 –63.8 –51.1 –40.4 –29.8 
 MPS (billion VND)  4.0 25 45 –33 –371 –422 –368 –234 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: A sugar-specific %PSE was not calculated for Vietnam.
39The refineries’ processing costs account for 56.2 percent of total revenue, and their profit is 3.6 percent of the 
selling price. The technical conversion factor is 9.74 (180,000 tons of sugarcane were used to produce 18,477 
tons of sugar in 1994).
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out these subsidies, domestic cane prices 
would have been pushed lower, with a lower 
estimated %MPS protection.
Summary of Other 
Commodity Results 
by Country
India
Rice and sugar are important commodities 
in each of the countries in our study. Our 
additional commodity coverage varies among 
the countries, as described above.40 A sum-
mary of the results of the commodity-
 specific analysis for the nine crops other 
than rice and sugar for India is shown in 
Table 5.11. Wheat, along with rice and sugar, 
shown earlier, dominates the results nu-
merically. For example, in 2002 these three 
commodities are estimated to receive two-
thirds of the budget support (Rs billion 300.1 
out of a total for all of agriculture of Rs bil-
lion 444.9).41 Likewise, the nominal PSE of 
these three commodities was Rs billion 
470.3, compared to a nominal value for the 
eleven commodities of Rs billion 619.8, a 
share of 75.9 percent. But these three com-
modities also account for nearly 75 percent 
of the value of production of the eleven 
commodities. Thus, on average, in 2002 the 
other eight covered commodities received a 
share of the nominal PSE about proportional 
to their value in production.
 For wheat, MPS exhibits a counter-
cyclical pattern similar to rice, but with less 
%MPS disprotection. Budgetary outlays for 
fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation subsidies 
again provide support measured in the com-
modity-specific %PSEs, which are slightly 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
         
21.2 37.0 49.7 –18.0 11.1 66.9 7.2 14.0 35.9 99.6
463 789 1,017 –487 392 2,894 337 908 1,719 3,972
79 129 95 107 142 279 112 71 49 74
542 918 1,112 –380 534 3,173 448 978 1,768 4,046
         
24.7 42.9 54.2 –14.1 15.0 73.2 9.4 14.9 36.8 101.3
19.8 30.0 35.1 –16.4 13.0 42.3 8.6 13.0 26.9 50.3
         
 44.6 31.7 27.8 20.0 11.2 17.7 16.4  
 78.8 65.6 67.1 47.4 20.0 29.2 31.5  
 –0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2  
 78.5 65.7 67.2 47.6 20.2 29.3 31.6  
         
 44.5 31.7 27.8 20.1 11.2 17.8 16.5  
 30.8 24.1 21.8 16.8 10.1 15.1 14.2  
         
–36.1 –34.5 200.5 370.3 353.0 346.3 181.5 285.4  
–432 –666 4,421 4,534 5,169 6,106 3,630 7,106  
40Additional description of the commodity results is provided in Sun (2003) and the MTID discussion papers 
by Mullen et al. (2004), Nguyen and Grote (2004), Thomas and Orden (2004), Cheng and Orden (2005), and 
Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005). 
41Totals including rice and sugar are shown in Table 5.15. 
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Table 5.11 Summary for India of other commodity-specific MPS and PSEs, 1985–2002
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Wheat
 MPS (billion Rs) 0.7 4.8 –3.2 –5.1 3.2 –26.0 –11.7 –36.7
  %MPS 1.0 7.0 –4.3 –6.3 3.5 –22.2 –9.0 –22.6
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 8.7 10.3 8.4 15.5 21.9 26.2 34.9 36.9
 PSE (billion Rs) 9.4 15.1 5.2 10.3 25.1 0.2 23.2 0.2
  %PSE 12.4 17.9 6.5 11.2 21.7 0.2 15.1 0.1
Corn
 MPS (billion Rs) 0.0 1.3 4.2 4.1 0.2 0.8 –1.3 –0.1
  %MPS 0.1 13.6 46.9 57.3 1.3 4.4 –6.1 –0.2
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 0.5 1.9 4.7 5.1 1.5 2.3 0.7 2.1
 PSE (billion Rs) 0.5 1.9 4.7 5.1 1.5 2.3 0.7 2.1
  %PSE 4.2 16.2 33.6 41.0 8.3 11.6 3.1 6.6
Sorghum
 MPS (billion Rs) 3.8 4.9 7.3 11.0 5.3 7.7 13.2 –6.4
  %MPS 23.9 33.4 63.8 73.3 23.3 26.4 80.2 –20.8
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.0
 PSE (billion Rs) 4.3 5.5 7.6 11.7 6.5 9.1 15.2 –4.5
  %PSE 21.3 27.3 40.0 43.8 22.0 23.9 47.8 –17.0
Groundnuts
 MPS (billion Rs) 12.3 4.8 13.5 19.3 20.0 10.0 12.0 5.5
  %MPS 73.3 25.7 71.6 98.4 65.4 20.3 19.9 8.4
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.9 2.9
 PSE (billion Rs) 13.0 5.7 14.1 20.4 21.7 12.1 14.9 8.4
  %PSE 43.7 23.2 42.8 51.0 41.5 19.7 19.8 11.4
Rapeseed
 MPS (billion Rs) –2.2 1.2 1.2 9.7 11.5 1.4 18.0 12.1
  %MPS –12.4 –17.3 11.3 68.6 56.0 6.1 58.2 28.3
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 1.0 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.8 3.2 4.0 4.6
 PSE (billion Rs) –1.2 2.4 2.4 11.9 14.3 4.5 22.1 16.7
  %PSE –7.4 19.3 19.3 45.7 41.0 17.0 41.6 28.1
Soybeans
 MPS (billion Rs) –1.2 –0.6 0.8 2.5 –1.4 –0.6 0.0 0.2
  %MPS –30.4 –18.5 25.8 42.2 –12.4 –4.7 –0.3 0.7
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1
 PSE (billion Rs) –1.0 –0.3 1.1 3.1 –0.7 0.1 0.9 1.3
  %PSE –32.1 –10.1 26.8 33.9 –6.5 1.0 6.0 4.6
Sunflowers
 MPS (billion Rs) –0.1 0.7 2.3 0.9 –0.4 1.8 3.6 2.6
  %MPS –6.3 46.8 110.9 56.5 –10.5 36.2 39.2 27.9
 Budgetary payments (billion Rs) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
 PSE (billion Rs) 0.0 0.8 2.5 1.1 –0.1 2.2 4.0 3.1
  %PSE 2.8 36.0 53.9 41.6 –3.6 30.2 30.7 25.0
Source: Gulati-Purcell database (2002) and authors’ calculations.
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
–51.6 –2.4 –7.5 –115.4 –136.4 4.9 26.4 120.0 44.6 –9.2 –23.9
–24.7 –1.2 –3.1 –34.1 –34.1 1.6 7.8 40.0 12.6 –2.0 –5.3
42.0 47.8 68.9 83.5 88.8 96.1 108.2 114.9 126.6 135.8 148.9
–9.6 45.4 61.4 –32.0 –47.6 101.0 134.5 235.0 171.2 126.6 125.1
–4.8 18.5 20.5 –10.4 –13.5 24.6 28.5 43.9 32.6 21.7 21.6
0.1 –6.8 0.1 –7.1 4.3 –3.5 2.9 1.7 1.2 1.3
0.5 –20.8 0.3 –16.2 9.9 –7.6 5.8 2.9 2.0 2.0
2.6 –4.0 4.0 –2.3 9.4 2.1 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.5
2.6 –4.0 4.0 –2.3 9.4 2.1 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.5
8.8 –13.4 9.8 –5.4 17.8 4.4 15.5 12.6 13.0 12.9
6.5 –2.5 –3.7 –13.1 22.1 –6.3 12.7 20.5 –5.4 13.7
20.0 –7.9 –10.3 –22.3 67.7 –14.0 25.6 42.9 –10.5 45.0
2.1 2.4 3.8 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.4 6.0 6.3
8.6 –0.2 0.1 –8.4 26.9 –1.4 18.2 26.0 0.6 20.0
21.0 –0.5 0.3 –16.7 45.8 –3.1 26.8 35.1 1.2 39.7
16.2 –6.3 9.8 –25.7 11.8 –0.5 35.4 –5.9 –23.0 26.3
29.2 –8.4 12.7 –22.6 12.2 –0.5 40.8 –8.0 –23.6 38.7
3.3 3.7 5.5 6.7 7.1 7.5 8.4 8.7 9.6 10.2
19.5 –2.6 15.3 –19.0 18.8 7.0 43.7 2.8 –13.4 36.5
26.0 –3.6 16.5 –20.0 16.5 7.2 33.6 3.6 –16.0 35.0
4.1 3.2 –0.8 –11.3 –14.2 –11.5 10.9 1.1 –4.7 –8.5
10.5 6.3 –1.1 –14.2 –15.6 –14.7 14.3 1.5 –8.2 –10.8
5.4 6.3 8.2 9.9 10.8 12.2 14.0 15.6 17.1 18.6
9.6 9.5 7.5 –1.4 –3.4 0.8 24.9 16.7 12.3 10.1
19.5 15.6 9.7 –1.8 –3.9 1.0 24.7 18.7 17.8 11.4
–4.8 –11.9 –4.1 –18.1 –13.5 –24.6 –28.6 –21.8 –23.1 –14.8
–12.3 –27.7 –8.1 –25.9 –15.2 –24.2 –30.9 –32.2 –29.0 –26.2
1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.7
–3.5 –10.3 –2.1 –15.7 –10.9 –21.6 –25.1 –17.9 –18.8 –10.2
–9.7 –31.7 –4.3 –28.9 –13.9 –27.0 –37.3 –36.0 –31.0 –21.9
–1.2 –2.2 0.0 –2.3 –0.7 –3.0 –2.0 –1.7 –1.6 –3.6
–8.6 –14.7 –0.2 –13.3 –6.5 –19.6 –19.6 –18.0 –13.4 –19.6
0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9
–0.6 –1.6 0.9 –1.2 0.5 –1.6 –0.5 –0.1 0.2 –1.7
–4.5 –11.5 5.4 –7.3 4.1 –12.2 –5.2 –1.1 1.3 –10.2  
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positive for wheat except in the mid-1990s 
and (like rice) increased sharply when world 
prices fell in the late 1990s. Less support is 
evident for coarse grains. For pulses (chick-
peas) there is variability in our estimates of 
%MPS, which, with few policy-based trade 
barriers, may reflect marketing channel con-
straints on importing and exporting when 
domestic prices deviate from world price 
levels. For cotton we find declining levels of 
support after the late 1980s. 
 Finally, in the oilseed sector India has 
pursued an import substitution strategy, with 
domestic processing of the two main oil-
seeds (groundnut and mustard) reserved for 
small-scale industries (Hoda and Gulati 
2007). We find relatively little of the sec-
toral protection filtering down to oilseed 
prices at the farm level, suggesting that much 
of the protection is targeted at the small-
scale processing industry. Oilseed trade pol-
icy in the period 1994–2001 demonstrates 
the reform and reversal that occurred at the 
same time as developed countries such as 
the United States were substantially increas-
ing their subsidy payments to farmers. First, 
in 1994 the government freed imports of 
major edible oils, with applied tariffs fall-
ing from 65 percent to 15 percent on crude 
edible oils by December 1999. But, as world 
prices fell in the late 1990s, there was a 
surge of imports exceeding 5 million metric 
tons per year, and India’s self-sufficiency 
fell to 55 percent in 2001. In the face of en-
suing pressure from the domestic vegetable 
oil industry, the GOI increased the import 
duties on edible oils in 2000 and set more 
differentiated rates among them (Dohlman, 
Persaud, and Landes 2003). By August 2001 
the basic tariff rates stood at 30 percent for 
Table 5.12 Summary for Indonesia of other commodity-specific MPS and PSEs, 1985–2003
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Corn
 MPS (billion Rp) –45.8 176.9 222.1 –37.6 –44.8 62.1 222.9 156.6
  %MPS –6.4 20.5 26.7 –2.3 –2.7 3.5 12.9 7.1
 Budgetary payments (billion Rp) 17.6 16.8 11.2 21.5 10.3 12.2 13.8 19.3
 PSE (billion Rp) –28.1 193.7 233.4 –16.0 –34.5 74.3 236.8 175.9
  %PSE –4.2 18.3 21.8 –1.0 –2.2 4.0 12.0 7.3
Soybeans
 MPS (billion Rp) 157.3 262.7 421.3 392.0 314.6 640.3 747.0 866.5
  %MPS 85.7 117.2 95.3 57.6 38.7 80.3 84.2 80.0
 Budgetary payments (billion Rp) 3.5 3.5 2.5 4.1 2.2 2.7 3.4 4.5
 PSE (billion Rp) 160.8 266.2 423.8 396.1 316.8 643.0 750.4 871.0
  %PSE 46.7 54.3 48.9 36.8 28.1 44.6 45.8 44.6
Crude palm oil
 MPS (billion Rp) 166.4 755.1
  %MPS 11.0 34.9
 Budgetary payments (billion Rp) 26.9 31.9
 PSE (billion Rp) 193.3 787.0
  %PSE 11.3 26.7
Natural rubber
 MPS (billion Rp) –44.3 –180.2 99.1 –66.1 1.2 –50.2 –74.1 –72.1
  %MPS –5.5 –17.7 6.3 –3.1 0.1 –2.8 –3.7 –3.2
 Budgetary payments (billion Rp) 4.3 3.2 2.5 3.8 2.0 2.3 2.9 3.4
 PSE (billion Rp) –40.0 –177.1 101.6 –62.3 3.2 –47.8 –71.1 –68.7
  %PSE –5.2 –21.1 6.1 –3.0 0.2 –2.7 –3.7 –3.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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oilseeds and oilmeals, 75 percent for main 
crude edible oils, and 85 percent for refined 
sunflower-safflower oil and refined rape-
seed oil (USDA-FAS 2003c).
Indonesia
For Indonesia the commodity-specific results 
for four additional commodities are shown 
in Table 5.12. With the exception of the 
1997–98 crisis, the two other imported com-
modities (maize and soybeans) have been 
protected. However, whereas support for rice 
and sugar has been rising, support for maize 
and soybeans shows a declining trend. Re-
sults for the two exported commodities show 
that palm oil has been protected except for 
1995 (implementation of the export tax 
structure) and 1998 (devaluation of the ru-
piah). Rubber shows little protection or dis-
protection because the domestic price move-
ments are consistent with movements in 
world prices, which can be influenced by 
Indonesia’s production and trade activities 
combined with those of its large producing 
neighbors, Thailand and Malaysia.
China
For China the commodity-specific %MPS 
and %PSEs are reported in Table 5.13 for 
seven additional crops. Corn, sorghum, and 
peanuts are export commodities, while wheat, 
rapeseed, soybeans, and cotton are imported. 
During the period 1995–2001 there were few 
input subsidies or direct payments to farmers 
in China; various taxes and fees targeted at 
specific agricultural commodities were col-
lected by the local and central governments 
and are included in our analysis as negative 
budgetary payments allocated to each com-
modity (including rice and sugar) according 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
277.9 514.6 598.9 –106.1 498.0 –5,095.1 964.8 1,128.8 1,824.8 1,325.9 2,109.5
15.5 24.6 20.1 –2.4 12.5 –38.4 11.3 12.0 16.4 11.5 16.6
14.0 16.5 36.6 30.1 33.9 51.5 109.3 45.2 26.2 18.2 31.3
291.9 531.1 635.5 –76.0 531.9 –5,043.5 1,074.1 1,173.9 1,851.0 1,344.1 2,140.8
14.0 20.3 17.6 –1.6 11.8 –60.9 11.3 11.0 14.3 10.4 14.4
916.5 872.4 985.7 879.5 710.3 –356.1 1,645.8 979.6 875.5 228.0 101.6
89.4 80.6 83.8 69.6 50.2 –9.1 62.5 50.1 46.5 15.9 6.3
3.7 3.7 7.5 4.9 5.2 6.6 16.4 4.8 2.3 1.2 2.0
920.2 876.1 993.2 884.4 715.5 –349.5 1,662.2 984.3 877.8 229.2 103.6
47.3 44.7 45.8 41.2 33.6 –9.8 38.7 33.5 31.8 13.8 6.0
1,030.0 884.5 –537.7 602.8 –59.1 –13,673.1 484.7 662.7 4,561.1 3,477.6 5,309.0
43.5 24.9 –9.5 10.9 –0.8 –48.5 3.2 5.0 22.8 12.0 16.6
37.2 48.0 99.5 79.3 104.1 149.6 389.1 169.8 107.4 84.2 133.2
1,067.2 932.5 –438.2 682.0 45.1 –13,523.5 873.9 832.5 4,668.5 3,561.8 5,442.2
31.1 20.8 –8.4 11.0 0.6 –92.2 5.5 5.9 18.9 11.0 14.5
5.8 305.6 228.9 59.2 –2,024.6 2,089.3 1,246.0 –975.0 556.9 820.7
0.2 9.8 4.7 1.2 –43.4 21.0 18.2 –11.5 6.5 8.2
3.2 3.5 6.8 5.1 6.0 7.9 19.0 7.5 4.5 3.1
9.0 309.1 235.7 64.2 –2,018.6 2,097.2 1,265.1 –967.5 561.4 823.8
0.4 9.1 4.6 1.3 –76.1 17.4 15.6 –12.9 6.1 7.6  
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Table 5.13 Summary for China of other commodity-specific MPS and PSEs, 1995–2001
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Wheat
 MPS (billion yuan) 40.3 –10.1 –9.2 –6.8 –24.7 –24.4 –24.4
  %MPS 30.0 –5.4 –5.1 –4.4 –15.2 –19.5 –19.8
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –2.5 0.6 0.7 1.9 1.7 1.2 1.3
 PSE (billion yuan) 37.9 –9.5 –8.5 –4.9 –23.0 –23.2 –23.1
  %PSE 28.2 –5.0 –4.7 –3.2 –14.2 –18.6 –18.8
Corn
 MPS (billion yuan) 41.5 –55.7 3.9 18.2 1.0 3.1 11.9
  %MPS 38.2 –27.6 3.5 14.5 0.9 3.6 12.1
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –2.1 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.5
 PSE (billion yuan) 39.3 –55.2 4.4 20.1 2.4 4.2 13.4
  %PSE 36.2 –27.4 3.9 16.1 2.1 4.8 13.6
Sorghum
 MPS (billion yuan) 1.2 –5.8 –1.1 –0.8 –1.4 –0.9 –1.0
  %MPS 23.7 –53.4 –25.3 –17.6 –36.2 –30.5 –31.0
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 PSE (billion yuan) 1.1 –5.8 –1.1 –0.7 –1.3 –0.8 –0.9
  %PSE 22.0 –53.2 –25.0 –16.5 –35.4 –29.7 –30.1
Rapeseed
 MPS (billion yuan) 3.2 3.1 1.5 2.0 2.3 –0.8 0.2
  %MPS 13.7 15.5 6.5 10.2 11.5 –3.9 0.8
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
 PSE (billion yuan) 2.8 3.2 1.6 2.3 2.6 –0.6 0.4
  %PSE 12.1 15.9 6.9 11.6 12.8 –2.8 2.1
Peanuts
 MPS (billion yuan) –16.5 –20.4 –21.5 –29.7 –21.7 –22.8 –21.9
  %MPS –33.5 –37.9 –38.0 –46.8 –39.9 –38.0 –39.8
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
 PSE (billion yuan) –16.9 –20.3 –21.4 –29.2 –21.3 –22.4 –21.5
  %PSE –34.4 –37.7 –37.8 –46.1 –39.2 –37.3 –39.0
Soybean
 MPS (billion yuan) 5.9 7.4 8.4 2.7 4.0 3.9 4.1
  %MPS 20.3 23.3 23.6 8.6 16.4 14.0 16.0
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –0.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4
 PSE (billion yuan) 5.4 7.5 8.6 3.2 4.3 4.3 4.5
  %PSE 18.6 23.7 24.1 10.1 17.8 15.3 17.6
Cotton
 MPS (billion yuan) –3.8 –3.8 –2.8 –9.6 –16.7 –11.4 –15.6
  %MPS –5.1 –5.9 –4.2 –15.2 –36.3 –20.0 –27.9
 Budgetary payments (billion yuan) –1.0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5
 PSE (billion yuan) –4.8 –3.6 –2.6 –8.9 –16.3 –10.9 –15.0
  %PSE –6.5 –5.6 –3.8 –14.1 –35.6 –19.0 –26.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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to its share in the total value of production. 
Net budgetary payments were negative in 
1995 and positive thereafter but small in mag-
nitude in all years.
 Our results indicate that the protection 
or disprotection varies among commodities 
and for each commodity across years. In 
general, corn, rapeseed, and soybeans are 
protected while wheat, sorghum, peanuts, 
and cotton are disprotected. The agricul-
tural importables have either a higher rate 
of protection or a lower rate of disprotection 
relative to exportables sorghum and peanuts, 
reflecting China’s strategy of import substi-
tution but also our lack of adjustments for 
domestic costs in the reference prices. Food 
crops (wheat and corn) receive higher protec-
tion than cash crops (peanuts and cotton).
Vietnam
Table 5.14 shows the commodity-specific 
results for seven additional commodities for 
Vietnam. Overall the %MPS results for cof-
fee, tea, cashew nuts, and groundnut show a 
move from initial disprotection toward less 
disprotection or modest positive support, 
although with some variability among the 
commodities and in the early 1990s com-
pared to the late 1990s. During this period 
of significant reform of marketing arrange-
ments in Vietnam there was increased in-
volvement of the private sector but also re-
strictions that continued to give some market 
power to limited numbers of trading firms 
and that may have depressed farm-level 
prices. By the end of the 1990s export re-
ward and credit programs for coffee and tea 
contribute to positive support levels. There 
has been less intervention in the markets for 
rubber and black pepper, and the estimated 
MPS are relatively small. Finally we report 
negative %MPS for pig meat. This arises for 
two likely reasons: the dominance of state-
owned processing companies in pig meat 
exports and the difficulty of making quality 
adjustments between prices for domestic pig 
meat at the farm level and the exported 
products, which are primarily processed.
Total PSEs
The commodity-specific %MPS and %PSEs 
provide important disaggregated information 
and highlight different policies toward spe-
cific products. Aggregating these measures 
into a total PSE provides a widely used sum-
mary statistic about levels of protection or 
disprotection of agriculture. Calculations of 
the total PSE and total %PSE are derived 
from the commodity-specific estimates of 
MPS and total budget support (BP), as de-
scribed in Chapter 2.
India
Results for the total PSEs are shown for India 
in Table 5.15 and Figures 5.7 and 5.8. The 
modified procedure is used to select adjusted 
reference prices for rice, wheat, corn, sor-
ghum, sugar, and groundnuts, while rape-
seed, soybeans, sunflowers, chickpeas, and 
cotton are assumed to be imported. We com-
pute total MPS
c
 and PSE
c
 without scaling 
up from the estimated MPS for the covered 
commodities, as well as total MPS and PSE 
using the scaling-up procedure, as described 
in Chapter 2.
 In broad terms, a countercyclical pattern 
of protection and support (versus disprotec-
tion) of agriculture is evident at the aggre-
gate level for India. Support is provided in 
the mid-1980s, when world prices were low, 
turns to disprotection through the 1990s, and 
emerges as protection and support again 
after 1998, when world prices are again rel-
atively low.
 The relative importance of budget pay-
ments for input subsidies compared with out-
put market price interventions in providing 
recent support is evident from a comparison 
of MPS
c
 for the eleven covered commodities 
to the BP for agriculture (Figure 5.7). In the 
period 1985–88 positive MPS exceeded bud-
getary payments, so price support accounted 
for 52 percent of the total support provided, 
as measured by the PSE
c
. In the period 
1989–97 MPS was negative in each year and 
remained large enough to result in negative 
total support, measured by PSE
c
, in five 
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years. This is in contrast to the period 1998–
2002, when BP exceeded MPS
c
 so that, even 
when aggregate price support is negative, 
the sum of price and budget support (PSE
c
) 
is positive.
 In 2000 and 2002, years in which MPS 
was positive, it accounted for 39.7 percent 
of support as measured by the PSE
c
 (MPS
c
 
of Rs 423.3 billion versus budget payments of 
Rs 821.9 billion for the two years). In those 
years of low world prices since 1998 in which 
MPS
c
 has been negative (1998, 1999, and 
2001), the budget support provided has been 
five times as large (a total of Rs 1,091.6 bil-
lion versus MPS
c
 of Rs –203.3 billion).
 When the MPS
c
 component of the PSE 
is relatively small, it makes relatively little 
difference whether the scaling-up procedure 
is applied or not (as in 1985, 1989, 1991, 
1998, 1999, or 2001; see Table 5.15 and Fig-
ure 5.8). In contrast, when world prices were 
high in 1996 and the negative nominal MPS
c 
was more than double the positive budget 
support (Rs –621.0 billion compared to Rs 
279.4 billion), the scaled-up PSE (Rs –1,144 
billion) is more than three times larger in 
Table 5.14 Summary for Vietnam of other commodity-specific MPS, 1986–2002
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Coffee
 MPS (billion VND) –1.8 –7.1 58.4 63.0 –47.7 55.0 151.6
  %MPS –35.5 –36.7 254.5 55.9 –19.2 16.6 39.8
Tea
 MPS (billion VND) –0.8 –19.2 48.9 24.1 –144.7 –63.3 –51.6
  %MPS –12.0 –59.7 173.2 17.0 –45.2 –17.1 –10.7
Cashew nuts
 MPS (billion VND) –105.5 –185.6 –146.1
  %MPS –30.7 –27.9 –28.5
Groundnuts
 MPS (billion VND) –2.9 –26.1 98.6 93.1 –211.5 –482.6 –404.3
  %MPS –26.5 –45.7 195.7 37.8 –38.5 –50.9 –47.1
Rubber
 MPS (billion VND)
  %MPS
Black pepper
 MPS (billion VND) 0.1 1.4 37.2 21.8 –6.5 5.3 9.1
  %MPS 4.4 10.8 372.9 66.4 –8.4 6.3 17.5
Pig meat
 MPS (billion Rs) –1,100.9 –362.9 584.8 –296.2 –3,369.9 –4,599.1 –6,013.3
  %MPS –95.6 –64.1 109.6 –12.1 –60.3 –53.9 –57.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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magnitude than the PSE
c
 without scaling-up 
(Rs –341.6 billion).
 In percentage terms, both the %PSE
c
 
without scaling-up (–10.3 percent using 
the OECD denominator) and the total %PSE 
with scaling-up (–34.5 percent) are most 
negative in 1996.42 The %PSE
c
 reaches 12.7 
percent and the %PSE reaches 19.5 percent 
in 2000, their highest positive values. Over-
all the %PSE
c
 results over the period 1985–
2002 show positive support for agriculture 
of nearly 10 percent in the mid-1980s that 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
309.1 –613.1 –1,563.2 –1,273.4 –47.6 –361.5 2,694.3 3,115.0
40.7 –27.6 –44.8 –42.9 –1.3 –7.1 47.8 66.6
125.0 119.8 250.6 –6.3 20.8 161.0 450.1 234.3 384.6 209.8
33.9 24.7 58.3 –0.9 2.4 14.6 38.2 19.7 31.2 14.5
303.1 220.4 210.8 –21.7 –224.6 15.0 –67.6 –110.1 29.7 –399.2
62.1 29.4 23.4 –1.6 –12.3 0.8 –3.4 –4.0 1.4 –10.3
–138.3 –410.2 –423.8 –219.9 131.9 286.2 –94.2 –159.4 32.5 –206.9
–17.3 –32.8 –26.1 –12.3 8.8 17.4 –5.4 –8.9 1.9 –10.6
–526.3 38.9 193.9 307.6 –117.7 –308.2 528.3
–27.3 1.9 12.1 17.1 –5.0 –13.2 18.8
6.4 16.9 3.4 10.1 28.6 51.8 129.0 –119.7
9.9 12.1 1.8 5.5 8.0 6.7 8.8 –7.0
–4,433.4 –1,938.8 –1,227.1 –1,662.2 –12,752.9 –9,182.5 –3,771.6 –6,486.6 –9,000.8 1,151.6
–41.2 –20.7 –9.8 –12.4 –52.2 –41.8 –19.2 –30.7 –37.9 5.4
42Our discussion focuses on %PSE
c
 and %PSE measured using the OECD denominator, but Table 5.15 also 
reports the %PSE using the “trade economist” denominator. For total value of production at international ad-
justed reference prices, we have approximated by simply subtracting the nominal MPS for our eleven covered 
commodities from the value of total agricultural production at domestic prices. The results with the OECD 
denominator are again larger (smaller) in absolute value than those for the trade economist denominator when 
the %PSE
c
 or %PSE is negative (positive), but the differences are small in most years. For either denominator, 
the difference between the %PSE
c
 and the %PSE can be large and they can be of different signs.
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declines to a nearly neutral policy effect in 
the mid-1990s, before dropping to its lowest 
value (disprotection) when world prices were 
high in 1996, then rises during 1997–2002, 
again to a level around 10 percent. The 
scaled-up %PSE follows a similar pattern 
over time but shows higher support (near 20 
percent) in the 1980s, falling to greater per-
centages of disprotection from 1992 to 1997.
 For purposes of comparison, the total 
PSEs calculated under the exportable and 
importable hypotheses for all commodities 
in all years are shown in Tables 5.16 and 
5.17. Results under the exportable hypothesis 
are relatively close to those under the modi-
fied procedure, especially during the mid-
1990s. Support for agriculture is estimated 
to be somewhat higher in the 1980s and dur-
ing the period 1998–2002 under the export-
able hypothesis, particularly when measured 
with the scaled-up total PSE.
 The results under the importable hypoth-
esis show a pattern similar over time to the 
results under the modified procedure, but 
the magnitude of the estimates differs. Dis-
protection of agriculture measured by either 
%PSE
c
 or %PSE is more pronounced in the 
period 1989–97 under the importable hy-
pothesis than under the modified procedure. 
Scaling-up has a more pronounced effect 
because MPS
c
 is larger in magnitude under 
the importable hypothesis. In subsequent 
years agriculture is slightly supported with-
out scaling-up but remains slightly dispro-
tected even during 1998–2002 under the im-
portable hypothesis and the scaled-up %PSE.
 Under the importable or exportable hy-
pothesis, the level of estimated disprotection 
in the 1990s, as measured by the scaled-up 
%PSE
c
 and %PSE, is less in magnitude than 
that estimated by Gulati and Narayanan 
(2003). For example, in our analysis dis-
protection measured by the %PSE falls to 
its lowest values, –59.4 percent under the im-
portable hypothesis and –28.7 percent under 
the exportable hypothesis, in 1996, com-
pared to –101.9 percent and –68.5 percent, 
respectively, in 1997 in their analysis. Gulati 
Table 5.15 India total PSE under the modified procedure, 1985–2002 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Measured support (billion Rs)
 MPS
c
5.9 54.7 53.2 39.8 –3.7 –70.4 –13.3 –159.6
 Budgetary payments 29.3 34.7 27.1 50.3 72.6 87.6 117.5 122.6
Covered share 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.42
MPS (billion Rs) 13.4 120.6 121.6 82.1 –7.6 –147.8 –26.0 –380.5
PSE (billion Rs)
 PSE
c
35.2 89.4 80.3 90.1 68.9 17.2 104.3 –37.0
 PSE 42.8 155.3 148.7 132.5 64.9 –60.2 91.5 –257.9
PSE (%)
 Trade economist denominator
  PSE
c
4.5 11.7 10.0 11.0 6.2 1.3 7.2 –1.8
  PSE 5.5 22.2 20.2 17.1 5.8 –4.2 6.2 –11.1
 OECD denominator
  PSE
c
4.3 10.4 9.1 9.9 5.9 1.3 6.7 –1.8
  PSE 5.2 18.1 16.8 14.6 5.5 –4.4 5.9 –12.5
 Trade economist denominator
  PSE
c
4.5 11.7 10.0 11.0 6.2 1.3 7.2 –1.8
  PSE 5.5 22.2 20.2 17.1 5.8 –4.2 6.2 –11.1
Source: Gulati-Purcell database (2002) and authors’ calculations.
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and Narayanan (2003) make their calcula-
tions with MSP or procurement prices even 
when these prices are below those prevail-
ing in domestic markets. Moreover, the de-
nominator for their %PSE measure does not 
include budget payments. Both of these fac-
tors contribute to their estimates of more 
negative total %PSEs. Gulati and Nara-
yanan (2003) report measures equivalent to 
our scaled-up total %PSE.43 In our analysis 
we find a greater difference with the earlier 
results under both the importable and ex-
portable hypotheses without scaling than 
with scaling. Thus all three dimensions of 
our analysis—the adjustments made in de-
riving price comparisons, whether autarky 
prices are considered as possibly relevant 
reference prices, and whether MPS measured 
for the covered commodities is scaled up 
to apply (implicitly) to other commodities—
affect the reported MPS and PSE results 
and their interpretation.
Indonesia
The total PSE results show that Indonesia has 
been subsidizing its agriculture since the 
1990s (Table 5.18 and Figures 5.7 and 5.8). 
The level of protection has less of a counter-
cyclical component than for India. In particu-
lar, whereas India disprotected its agriculture 
in the 1990s, Indonesia provided support. 
The effects of the devaluation of the rupiah 
during the financial crisis of 1997–98 are 
evident as a sharp downward spike that does 
not persist. The domestic value of interna-
tional prices jumped to high nominal levels, 
and domestic prices followed with a short 
lag. When the rupiah stabilized at a higher 
level, the gap between domestic and inter-
national prices returned to precrisis levels. 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
–116.9 –254.9 –240.1 –621.0 –386.1 –49.8 –98.5 248.3 –55.0 175.0
138.9 157.5 230.4 279.4 296.6 318.4 357.5 377.0 415.7 444.9
0.40 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.38
–290.4 –640.7 –511.8 –1,424 –883 –108.4 –229.3 584.8 –142.3 460.4
22.1 –97.4 –9.7 –341.6 –89.5 268.6 259.0 625.2 360.7 619.8
–151.5 –483.2 –281.4 –1,144 –586 209.9 128.2 961.8 273.4 905.3
1.0 –3.3 –0.3 –9.4 –2.3 7.4 5.8 14.5 7.6 12.4
–6.1 –14.4 –8.4 –25.7 –13.4 5.7 2.8 24.3 5.7 19.2
0.9 –3.4 –0.3 –10.3 –2.4 6.9 5.5 12.7 7.1 11.0
–6.5 –16.8 –9.1 –34.5 –15.5 5.4 2.7 19.5 5.4 16.1
1.0 –3.3 –0.3 –9.4 –2.3 7.4 5.8 14.5 7.6 12.4
–6.1 –14.4 –8.4 –25.7 –13.4 5.7 2.8 24.3 5.7 19.2
43Hoda and Gulati (2007) provide a discussion of nominal protection in the dairy and fruit and vegetable sectors, 
but they do not calculate PSEs.
102   CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.7 Market price support and budget expenditures for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1985–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5.16 India total PSE under the exportables hypothesis, 1985–2002
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Measured support (billion Rs)         
 MPS
c 
38.5 88.0 144.0 99.9 32.7 –24.0 66.0 –101.3 
 Budgetary payments 29.3 34.7 27.1 50.3 72.6 87.6 117.5 122.6 
Covered share 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.42 
MPS (billion Rs) 86.8 192.2 324.9 206.1 66.4 –50.0 128.7 –239.5 
PSE (billion Rs)         
 PSE
c 
67.8 122.7 171.1 150.2 105.3 63.6 183.5 21.3 
 PSE 116.2 226.9 352.0 256.4 139.0 37.7 246.2 –117.0 
PSE (%)         
 Trade economist denominator         
  PSE
c 
9.0 16.8 24.1 19.9 9.8 4.9 13.4 1.0 
  PSE 16.5 36.1 66.1 39.5 13.4 2.8 18.8 –5.4 
 OECD denominator         
  PSE
c 
8.3 14.3 19.3 16.6 8.9 4.6 11.8 1.0 
  PSE 14.2 26.5 39.8 28.3 11.8 2.7 15.8 –5.7 
Source: Gulati-Purcell database (2002) and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.8 Percentage total PSEs for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, 1985–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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–70.6 –215.8 –189.4 –538.3 –324.2 49.0 89.1 502.4 422.1 476.8
138.9 157.5 230.4 279.4 296.6 318.4 357.5 377.0 415.7 444.9
0.41 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.39
–174.0 –537.4 –401.1 –1,229 –733 104.9 204.8 1,147.1 1,056.8 1,216.7
         
68.3 –58.3 41.0 –258.8 –27.7 367.3 446.6 879.4 837.8 921.7
–35.0 –379.9 –170.7 –949 –436 423.3 562.3 1,524.1 1,472.5 1,661.6
         
         
3.0 –2.0 1.4 –7.3 –0.7 10.4 10.5 21.8 19.6 19.6
–1.5 –11.7 –5.2 –22.3 –10.4 12.2 13.5 44.8 40.5 42.0
         
2.9 –2.0 1.3 –7.8 –0.7 9.4 9.5 17.8 16.4 16.4
–1.5 –13.2 –5.5 –28.7 –11.6 10.9 11.9 30.9 28.8 29.6
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Table 5.17 India total PSE under the importables hypothesis, 1985–2002
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Measured support (billion Rs)          
 MPS
c 
–51.7 –5.8 53.2 5.5 –143.2 –217.4 –153.0 –369.7 –393.1 
 Budgetary payments 29.3 34.7 27.1 50.3 72.6 87.6 117.5 122.6 138.9 
Covered share 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.42 0.40 
MPS (billion Rs) –118.0 –12.8 121.6 11.4 –293.7 –456.2 –300.4 –881.4 –976.6 
PSE (billion Rs)          
 PSE
c 
–22.4 28.9 80.3 55.9 –70.6 –129.8 –35.4 –247.2 –254.1 
 PSE –88.6 21.9 148.7 61.8 –221.1 –368.6 –182.9 –758.8 –837.6 
PSE (%)          
 Trade economist denominator          
  PSE
c 
–2.7 3.5 10.0 6.6 –5.7 –8.6 –2.2 –10.7 –9.8 
  PSE –9.8 2.6 20.2 7.3 –15.8 –21.2 –10.5 –26.8 –26.3 
 OECD denominator          
  PSE
c 
–2.7 3.4 9.1 6.2 –6.0 –9.5 –2.3 –11.9 –10.8 
  PSE –10.8 2.6 16.8 6.8 –18.8 –26.9 –11.7 –36.7 –35.7 
Source: Gulati-Purcell database (2002) and authors’ calculations.
Table 5.18 Indonesia total PSE, 1985–2003
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Measured support (billion Rp)         
 MPS
c 
2,867.1 3,313.5 1,109.1 –1,352.6 –2,544.8 1,124.9 1,786.3 5,314.1 
 Budgetary payments 1,126.0 891.1 669.2 1,078.5 649.5 705.4 924.6 1,114.9 
Covered share 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.74 
MPS (billion Rp) 4,788.6 6,033.2 2,010.2 –2,132.3 –3,964.9 1,727.1 2,514.9 7,225.6 
PSE (billion Rp)         
 PSE
c 
3,993.2 4,204.6 1,778.3 –274.1 –1,895.3 1,830.3 2,710.9 6,429.0 
 PSE 5,914.6 6,924.2 2,679.4 –1,053.8 –3,315.5 2,432.5 3,439.5 8,340.4 
PSE (%)         
 Trade economist denominator         
  PSE
c 
28.8 25.3 6.5 –0.8 –4.8 4.9 6.9 16.4 
  PSE 42.7 41.6 9.8 –3.1 –8.4 6.5 8.8 21.2 
 OECD denominator         
  PSE
c 
20.2 17.9 5.9 –0.8 –5.3 4.6 6.4 13.5 
  PSE 29.9 29.4 8.9 –3.1 –9.2 6.1 8.1 17.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
        
–584.3 –611.1 –980.9 –839.2 –496.0 –530.7 –192.5 –263.2 –280.4
157.5 230.4 279.4 296.6 318.4 357.5 377.0 415.7 444.9
0.40 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.38
–1,468.0 –1,302.3 –2,248 –1,919 –1,079.9 –1,236.1 –453.2 –680.1 –737.4
        
–426.8 –380.7 –701.5 –542.6 –177.7 –173.3 184.4 152.5 164.5
–1,310.5 –1,071.8 –1,969 –1,622 –761.5 –878.6 –76.3 –264.4 –292.6
        
        
–12.9 –11.0 –17.5 –12.6 –4.4 –3.5 3.9 3.1 3.0
–31.3 –25.8 –37.3 –30.1 –16.3 –15.7 –1.5 –4.9 –4.9
        
–14.8 –12.3 –21.2 –14.4 –4.6 –3.7 3.7 3.0 2.9
–45.6 –34.8 –59.4 –43.0 –19.5 –18.6 –1.5 –5.2 –5.2
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
          
7,145.4 8,410.1 6,846.2 6,000.5 2,774.2 –68,754.9 22,374.7 19,968.5 27,004.0 48,254.4 52,772.8
1,107.5 1,220.6 2,245.6 1,880.1 2,150.9 2,776.0 6,131.5 2,932.9 1,813.0 1,298.0 1,315.0
0.73 0.82 0.93 0.95 0.81 0.46 0.72 0.59 0.57 0.75 0.78
9,837.2 10,206.0 7,391.8 6,292.9 3,425.4 –150,587.6 30,866.7 33,847.1 47,441.0 64,319.8 67,584.8
          
8,252.9 9,630.8 9,091.8 7,880.6 4,925.2 –65,978.9 28,506.1 22,901.3 28,816.9 49,552.3 54,087.8
10,944.6 11,426.6 9,637.4 8,173.0 5,576.3 –147,811.5 36,998.2 36,779.9 49,254.0 65,617.7 68,899.8
          
          
21.4 24.0 18.2 14.8 7.2 –16.9 17.7 12.6 13.6 28.3 34.7
28.4 28.4 19.3 15.3 8.2 –37.9 23.0 20.2 23.3 37.4 44.2
          
16.7 18.7 15.3 12.8 6.7 –27.2 14.4 10.5 11.0 20.6 24.1
22.1 22.1 16.2 13.3 7.5 –61.0 18.7 16.8 18.9 27.2 30.7
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The last three years show an increasing trend 
in protection.
 Compared to India, scaling-up has less 
effect on the total %PSEs for Indonesia in 
the 1990s. This is primarily due to the high 
estimated percentage of total Indonesian ag-
ricultural production accounted for by the 
six commodities.44 It is also partly due to 
counteracting effects of negative MPS and 
positive budget payments in India during 
this period. For the postcrisis years 1999–
2002, when the MPS estimates are relatively 
large and account for most of the nominal 
support, the %PSE
c
 for Indonesia averages 
14.1 percent, while the %PSE averages 20.4 
percent, a difference of 6.3 percentage points. 
This exceeds the difference for India, where 
the %PSE
c
 averages 9.1 percent and the 
%PSE averages 10.9 percent during these 
four years.
China
Table 5.19 and Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the 
total %PSE estimated for China. Over this 
short period China’s policies have on aver-
age been nearly neutral (neither protection 
nor disprotection), although domestic prices 
lagged the run-up in world prices in 1996, 
creating disprotection for that year. The 
over all low level of total support we find for 
China is consistent with a study by the 
OECD (2005b), but their results display 
somewhat less annual variability through dis-
protection in 1996 and 1999. The MPS
c
 in 
China is a more important component of the 
PSE than the budgetary payments in 1995–
99, but it then drops and is similar in mag-
nitude to the budgetary payments in 2000 
and 2001. In contrast, the importance of bud-
getary payments was found to be larger 
in 1996 and 1997 in OECD (2005b). The 
Table 5.19 China total PSE, 1995–2001
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Measured support (billion yuan)       
 MPS
c 
86.5 –183.5 23.0 33.4 –77.2 –13.3 13.3
 Budgetary payments –22.7 5.8 6.8 20.5 16.2 15.2 17.9
Covered share 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.39
MPS (billion yuan) 172.2 –368.5 49.8 71.8 –172.4 –32.3 34.1
PSE (billion yuan)       
 PSE
c 
63.7 –177.7 29.8 53.9 –61.1 1.9 31.2
 PSE 149.4 –362.7 56.5 92.4 –156.2 –17.1 52.0
PSE (%)       
 Trade economist denominator       
  PSE
c 
3.3 –7.9 1.4 2.8 –3.5 0.1 1.9
  PSE 7.8 –16.1 2.7 4.8 –9.0 –1.1 3.2
 OECD denominator       
  PSE
c 
4.0 –10.8 1.8 3.4 –4.5 0.1 2.3
  PSE 9.4 –22.0 3.4 5.9 –11.5 –1.3 3.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
44This share may be somewhat inflated because production for the PSE commodities is valued at wholesale 
prices and sometimes retail prices (depending on the domestic prices used in the comparison) while the total 
value of agricultural production is valued at producer prices (FAO 2006). 
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OECD also reports further increases in sup-
port in 2002 and 2003, suggesting a trend 
from disprotection to protection over the pe-
riod 1993–2003.
Vietnam
The total PSE results for Vietnam are shown 
in Table 5.20 and Figures 5.7 and 5.8. The 
hyperinflation in 1988–89 results in an up-
ward spike in protection. As with Indone-
sia’s 1998 crisis-related spike in the opposite 
direction (devaluation followed by inflation), 
this effect does not persist. More generally 
the %PSEs indicate that Vietnam has re-
versed from disprotecting to protecting its 
agriculture. Budget payments are relatively 
small throughout the period 1987–2002, so 
the %PSE trend is dominated by the MPS.45
 A comparison of the results shows that 
the %PSE
c
 and %PSE follow a similar trend 
and differ significantly in value only in the 
early 1990s, when MPS was negative and the 
covered share relatively low. The general 
similarity of these results comes from the 
included commodities’ accounting for about 
70 percent of total agricultural production. 
However, the %PSE
c
 may be the more ap-
propriate measure, as it was the more im-
portant agricultural commodities, which are 
the ones more likely to be subject to policy 
attention, that were chosen for investigation. 
The excluded commodities receive negligible 
policy attention. The scaling-up procedure 
thus gives upwardly biased results, as the 
assumption that both excluded and included 
commodities are subject to similar protec-
tion levels does not hold.
45Again the budgetary payment results might be slightly underestimated, as seed subsidies in programs at the 
provincial level could not be taken into account. Similarly, loans with preferential interest rates provided to mi-
norities in the early 1990s by the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development have not been included for lack 
of data. Concessional loans as promoted in the one-million-ton sugar program and the tea production promotion 
at the local level are also not incorporated.
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Table 5.20 Vietnam total PSE, 1987–2002
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Measured support (billion VND)         
 MPS
c 
–174.4 4,685.4 462.2 –8,979.5 –11,724.8 –12,687.2 –9,841.2 –9,186.8 
 Budgetary payments 8.1 39.0 46.7 1,065.9 795.3 605.3 484.6 –1,138.2 
Covered share 0.86 0.87 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.63 
MPS (billion VND) –202.7 5,393.7 661.0 –14,021.3 –19,031.3 –21,994.9 –16,127.5 –14,647.3 
PSE (billion VND)         
 PSE
c 
–166.3 4,724.4 508.9 –7,913.6 –10,929.5 –12,081.9 –9,356.6 –10,324.9 
 PSE –194.5 5,432.7 707.7 –12,955.4 –18,236.0 –21,389.5 –15,643.0 –15,785.5 
PSE (%)         
 Trade economist denominator         
  PSE
c 
–9.4 175.4 3.9 –27.0 –20.9 –18.4 –15.1 –15.8 
  PSE –11.0 201.6 5.5 –44.1 –34.8 –32.6 –25.3 –24.2 
 OECD denominator         
  PSE
c 
–13.4 60.6 3.8 –36.4 –25.6 –24.3 –17.2 –16.2 
  PSE –15.6 69.7 5.3 –59.6 –42.7 –43.1 –28.7 –24.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
       
–10,931.5 2,368.2 –491.3 8,006.0 25,825.4 16,572.9 12,695.2 14,457.6
3,702.6 488.3 1,702.4 882.1 1,742.2 –126.5 632.1 1,063.4
0.62 0.76 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.74 0.69 0.82
–17,730.0 3,128.0 –594.7 9,948.2 31,139.1 22,335.4 18,406.3 17,559.2
       
–7,228.9 2,856.5 1,211.0 8,888.2 27,567.6 16,446.5 13,327.3 15,521.0
–14,027.4 3,616.3 1,107.6 10,830.3 32,881.3 22,208.9 19,038.5 18,622.7
       
       
–8.1 3.5 1.4 8.5 28.2 15.5 13.1 14.9
–15.7 4.4 1.3 10.3 33.6 20.9 18.7 17.9
       
–8.1 3.1 1.2 7.8 21.4 13.1 10.6 12.3
–15.7 3.9 1.1 9.5 25.6 17.7 15.1 14.7
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Effects of Exchange Rate Misalignment
on PSEs for India and China
The level of the exchange rate and its degree of misalignment plays an important role in determining the values of PSEs (Harley 1996; Bojnec and Swinnen 1997; Melyukhina 2002). This issue is particularly important for developing countries when capital surges 
or macroeconomic instability, together with delayed or insufficient adjustments in exchange 
rates, have led to significant economic crises and subsequent exchange rate movements, as has 
been the case at certain times during the past two decades for India, Indonesia, China, and 
Vietnam. Prolonged misalignments of the exchange rate potentially subsidize or tax the agri-
cultural sector and can result in mistaken estimates of the level and sometimes the direction 
of agricultural support as measured by the MPS or PSE using the observed rate. In these cases 
the effects of exchange rate misalignment provide useful insights when the support measures 
are presented. In the results presented in Chapter 5, changes in nominal exchange rates have 
been shown to have substantial effects on measured %MPS and %PSEs over time. However, 
the degree of exchange rate misalignment in various years has not been evaluated.
 While there is general agreement that use of misaligned exchange rates introduces a bias 
in the %MPS and %PSE calculations, and that this bias can be substantial in some cases, there 
is much less agreement on the appropriate alternative. Previous studies (Liefert et al. 1996; 
Shick 2002) have used certain adjustments of exchange rates, such as for purchasing power 
parity (PPP), to determine the equilibrium exchange rate. Their analyses indicate that ex-
change rate misalignment had significant impacts on the calculation of PSEs for Russia. De-
spite plausible results, calculations based on PPP call for a degree of discretion. The results are 
sensitive to the selection of a base year in which the exchange rate is assumed to be in equilib-
rium. Thus other models of the equilibrium exchange rate may be preferred to the PPP ap-
proach in PSE estimation (Harley 1996).
 Recently an equilibrium approach that relates the real exchange rate to underlying eco-
nomic fundamentals has gained prominence among both macroeconomic practitioners and 
policymakers in addressing issues of exchange rate misalignment and testing for over- or un-
dervalued currencies. We apply this approach to analyze exchange rate misalignment and then 
assess its effects on the total %PSEs of India and China. These are the two larger economies 
in our study, yet exchange rate effects on agricultural support or disprotection levels have not 
previously received empirical assessment. Once exchange rate misalignment has been evalu-
ated, our analysis of its effects on agricultural support explicitly takes into account the degree 
of exchange rate pass-through to domestic agricultural prices and budgetary payments when 
%PSEs are presented under the counterfactual assumption that the exchange rates move to 
their equilibrium annual values. These analyses of exchange rate equilibrium and pass-through 
utilize more advanced time series econometric techniques than in the previous chapters.
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Exchange Rate Equilibrium 
and Misalignment in India 
and China
To address the effects of exchange rate mis-
alignments on agriculture support levels 
measured by the %PSE, the first step is to 
establish the exchange rate equilibrium. This 
task is fundamentally difficult because the 
equilibrium value of the exchange rate is not 
observable. Assessment is further compli-
cated by the existence of a variety of models 
of exchange rate determination. Common 
approaches to equilibrium exchange rate 
determination range from the simple PPP 
model to more sophisticated models such as 
the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
(Williamson 1994), natural real exchange 
rate (Stein 1994), behavioral equilibrium ex-
change rate (BEER) (Clark and MacDonald 
1999), and real equilibrium exchange rate 
(REER) (Edwards 1989; Hinkle and Montiel 
1999).
 The equilibrium exchange rate for the In-
dian rupee has been modeled using several 
of the approaches mentioned above. Kohli 
(2003) calculates the equilibrium (nominal) 
exchange rate of the Indian rupee for post-
floating years using PPP with a base rate 
set at the 1993 level. Results from this study 
show that the nominal exchange rate moved 
closely with the PPP rate during the sample 
period, with slight overvaluation. Patnaik 
and Pauly (2001) use a variant of the BEER 
approach to derive the equilibrium exchange 
rate for India. Their results suggest that in 
the 1990s the equilibrium value of the rupee 
was essentially determined by the output 
market. However, owing to slow adjustments 
in this market, the exchange rate was not 
always at the equilibrium rate. There were 
periods when the rupee was overvalued or 
undervalued compared to the long-run rate, 
but there was a clear tendency to revert to the 
equilibrium level. Cerra and Saxena (2002) 
apply the REER approach to study whether 
the India rupee was misaligned before the 
1991 crisis through a vector error correction 
model. The evidence from this study indi-
cates that the Indian rupee was overvalued 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The over-
valuation played a significant role in the 
macroeconomic crisis, which resulted in 
sharp exchange rate depreciations.
 The equilibrium and misalignment of 
the Chinese yuan has been assessed in vari-
ous studies. Chou and Shih (1998) estimate 
the equilibrium exchange rate of the yuan 
between 1978 and 1994 using both a PPP 
approach and an approach based on the 
shadow price of foreign exchange. Their 
findings indicate that the real exchange rate 
of the yuan is mean reverting and the long-
run PPP relationship holds. In addition the 
yuan is shown to be overvalued for much of 
this period, but it came close to equilibrium 
between 1990 and 1994. Zhang (2001) esti-
mates the REER of the yuan between 1952 
and 1997 and finds that the exchange rate 
was chronically overvalued during most of 
the central planning period. Undervaluation 
frequently occurred during the reform period 
from 1978 to 1997, indicating that China has 
had a proactive exchange rate policy, with 
the nominal exchange rate used as a policy 
tool to attain real targets. Similar findings 
are reported by Zhang (2002), who uses both 
REER and BEER approaches to estimate the 
misalignment of the yuan. A series of em-
pirical studies have subsequently calculated 
the equilibrium value of the Chinese yuan, 
and in particular that vis-à-vis the U.S. dol-
lar. Although different theoretical and em-
pirical methods are used in these studies 
and the results differ in terms of the degree 
of misalignment measured, they have gen-
erally shown that the Chinese yuan has been 
undervalued in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Jeong and Mazier 2003; Benassy-
Quere et al. 2004; Frankel 2004; Funke and 
Rahn 2004; Goldstein 2004; Wren-Lewis 
2004; Coudert and Couharde 2005).
Model Description
Following Edwards (1989), Zhang (2001), 
and Cerra and Saxena (2002), our analysis 
adopts the REER approach, in which the real 
exchange rates in India and China are deter-
mined by a set of economic fundamentals. 
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The fundamentals identified include four 
categories: (1) domestic supply-side factors, 
and particularly the Balassa-Samuelson ef-
fect arising from faster productivity growth 
in the tradable- relative to the nontradable-
goods sector; (2) fiscal policy, such as fiscal 
deficits as well as changes in the composi-
tion of government spending between trad-
able and nontradable goods; (3) the inter-
national economic environment, including 
world interest rates, capital inflows, and 
terms of trade; and (4) commercial policy, 
such as trade liberalization through reduc-
tions in import tariffs and export subsidies. 
Time series co-integration estimation is used 
to test for a stationary long-run relationship 
between the exchange rate and the economic 
fundamentals.
 A system of variables x consisting of the 
real exchange rate and the underlying funda-
mentals is formulated as x = [LRER, LPRO, 
LGEX, WIR, LTOT, LOPN], with each vari-
able defined as follows. All variables are in 
logarithmic form, except for the world inter-
est rate (WIR), and when index numbers are 
used the base year is 2000. Annual data 
are drawn from the International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF (2004) and supple-
mented by various issues of the Handbook 
of Statistics on the Indian Economy pub-
lished by the Reserve Bank of India and the 
China Statistical Yearbook published by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS 
various years). The sample period for deter-
mination of the equilibrium real exchange 
rate is 1950–2002 for India and 1952–2003 
for China.
 The real exchange rate (LRER) is de-
fined as the product of the nominal exchange 
rate and the ratio of the consumer price in-
dexes: LRER = ln(e ⋅CPIUS/CPI), where e is 
the nominal exchange rate and CPIUS and 
CPI are the consumer price indexes for the 
United States and India (or China), respec-
tively.46 While some other studies have used 
the multilateral real effective exchange rate, 
the real exchange rate defined here is a bi-
lateral rate expressed in domestic currencies 
per U.S. dollar (an increase represents de-
preciation). The bilateral rate can be readily 
applied to the %PSE calculations since world 
commodity prices are generally denominated 
in U.S. dollars.
 The Balassa-Samuelson effect caused 
by differential productivity growth in the 
tradable- versus nontradable-goods sectors 
is approximated by the productivity change 
variable (LPRO). To be consistent with the 
Balassa-Samuelson theory, an increase in the 
productivity in the tradable sector relative to 
the nontradable sector would appreciate the 
exchange rate, because it creates excess de-
mand in the nontradable sector. Following 
Zhang (2001) and Cerra and Saxena (2002), 
this variable is proxied by the log of the 
annual growth of the industrial production 
index (IPI) for India, LPRO = ln(IPI/IPI
–1), 
and the gross fixed capital formation (FCF) 
for China, LPRO = ln(FCF/GDP).
 Government expenditure (GEX) as a per-
centage of GDP is used to capture the effect 
of fiscal policies: LGEX = ln(GEX/GDP). 
Changes in the composition of government 
consumption affect the exchange rate in 
different ways, depending on whether the 
consumption is directed to tradable or non-
tradable goods. If an increase in government 
consumption is concentrated in nontradable 
goods, excess demand in this sector will lead 
to higher prices for nontradable goods and 
thus real exchange rate appreciation. Depre-
ciation will occur if expanded government 
consumption is concentrated in tradable 
goods.
46For China, a complexity in the computation of the real exchange rate is related to its dual-track exchange 
system. With this system, which existed from 1981 to 1993, the nominal exchange rate used for computing the 
real exchange rate is a weighted average between the official rate and the secondary rate (Zhang 2001). From 
1981 to 1985, the secondary rate is the internal rate for trade settlements. Its weight is 0.8, which is also the 
rate of trade in total exchange income. From 1986 to 1993, the secondary rate is the swap rate, with a weight of 
0.44, the exchange retention ratio.
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 Two variables are defined to capture 
changes in the international economic envi-
ronment. First the real world interest rate 
(WIR) is used, which is approximated by the 
U.S. real interest rate, calculated by sub-
tracting the U.S. inflation rate (measured by 
the CPIUS) from the 1-year Treasury Bill 
rate (TBR): WIR = TBR – (CPIUS – CPIUS
–1 )/
CPIUS
–1. It is widely accepted that world in-
terest rate fluctuations drive real exchange 
rate movements in developing countries. A 
common effect associated with a reduction 
in the world interest rate is real exchange 
rate appreciation.
 A second international economic vari-
able is the terms of trade (LTOT). For India 
it is defined as the ratio of export price 
index (export unit value XUV) to import 
price index (import unit value MUV): LTOT 
= ln(XUV/MUV). For China, owing to the 
lack of consistent export and import price 
data, this variable is proxied by the growth 
of the value of exports (VX): LTOT = 
ln(VX/VX
–1). Previous studies (Goldfajn and 
Valdés 1999) have shown that the effect of 
terms of trade on the exchange rate is am-
biguous. An improvement in the terms of 
trade, for instance, through a decrease in the 
price of importables, increases national in-
come, which in turn increases demand for 
nontradable goods, leading to real exchange 
rate appreciation (an income effect). Simul-
taneously the movement of production away 
from importables toward nontradables can 
depress the price of nontradables, causing 
real exchange rate depreciation (a substitu-
tion effect). Therefore the net effect of terms 
of trade on the real exchange rate depends 
on the relative magnitude of the income and 
substitution effects.
 Openness of the economy (LOPN) is 
calculated as the ratio of the sum of the value 
of imports (VM) and the value of exports 
(VX) to the GDP: LOPN = ln((VM + VX)/
GDP). Openness reflects how connected the 
economy is to the rest of the world and the 
degree of trade liberalization. Use of trade 
value as a proxy for policies is justified be-
cause of the difficulty of obtaining good time 
series data on import tariffs and export sub-
sidies, and also because trade value may ac-
count not only for explicit trade policies but 
also for implicit barriers to trade. Previous 
studies have shown that improvement in the 
openness of a country’s economy (a decrease 
in tariffs and subsidies) generates a depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate owing to 
crowding-in and subsequent reduction in the 
prices of nontradable goods (Goldfajn and 
Valdés 1999).
Long-Run Exchange 
Rate Determination
The Johansen maximum likelihood method 
for estimating co-integrating vectors (Johan-
sen 1991) is used to determine the equilib-
rium exchange rates in India and China. The 
co-integrating vectors establish the long-
run equilibrium relationship between the 
exchange rate and the specified economic 
fundamentals. The estimated results (with 
standard errors in parentheses) are discussed 
in depth by Cheng and Orden (2005, 2007) 
and are as follows:
India:
LRER = 4.037 – 10.370LPRO
 (1.345)
 + 0.621LGEX + 2.695WIR
 (0.078) (1.104)
 + 0.569LTOT + 0.654LOPN
 (0.184) (0.076)
China:
LRER = –0.179 – 0.000LPRO
 (0.000)
 – 1.855LGEX + 11.735WIR
 (0.756) (3.237)
 – 1.913LTOT + 0.769LOPN.
 (0.593) (0.112)
 In general the parameter estimates are 
consistent with the expectations discussed 
above. The negative sign of the variable 
LPRO for India suggests that an increase in 
the productivity in the tradable goods sector 
relative to the nontradable goods sector is 
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associated with real exchange rate appreci-
ation, which is consistent with the Balassa-
Samuelson theory. The exclusion of LPRO 
in China’s equilibrium exchange rate rela-
tionship indicates the absence of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. This is possibly due to 
China’s domestic prices having been heavily 
administered under central planning and the 
expected link between productivity and rel-
ative prices distorted. Similar findings are 
reported by Coudert and Couharde (2005). 
An increase in the government expenditure 
(LGEX) causes the rupee to depreciate but 
the yuan to appreciate. The difference in the 
sign, which is consistent with Zhang (2001) 
and Cerra and Saxena (2002), may be due 
to Indian government expenditures having 
a higher content of tradable goods than for 
China. The positive sign associated with WIR 
indicates that a reduction in the world interest 
rate appreciates the long-run real exchange 
rates for India and China.
 The positive sign on LTOT for India sug-
gests the dominance of the substitution effect 
over the income effect and that improve-
ments in the terms of trade depreciate its 
currency. The reverse happens in the case 
of China, where an increase in the terms of 
trade leads to real appreciation. The volume 
of trade or degree of openness, as measured 
by the variable LOPN, is an important fac-
tor in determining the level of the real ex-
change rate. In both countries the positive 
signs confirm the findings in the macro-
economic literature that economic closeness 
is typically associated with overvaluation, 
and that external liberalization aimed at re-
ducing tariffs and eliminating trade restric-
tions causes currency depreciation. 
 To calculate the equilibrium exchange 
rate based on the co-integrating vectors, we 
further filter the values of the economic 
fundamentals using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(H-P) decomposing technique (Hodrick and 
Prescott 1997), as the economic fundamen-
tals themselves may be out of long-run 
steady-state values. The H-P method de-
composes these time series into a trend µt 
and a stationary component xt – µt by mini-
mizing: ΣTt=1(xt – µt)2 + λΣtT=2–1[(µt+1 – µt) – 
(µt – µt–1)]2, where λ is an arbitrary constant 
reflecting the penalty of incorporating fluc-
tuations into the trend.47 We also note that 
the individual coefficients in the estimated 
co-integrating vector do not enter our analy-
sis of exchange rate impacts on agricultural 
support. Rather it is only the estimated mis-
alignment of observed exchange rates from 
their long-run equilibrium values that affects 
the calculation of the support measures. Thus 
it is the overall validity of the co-integrating 
relationship that is of direct interest, even 
while macroeconomic research continues 
to investigate the most appropriate choices 
among economic fundamentals and empiri-
cal proxies for these measures.
Exchange Rate Equilibrium 
and Misalignment
The actual and estimated equilibrium real 
exchange rates for India for 1980–2002 are 
shown in Figure 6.1. The difference be-
tween the two indicates the exchange rate 
misalignment. The figure shows that the 
actual real exchange rate of the Indian rupee 
significantly increased (depreciated) from 
1980 to 1993. Large steps of devaluation 
started in 1988 and continued through 1992. 
The actual exchange rate shows a persistent 
overvaluation from 1986 to 1992 compared 
with the equilibrium rate. Concurrent with 
the long period of real exchange rate over-
valuation were the deterioration of the coun-
try’s balance of payments, the depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves, and political tur-
moil, which triggered the macroeconomic 
crisis that began in 1991.
47Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggested a λ of 1,600 for quarterly data. However, different numbers should 
be used depending on the data frequencies. This number is much larger when the dataset is monthly but much 
smaller when it is annual. In this analysis λ is chosen to be equal to 10 to match our annual dataset.
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 The actual real exchange rate came into 
line with the equilibrium real exchange rate 
in 1993, after devaluations and as a result of 
postcrisis adjustments featuring macroeco-
nomic stabilization and structural reforms, 
especially in the direction of trade and fi-
nancial liberalization. The combined effects 
of these measures were evident in the exter-
nal sector. In the years following the crisis, 
rising capital inflows and shrinking trade 
deficits have led to continued accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves by India. The 
actual real exchange rate of the Indian rupee 
has fluctuated around its equilibrium values 
with only limited degrees of misalignment. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, both the actual and 
equilibrium real exchange rates have been 
relatively stable during the years 1993–2002, 
with a slight initial appreciation followed by 
depreciation when the U.S. dollar began to 
appreciate globally in 1996. In cases of mis-
alignment during this period, the actual rate 
has subsequently moved in the direction of 
restoring the equilibrium.
 In comparison to the Indian rupee, the 
actual real exchange rate movements of the 
Chinese yuan during the postreform era are 
in general characterized by undervaluations 
(Figure 6.2). Short periods of overvaluation 
also occur during the early reform years 
from 1980 to 1983 and more recently from 
1996 to 1998. The real exchange rate was 
for the most part undervalued from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s. Strong economic 
fundamentals, represented by China’s con-
tinuous current account and capital account 
surpluses as well as reserve accumulations, 
are the major reasons for the currency under-
valuation in this period. However, capital 
inflows to China still suffer from different 
degrees of volatility and sudden withdrawal 
risks, especially during times of crisis in 
other countries. Indeed the real exchange rate 
of the yuan experienced a period of over-
valuation during the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997–98, although the degree of over-
valuation was relatively small.
 Starting in 2000 there has been a period 
of undervaluation of the yuan. The widen-
ing gap between the equilibrium and actual 
rates has stimulated a heated debate on the 
issue of exchange rate manipulation by the 
Chinese government. Trade-sensitive indus-
tries in the United States, in particular, have 
expressed serious concerns about the yuan’s 
undervaluation in the face of significant 
losses of manufacturing jobs and large trade 
deficits with China, which amounted to over 
$162 billion and $202 billion in 2004 and 
2005, respectively. A series of Section 301 
unfair trade practice petitions against China 
has been filed by a coalition of industry and 
labor groups, and the U.S. Congress has con-
sidered legislation to impose a 28 percent 
Figure 6.1 Actual and estimated equilibrium real exchange rates for India, 1980–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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tariff on Chinese imports to offset the cur-
rency value. Despite strong political pressure, 
the Chinese government has maintained its 
fixed nominal exchange rate regime, allow-
ing only slight appreciation against the 
dollar.
Effects of Exchange Rate 
Misalignment on PSEs
We apply our model-based equilibrium 
exchange rates to evaluate exchange rate 
effects on the PSEs of India and China. The 
analysis is based on non-scaled-up total 
%PSE
c
 in each country. Disaggregated 
commodity-specific results are not reported, 
nor are results for scaling up to %PSE. These 
additional results are evaluated in Cheng 
(2005) and Cheng and Orden (2005). 
 Following the terminology of Krueger, 
Schiff, and Valdés (1991), we define three 
effects using the total %PSE
c
. The direct 
effect induced by sector-specific policies is 
defined as the %PSE
c
 calculated using the 
actual nominal exchange rate E:
Direct effect = %PSE(E) 
 MPS(E) + BP
 = ——————
 VOP + BP
 Σ(Pjd – Pjar(E))Qj + BP
 = ——————————,
 VOP + BP
where j denotes a commodity among those 
covered in the analysis, pjd is the domestic 
price, Pjar is the adjusted reference price, Qj 
is the quantity produced, BP is budgetary 
payments, and VOP is the total value of ag-
ricultural production at domestic producer 
prices.
 The total effect induced by both sectoral 
and exchange rate policies is defined as the 
%PSE
c
 calculated using the equilibrium ex-
change rate, denoted by E*. Exchange rate 
changes are assumed to be reflected in equal 
proportion in world reference prices expressed 
in domestic currency. A ceteris paribus as-
sumption holds domestic prices, domestic 
cost adjustment to the reference price, and 
domestic budgetary payments constant:
Total effect = %PSE(E*) 
 MPS(E*) + BP
 = ———–———
 VOP + BP
 Σ(Pjd – Pjar(E*))Qj + BP
 = ———————————.
 VOP + BP
 The difference between the total and di-
rect effects captures the indirect effect of 
misalignment of the exchange rate:
Indirect effect = %PSE(E*) – %PSE(E)
 Σ(Pjar(E) – Pjar(E*))Qj
 = ——————————.
 VOP + BP
Figure 6.2 Actual and estimated equilibrium real exchange rates for China, 1980–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Ignoring domestic cost adjustments to the 
world reference price, it can be shown that 
the indirect effect is m⋅(ΣPjwE*Qj)/(VOP 
+ BP) where m is the percentage exchange 
rate misalignment, m = (E – E*)/E*. The 
indirect effect is negative if overvaluation oc-
curs (m < 0), positive if undervaluation 
occurs (m > 0), and zero if no misalignment 
exists (m = 0). Ignoring the domestic cost 
adjustment simplifies the expressions for the 
indirect effect (Cheng and Orden 2005, 2007). 
However, in the calculations to evaluate ex-
change rate effects on the %PSE
c
 for India 
and China the domestic adjustments to the 
reference prices are taken into account.
Exchange Rate
Pass-Through and 
Counterfactual
PSE Measures
The direct, total, and indirect effects are 
defined above under the ceteris paribus 
assumption of zero exchange rate pass-
through. However, the effects of realign-
ment of the exchange rate on %PSEs will 
depend on the degree of pass-through of 
appreciation or depreciation exchange rate 
movements to domestic agricultural prices 
and budgetary payments. The empirical lit-
erature on exchange rate pass-through to 
prices is extensive but has mostly focused on 
the manufacturing industries of developed 
economies. Among those studies that exam-
ine exchange rate pass-through to agricul-
tural commodity prices, some have shown 
more complete and rapid pass-through to ag-
ricultural prices than manufacturing prices 
(Carter, Gray, and Furtan 1990; Xu and 
Orden 2002), which is consistent with the 
view that agricultural commodities operate 
in competitive flexible-price markets. Other 
studies have shown incomplete pass-through 
for some agricultural commodities (Park 
and Pick 1996). A number of explanations 
are offered for the incomplete pass-through 
from exchange rates. One is that importing 
and exporting firms choose to hold prices 
constant and simply reduce or increase their 
mark-ups when the exchange rate changes 
by “pricing to market.” Policy interventions 
affecting domestic prices, or domestic prices 
falling between import and export adjusted 
reference prices (P
m
 and P
e
) if all interven-
tions were removed, also affect exchange 
rate pass-through.
 The exchange rate pass-through to do-
mestic agricultural prices in India and China 
was evaluated using fixed-effects panel re-
gression models (Cheng 2005). The panel 
datasets include the eleven covered commodi-
ties for India and nine covered commodities 
for China, respectively. Annual data series 
are used because short-run exchange rate 
changes (monthly or quarterly) may not be 
fully passed through to prices, as they can 
be treated as temporary, and because higher-
frequency data for India and China are not 
available. The exchange rate data, domestic 
prices, world reference prices, and adjusted 
reference prices are obtained from the pre-
vious analysis.
 Aggregate pass-through coefficients of 
0.81 and 0.72 are found for India and China, 
respectively.48 The point estimates are not 
sensitive to different model specifications, 
and the pass-through coefficients are statis-
tically significant at the 0.05 level, indicat-
ing that no exchange rate pass-through is 
rejected for both countries. However, de-
spite relatively high estimated pass-though 
coefficients, the null hypotheses that they are 
equal to one, that is, complete exchange rate 
pass-through, is also rejected.
48Our aggregate results for pass-through are higher in magnitude than those found by Lu and Zhang (2003) and 
Sharma (2003) but are consistent with those reported by Mundlak and Larson (1992) and Gaulier, Lahrèche-Revil, 
and Mejean (2006). Differences in pass-through coefficient estimates arise owing to variations in estimation 
method, sample selection, and data aggregation. Commodity-specific pass-through coefficients are not reported 
herein. However, we find lower commodity-specific estimates for the food staples rice and wheat than in the 
aggregate for India, as would be expected given the extensive intervention in these markets. 
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 Using the notion of exchange rate pass-
through, a counterfactual measure of the 
%PSE
c
 can be computed under the assump-
tion that the exchange rate (E) moves to its 
equilibrium (E*) in a given period. We de-
note this measure by %PSECF, where CF 
indicates the counterfactual aspect of the 
measure and we drop the subscript for cov-
ered commodities for convenience. In place 
of the ceteris paribus assumption in calcu-
lating the total effect, the exchange rate 
changes in the counterfactual %PSECF are 
assumed to affect the domestic prices and 
budgetary payments in proportion to ex-
change rate pass-through. Domestic prices 
and budgetary payment change to Pjd/(1 + 
βm) and BP/(1 + βm) when there is incom-
plete pass-through, where β is the exchange 
rate pass-through coefficient, 0 < β < 1).49 
By comparison the domestic price and bud-
getary payment remain at Pjd and BP with 
no exchange rate pass-through (with β = 0), 
but change to Pjd/(1 + m) and BP/(1 + m) 
with complete pass-through (with β = 1).
 A comparison between the direct %PSE
c
 
(based on the actual exchange rate) and the 
counterfactual %PSECF (based on equilib-
rium exchange rate) for different exchange 
rate pass-through scenarios is presented in 
Table 6.1. The difference between the initial 
direct and new counterfactual measures is 
denoted as a “transfer” of the indirect effect 
to the counterfactual measure.
 In the case of no exchange rate pass-
through (NPT), the difference between 
%PSE CF and the initial direct %PSE
c
 is 
equal to the indirect exchange rate effect 
shown earlier. This represents a full trans-
fer of the exchange rate effect into the new 
measure of the %PSE
c
, with no change in 
actual incentives conveyed to producers 
through the domestic output prices or bud-
getary payments. The magnitude of the in-
direct effect, and thus the transfer, is deter-
49This analysis assumes a single pass-through coefficient, although differences may exist between exchange rate 
pass-throughs to commodity prices and to budgetary payments. See Cheng and Orden (2007) for a relaxation 
of this assumption, which has only a small effect on the empirical results. 
Table 6.1 Comparison between counterfactual and direct PSEs under different pass-through assumptions 
 Exchange rate pass-though
 NPT CPT IPT
 Pj
d
 BP Pj
d
 BP
  Σ(——— – Pjar(E*))Qj + ——— Σ(—–—— – Pjar(E*))Qj + —–——
 Σ(Pjd – Pjar(E*))Qj + BP 1 + m 1 + m 1 + βm 1 + βmCounterfactual (%PSECF) ——————————— ——————————————— ————————————————
 VOP + BP VOP BP VOP BP
  ——— + ——— ——— + ———
  1 + m 1 + m 1 + βm 1 + βm
  Σ(Pjd – Pjar(E))Qj + BPDirect effect (%PSE
c
)  ———————————
  VOP + BP
 ΣPjwE*Qj  ΣPjwE*QjTransfer m ——–——— 0 (1 – β)m ——–———
 VOP + BP  VOP + BP
  ΣPjwE*Qj ΣPjwE*Qj Nontransfer 0 m ——–——— βm ——–———
  VOP + BP VOP + BP 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For simplicity, the formulas shown ignore domestic cost adjustments to the world reference price, but these adjustments are 
incorporated in the empirical analysis. CPT, complete pass-through; IPT, incomplete pass-through; NPT, no pass-through.
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mined by the initial exchange rate mis -
alignment (m).
 In contrast, when there is complete ex-
change rate pass-through (CPT) the transfer 
of the initial indirect effect into the counter-
factual %PSECF measure is zero no matter 
how much the exchange rate was misaligned. 
Removing the exchange rate misalignment 
in this case affects the price incentives pro-
ducers face but leaves the protection coeffi-
cient measured by the initial direct %PSE
c
 
unchanged. Finally, in the case of incom-
plete exchange rate pass-through, the degree 
of transfer of the initial indirect effect into 
the counterfactual direct effect is determined 
by a combination of the initial exchange rate 
misalignment (m) and the degree of pass-
through (β).
Results for India and China 
Table 6.2 shows the direct, indirect, and total 
effects measured by the %PSE
c
 in India for 
the period 1985–2002, together with the 
counterfactual %PSECF under the assump-
tion of incomplete exchange rate pass-
through. The actual nominal exchange rates 
in the analysis are the annual average official 
rates, and the nominal equilibrium exchange 
rates are derived from the corresponding 
estimated real equilibrium rates.50 The sam-
ple period is divided into four distinct sub-
periods. Period I covers 1985–88 when the 
exchange rate started to overvalue with an 
average overvaluation of –8.6 percent. Pe-
riod II represents a sustained overvaluation 
period from 1989 to 1992 during which the 
macroeconomic crisis occurred and the 
exchange rate was under active adjustment. 
The overvaluation in this period was –11.8 
percent. Period III includes the postreform 
years 1993–98, with a slight undervaluation 
of 3.6 percent. The last period, period IV, is 
the stable exchange rate period from 1999 to 
2002, when the actual exchange rate is close 
to the equilibrium rate with a slight over-
valuation of –2.8 percent. Figure 6.3 illus-
trates the direct, indirect, and counterfactual 
results on an annual basis.
 The direct effects shown in Table 6.2 
and Figure 6.3 are equivalent to the %PSE
c
 
reported in Chapter 5. The indirect effect 
50Specifically, the nominal equilibrium exchange rate is obtained by multiplying the real equilibrium exchange 
rate by the ratio of India’s consumer price index to the U.S. consumer price index. 
Table 6.2 Direct, indirect, and total effects and counterfactual PSEs for India by 
periods, 1985–2002
PSE effects 
Period 
(percentage misalignment)
I
1985–1988
(–8.6%)
II
1989–1992
(–11.8%)
III
1993–1998
(3.6%)
IV
1999–2002
(–2.8%)
%PSE
c
 Direct 7.7 0.8 –2.9 9.0
 Indirect –3.2 –8.2 1.4 –1.3
 Total 4.5 –7.4 –1.5 7.7
%PSECF
 IPT 7.0 –1.1 –2.6 8.7
 Transfer to direct –0.7 –1.9 0.3 –0.3
 Nontransfer –2.5 –6.3 1.1 –1.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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caused by exchange rate misalignments has 
had quite different impacts on India’s agri-
culture in comparison to the direct effect. 
On average India’s agricultural sector has 
been indirectly penalized by exchange rate 
overvaluation in periods I, II, and IV, but 
subsidized by exchange rate undervaluation 
in period III. The indirect effect counteracts 
the direct effect in each period and was most 
negative in the years before and during the 
macroeconomic crisis, when the exchange 
rate was continuously misaligned; the indi-
rect effect averaged –8.2 percent during pe-
riod II. In the postcrisis years, as the result 
of the decreased magnitude of the exchange 
rate misalignment following macroeconomic 
reforms, the indirect effect dampens to less 
than 2 percent in absolute value.
 The indirect effect of the exchange rate 
is smaller in absolute value than the direct 
effect in periods I, III, and IV, indicating the 
dominance of sector-specific policies over 
the economywide policies reflected in the 
exchange rate. The opposite happened in 
period II, when substantial overvaluation had 
a large negative effect on incentives facing 
agricultural producers. This latter result is 
consistent with the study by Krueger, Schiff, 
and Valdés (1991), who found that economy-
wide policies played a dominant role across 
a range of developing countries (not includ-
ing India) in an earlier period to the mid-
1980s. More recently India has experienced 
neither sustained periods of significant ex-
change rate misalignment nor subsequent 
effects on agriculture as measured by the 
%PSE
c
s.
 The counterfactual %PSECF shown in 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.3 under incomplete 
exchange rate pass-through (IPT) assumes 
an estimated contemporaneous pass-through 
coefficient of 0.81. The comparative cases 
of no pass-through (NPT) and complete 
pass-through (CPT) are not reported explic-
itly, but they can be inferred from the re-
ported total and direct %PSE
c
 results under 
observed exchange rates, as described above.
 Since the contemporaneous pass-through 
of exchange rate movements is relatively 
high in India, only a small portion of the 
exchange rate effect remains in the counter-
factual %PSECF under the assumption of in-
complete exchange rate pass-through to do-
mestic prices and budgetary payments. For 
example, despite a large indirect effect in 
period II, only –1.9 percent out of –8.2 per-
cent transfers to the counterfactual %PSECF, 
with –6.3 percent disappearing as a result 
of the exchange rate pass-through. Counter-
factually, had this period of misalignment 
been corrected, we estimate that Indian 
farmers would have faced better production 
Figure 6.3 Direct, indirect, and counterfactual PSEs for India, annually 1985–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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incentives, with disprotection of only –1.1 
percent instead of –7.4 percent as measured 
by the total %PSE
c
.
 Table 6.3 shows the direct, indirect, and 
total effects measured by %PSE
c
 for the pe-
riod 1995–2001, as well as the counterfactual 
%PSECF with the estimated incomplete ex-
change rate pass-through (IPT) in China. The 
sample period is divided into two subperiods, 
I and II, representing, respectively, periods 
of slight currency overvaluation (1995–98) 
and more intense undervaluation (1999–
2001). Figure 6.4 shows the results on an 
annual basis.
 In China the indirect effect reinforced 
the direct effect in period I but counteracted 
it in period II. Exchange rate overvaluation 
and undervaluation in the two subperiods 
have indirectly penalized and subsidized 
China’s agricultural sector, respectively. An 
indirect effect of 5.6 percent in period II 
would have been transferred to the counter-
factual %PSECF if the exchange rate had 
moved to its equilibrium with no exchange 
rate pass-through to domestic prices or bud-
getary payments. However, only a small part 
of the indirect effect is transferred with the 
estimated exchange rate pass-through coeffi-
cient, a phenomenon similar to that observed 
in India. This leads to a counterfactual 
%PSECF measure of 1.1 percent in period II. 
Notwithstanding positive support measures, 
it is estimated that Chinese farmers would 
have faced deteriorated price incentives had 
the exchange rate appreciated to its equilib-
rium levels in this period.
 Finally, although these countries are not 
included in our analysis, exchange rate mis-
alignment could also affect the PSE calcula-
tions for Indonesia and Vietnam. Indonesia 
suffered substantially during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, when the nominal 
exchange rate depreciated almost 100 per-
cent. Two other major currency devaluations 
Table 6.3 Direct, indirect, and total 
effect and counterfactual PSEs for China 
by periods, 1995–2002
PSE effects
Period
(percentage misalignment)
I
1995–1998
(–3.2%)
II
1999–2001
(9.2%)
%PSE
c
 Direct –0.4 –0.7
 Indirect –2.3 5.6
 Total –2.7 4.9
%PSECF
 IPT –0.9 1.1
 Transfer to direct –0.5 1.8
 Nontransfer –1.8 3.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 6.4 Direct, indirect, and counterfactual PSEs for China, annually 1995–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations
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occurred in Indonesia in 1983 and 1986, re-
spectively. Despite these drastic exchange 
rate depreciations, studies have shown that 
the Indonesian rupiah has been only mod-
estly misaligned, even during the crisis year. 
For example, Chinn (2000) finds that the 
rupiah was overvalued against the dollar by 
about 6 percent in 1997 while Saxena (2002) 
reported an overvaluation rate of less than 
1 percent in the same year. For the noncrisis 
years, the misalignment of the currency is 
also small, and according to Saxena (2002) 
it has rarely exceeded 2 percent since 1980.
 In comparison to the Indonesian rupiah, 
the Vietnamese dong has experienced a high 
degree of exchange rate misalignment, es-
pecially in the country’s early reform years. 
The overvaluation was estimated to be as 
high as 60 percent in the mid-1980s, but it 
has since dropped substantially to less than 
5 percent during the period 1996–2002 
(Hoang 2003). Undervaluation also occurred 
in the early 1990s, with a magnitude of 15–
20 percent. Thus the impact of exchange 
rate misalignment on the PSE measures was 
potentially more significant in Vietnam 
through the mid-1990s than in India, China, 
or Indonesia. Exactly how the support mea-
sures and the incentives facing Vietnamese 
farmers would have been affected had the 
exchange rate moved to its equilibrium val-
ues during this period is a subject for further 
analysis.
123
C H A P T E R  7
Summary and Conclusions
T his report has provided an analysis of the evolution of agricultural policies during 1985–2002 and empirical estimates of the degree of protection or disprotection to ag-riculture for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. Among these four Asian countries, 
India and China are two of the world’s largest agricultural economies and have a relative ad-
vantage owing to their low labor costs. They are largely self-sufficient in agriculture but are 
net exporters of some major commodities and importers of others. Indonesia is primarily a 
food importer but an exporter of rubber and palm oil. Vietnam has recently emerged as a sub-
stantial exporter of rice, coffee, and other specialty crops.
 Agricultural policies among the four countries differ owing to their varying circumstances 
and the choices that have been made by their policymakers. India and Indonesia have deep 
traditions as market economies, while China and Vietnam have emerged from communist 
central planning and continue to be governed by communist regimes. In all four countries, as 
in many other developing countries with smallholder-dominated agricultural sectors and weak 
market infrastructure and institutions, government interventions were initially pursued instead 
of reliance on market forces to achieve the twin goals of self-sufficiency and low food prices 
for consumers.
 The policy reform processes pursued among these countries during the years 1985–2002 
differ in many details yet display several similar characteristics. In each country the economy 
has grown rapidly with economic reforms, with faster GDP growth in manufacturing and ser-
vices than in agriculture. There has been a movement in each country from an autarkic and 
state-led setting to a more deregulated market environment, with greater integration into the 
world economy and a new and larger role for the private sector. The agricultural reform pro-
cess has often lagged reforms in other parts of the economy, has not been uniform over time 
or across the countries, and has been marked in each case by policy reversals and setbacks. 
However, it has been two decades since agricultural reforms began in China and Vietnam and 
over ten years since India extended its broad-based economic reforms into agriculture. Indo-
nesia too included agriculture more fully in its policy reform process in the 1990s.
 This report was organized along the following lines: After a brief introduction, in the sec-
ond chapter we assessed the conceptual and measurement issues that arise in evaluating agri-
cultural protection or disprotection among developing countries, where most of the effects 
arise from the gap between domestic and international output or input prices, not direct sub-
sidy payments. Three key measurement issues were brought into focus. First, in comparing a 
country’s domestic commodity price to an international price, an accurate estimate of the policy-
related gap must account for factors such as external and internal transport costs and market-
ing margins, as well as processing costs and quality differences among the products being 
compared. Second, the net trade status of a commodity may itself be the result of policies in 
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place, and that has to be taken into account 
in choosing the price comparison appropri-
ate in the absence of the policies. Third, 
when MPS by commodity is combined with 
overall budgetary expenditures to assess the 
total PSE for agriculture, the extent of com-
modity coverage and the scaling-up assump-
tion applied for commodities not included in 
the price support analysis play critical roles 
in the assessment. 
 In the third chapter, we provided a brief 
overview of the general economic situation 
in each country since the 1980s and de-
scribed the pivotal role of the agricultural 
sector in output, employment, and trade. Re-
cent growth in high-value agricultural pro-
duction versus traditional commodities was 
discussed. In the fourth chapter, we reviewed 
the international trade and domestic policy 
regimes for agriculture in each country. We 
saw that tariff levels have come down in all 
cases, although less so in agriculture than in 
manufacturing. The shift away from output 
and input market interventions to allow 
greater private-sector activity in the agricul-
tural sector also emerges as a common theme 
of the reform process in the four countries, 
as does less state intervention in the high-
value sectors than in basic food staples, which 
partly explains the high-value growth.
 The fifth chapter provides our key MPS 
and PSE results for both specific commodi-
ties and the agricultural sector as a whole. 
First, we described the data and coverage of 
commodities and budgetary expenditures by 
country and other unique aspects of each 
analysis. We then compared the commodity-
specific results for rice and sugar, which are 
important products in all four countries and 
are subject to substantial but quite different 
policy interventions. Results for the other 
commodities included in the country analy-
ses were also summarized and the total PSE 
measure computed for each country. For 
India and China, we extended the analysis, 
in the sixth chapter, to examine the effects 
of exchange rate misalignment on the total 
PSE measure of agricultural support.
Summary of Policies and 
Resulting Support
Our coverage and key findings can be sum-
marized as follows. For India, although re-
forms in agricultural policy have lagged 
those initiated in other sectors after an eco-
nomic crisis in 1991, they have nonetheless 
created a more open economic orientation 
than existed prior to the 1990s. Drawing on 
the extensive price comparison and subsidy 
measurement datasets and regional assess-
ments of Ashok Gulati and his collaborators, 
we evaluate protection and support versus 
dis protection of agriculture in India by com-
paring domestic and international reference 
prices for eleven crops that comprise about 
45 percent of total agricultural output, and 
by evaluating the value of input subsidies 
for fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation.
 Our findings indicate that support for 
agriculture in India has been largely coun-
tercyclical to world prices. Agricultural sup-
port has increased when world prices were 
relatively low (as in the mid-1980s and the 
years 1998–2002) and decreased when world 
prices were relatively high (as in the early 
and mid-1990s). The results demonstrate the 
increased level of budgetary payments for 
input subsidies to agriculture in recent years. 
Yet in the aggregate, taking into account 
both price support and budgetary costs over 
the period 1985–2002, the countercyclical 
dimension of agricultural policy dominates 
over a clear trend from disprotection toward 
protection.
 Using different variants of MPS and PSE 
measurement, we have also extended earlier 
analysis for India in several dimensions. We 
find that, when trade volumes are relatively 
small, as occurred as India pursued a self-
sufficiency policy for important commod-
ities, the standard procedure of computing 
the MPS through a comparison of the do-
mestic price to an adjusted international 
reference price based on the direction of ob-
served trade can lead to a misleading con-
clusion about the level of support provided. 
Under the approach we adopt to address this 
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issue (following Byerlee and Morris 1993) 
the level of protection or disprotection is 
based on a reference price chosen based on 
economic criteria as the estimated price 
domestically if the policy interventions were 
removed. The relevant price can be either 
the import- or export-adjusted reference price 
or the autarky equilibrium price, depending 
on the relationship among these prices. We 
apply this modified procedure to six main 
crops (rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, sugar, 
and groundnuts) for which India has been 
near self-sufficiency or there have been 
changes in the direction of trade over the 
period of analysis.
 We also observe that, in the standard 
PSE approach, the MPS measured for the 
covered commodities is often scaled up based 
on the share of these commodities in the 
total value of agricultural production. When 
the commodity coverage is less than com-
plete, the scaling-up procedure leads to a 
total MPS of greater absolute value than the 
MPS for the covered commodities, a result 
that is only appropriate when MPS for the 
two sets of commodities are similar. For our 
analysis of India, this is likely not the case 
because the covered commodities are largely 
the basic food staples, while livestock, dairy, 
and high-value crops are not covered.
 Taking these and other measurement is-
sues into consideration, the support estimates 
we derive suggest that Indian agriculture, at 
least for basic commodities, was disprotected 
in the 1990s, as illustrated for rice (Figure 
5.3), sugar (Figure 5.6), and the total PSE 
(Figure 5.8). High levels of subsidies were re-
quired for India to export the key food grains 
rice and wheat during the period 2000–02, 
a conclusion reached by several other studies. 
However, we report less disprotection of 
Indian agriculture in the 1990s, and less 
protection at the end of the decade, than in 
earlier assessments. This difference is partly 
explained by the modified procedure for 
choice of a reference price. A large com-
ponent of this difference can be accounted 
for by whether the scaling-up procedure is 
invoked, as was the case in earlier PSE 
assessments.
 For Indonesia agricultural and trade poli-
cies have been dominated by the twin goals 
of achieving self-sufficiency in various food 
commodities and providing manufacturing 
sectors with supplies of primary agricultural 
inputs. The government has intervened in the 
production, marketing, and trade of agricul-
tural products through a complicated set of 
institutions and border and domestic policies. 
The economic policy reform process in In-
donesia started in the mid-1980s, but the 
major agricultural reforms came relatively 
late in the process, motivated by Indonesia’s 
economic difficulties during the Asian finan-
cial crisis of 1997–98.
 We evaluate agricultural support for four 
imported commodities (rice, sugar, maize, 
and soybeans) and two exported commodi-
ties (crude palm oil and natural rubber) for 
Indonesia. The support estimates we com-
pute quantify the net effects of the agricul-
tural policy interventions and reforms. The 
MPS and PSEs show that, in spite of the re-
forms, the government of Indonesia has con-
sistently subsidized agriculture since 1990, 
although not uniformly across commodities. 
Domestic rice and sugar producers have been 
protected from import competition. Provi-
sion of support was interrupted briefly during 
the financial crisis but subsequently reverted 
to precrisis levels and increased during 
2000–02 for some crops and overall.
 For China there has been a dramatic 
transformation of economic policy since the 
late 1970s from central planning toward a 
market-oriented system. Our PSE analysis of 
agricultural support is limited to the years 
1995–2001. Over this short period China’s 
agricultural policies are estimated to have 
been nearly neutral (neither protection nor dis-
protection), although domestic prices lagged 
the run-up of world prices in 1996, creating 
negative protection for that year. The pat-
tern of protection of rice in China is similar 
to that in India, with disprotection when 
world prices were high in 1996 turning to 
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protection when world prices were lower in 
2000 and 2001. Sugar has been protected in 
China for the entire period but at decreasing 
levels. In a longer-term context, there has 
been a substantial move toward lessened dis-
protection of agriculture in China (Cheng 
and Sun 1998; Mullen et al. 2004; OECD 
2005b).
 Vietnam has followed China in moving 
from a centrally planned to a market-oriented 
economic system under a communist politi-
cal regime. Vietnam has undertaken major 
economic and trade reforms since 1986. 
Our results, covering more than 70 percent 
of the value of agricultural output, show 
that most agricultural products were taxed 
in Vietnam from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s. Domestic economic reforms have 
opened up the economy since the early 
1990s, and there has generally been a policy 
shift from an import substitution strategy 
toward export promotion, with decreasing 
disprotection turning to positive support for 
rice and overall. Sugar is an exception to the 
shift away from import substitution, with a 
major subsidy policy initiated in the late 
1990s.
 For India and China we also evaluate the 
effects of exchange rate misalignment on 
the total PSE of agricultural support. This 
raises two additional measurement issues: 
evaluating the extent to which the observed 
exchange rate is misaligned compared with 
its long-run equilibrium value, and assess-
ing the extent to which exchange rate realign-
ments are passed through to domestic prices 
and budgetary payments. We find long-run 
co-integrating equilibrium relationships be-
tween the real exchange rate and economic 
fundamentals in both countries. These 
models suggest that the Indian rupee was 
continuously overvalued from the mid-1980s 
to the early 1990s while the Chinese yuan 
was undervalued in the early 2000s. We also 
estimate relatively high aggregate coeffi-
cients of exchange rate pass-through to 
domestic prices in India and China for the 
commodities covered in our PSE analysis. 
Our empirical results show that the indirect 
effect of exchange rate misalignment has 
often counteracted the direct effect of sector-
specific policies at the prevailing exchange 
rates. We defined a counterfactual PSE 
computed under the assumption that the 
exchange rate moves to its equilibrium level 
and the pass-through is taken into account. 
Our counterfactual results suggest that In-
dian farmers would have faced improved 
production incentives in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s had the exchange rate misalign-
ment during this period been corrected. In 
contrast, price incentives to Chinese farm-
ers would have worsened in the early 2000s 
had the exchange rate appreciated.
Broader Conclusions 
from the Study
In drawing conclusions from agricultural 
support measures such as MPS and PSEs, 
there are various reasons for caution. Our 
discussions of basic MPS and PSE measure-
ment issues in Chapter 2, and of exchange 
rate misalignment effects on PSEs in Chap-
ter 6, highlight the types of assumptions and 
judgments made when computing and inte-
grating the various components of these mea-
sures. The results reported herein for each 
country are drawn from coordinated but in-
dependently conducted studies undertaken 
by IFPRI during the period September 2003 
to June 2005. The analyses are broadly com-
parable, but specific details of the evalua-
tions differ across countries and commodi-
ties. By focusing in detail on the data and 
cost adjustments utilized in each case, and 
by presenting the results under various mea-
surement assumptions, we provide a sensi-
tivity analysis through which the findings can 
be compared and evaluated. Readers are also 
referred to the background study papers for 
additional details about the analysis for each 
country.
 In the four country analyses, judgments 
made about transportation costs, processing 
costs, and marketing margins may have 
underestimated or overestimated the prices 
of these activities, inflating or deflating the 
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value of policy-related support accruing to 
producers in some cases. In other cases the 
choice of process-level markets to compare 
international and domestic prices, determined 
by data availability, leaves unresolved the 
question of who is benefiting from the sup-
port, farmers or processors. The procedure 
of scaling up the PSE values to all of agri-
culture without fully examining the policies 
affecting noncovered commodities under-
scores the necessity for more comprehensive 
studies, which would include other agricul-
tural sectors, particularly livestock, dairy, 
and other high-value products.
 One issue that emerges from the analy-
sis is that adjustments to the world reference 
price for international and domestic trans-
portation, marketing, and processing costs 
are often difficult to assess accurately over 
sequential years owing to data constraints 
and the limited availability of relevant esti-
mated costs for the diverse factors and mul-
tiple years involved. Yet it has been shown 
that consideration of these costs can be quite 
important to the empirical results, as illus-
trated for rice in India (under the exportable 
hypothesis) and Vietnam. In these cases 
MPS calculations based on unadjusted ref-
erence prices show much higher rates of 
disprotection (or lower levels of support) 
than calculations made with domestic cost 
adjustments to estimate a farmgate-based 
price comparison.
 High transaction costs of various kinds 
reduce prices at the farm level. Reducing 
high transaction costs is an important de-
velopment goal, and appropriate public and 
private investments can improve economic 
efficiency and raise rural incomes. Separat-
ing these real cost concerns from the effects 
of agricultural domestic pricing, subsidy, 
and international trade policies for existing 
marketing infrastructure and institutions is 
the objective of the careful MPS analysis. 
This differentiation allows a focus on where 
domestic and trade policies should be re-
considered to promote improved economic 
efficiency. Some of these support and pro-
tection policies also spawn interventions that 
raise transaction costs by creating inefficient 
state-owned enterprises or limiting oppor-
tunities for involvement of the private sector 
in processing and marketing channels. These 
latter effects, although policy derived, should 
be captured as costs in the adjustments to 
international reference prices, not as MPS 
or PSEs.
 With these caveats, our various measures 
of support and disprotection for specific 
crops and agriculture in total provide a rea-
sonable basis for assessing the agricultural 
policies of India, Indonesia, China, and Viet-
nam. The results are indicative of the range 
of outcomes likely to be found more widely 
among developing countries. A major World 
Bank initiative to provide further analysis 
of developing country policies and their 
impacts draws partly on our assessment of 
measurement issues and empirical results 
(Anderson et al. 2006).
 Each of the four countries included in our 
study, beginning with an initial regime of 
heavy intervention in agricultural markets, 
has undergone a substantial reform process 
that has reduced government involvement and 
created economic opportunities within the 
private sector. These reforms have improved 
economic efficiency in the agricultural pro-
cessing and marketing channels. Yet the out-
comes in terms of levels of policy support 
provided to agriculture show clear differ-
ences. Indonesia has provided the most con-
sistent support, particularly to food crops. 
India has supported agriculture when world 
prices were low but has disprotected key 
grains, including rice and wheat, and also 
disprotected agriculture overall, during many 
years. In these two countries, the reform 
process does not seem to have fundamen-
tally changed the pattern of observed sup-
port levels over the period 1985–2002. China 
and Vietnam, in contrast, have transitioned 
from communist disprotection of agricul-
ture to providing net support to the sector.
 These divergent levels of protection and 
support to agriculture occur even as domes-
tic and international trade reforms have suc-
cessfully provided greater opportunities for 
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private-sector activity in the agricultural 
sectors of India, Indonesia, China, and Viet-
nam. This outcome highlights two distinct 
political economy dimensions to the evolu-
tion of support. The switch from taxation to 
protection is one important aspect of policy 
change among developing countries. The 
suc cess of market-oriented reforms in im-
proving incentives for agricultural produc-
ers in two of our cases, China and Vietnam, 
is a constructive policy reorientation in that 
it has removed distortions, enhanced effi-
ciency, and thus raised rural incomes. But 
further shifts into production-distorting sub-
sidization would be troubling. There are 
historical precedents for such shifts in other 
countries as national incomes rise.
 Our results also highlight the difficulty 
of achieving open-market, liberalizing pol-
icy reforms in cases in which farmers have 
traditionally been protected. For India we 
conclude that the countercyclical character 
of its support and disprotection policies has 
persisted from the mid-1980s through 2002. 
For Indonesia agriculture has been persis-
tently protected except during the country’s 
financial crisis. Thus across the four coun-
tries in our study the support policy outcomes 
are more nuanced than a simple story of 
movement from disprotection to protection. 
Past and potential cases of monotonic move-
ment toward support by countries are im-
portant to track and understand. So too is 
the difficult task of lowering existing pro-
tection among developing and developed 
counties alike in order to attain a more open 
and less distorted global agricultural trade 
regime.
 The levels of support provided to spe-
cific commodities and to agriculture in total 
in India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam are 
still generally relatively low compared with 
those in many developed countries. Their 
agricultural sectors may also be disadvan-
taged in a general equilibrium context by 
relatively higher levels of protection of in-
dustry among these countries compared with 
developed countries. Although this relative 
disprotection has declined with falling tar-
iffs in the manufacturing sector, there re-
mains further potential among the countries 
in our study for market-oriented reforms to 
benefit agriculture.
 The countercyclical support in India and 
the persistent support in Indonesia parallel 
support policies among developed countries. 
In all four countries, policy reform has stim-
ulated rapid economic growth but has also 
imposed structural adjustment pressures on 
the agricultural sector. With further indus-
trialization and urbanization, the govern-
ments of these countries face the same im-
portant questions of whether and by how 
much to assist their farmers relative to other 
producers. Fiscal limitations and commit-
ments to the WTO may constrain the gov-
ernments from fully following the developed 
countries regarding levels of agricultural 
support. But the outcome is not certain from 
the analysis we present for the years 1985–
2002. There is a risk that these countries 
will follow the developed world down a path 
of increased support for agriculture. 
 If support levels among these countries 
continue a trend toward greater support, as 
in China and Vietnam, or if subsidies and 
protection continue to prove resistant to re-
form, as in India or Indonesia, the outcome 
might seem to be poetic justice, given the 
detrimental effects that developed-country 
policies have had on agriculture in those 
countries. But sustained or increased levels 
of protection or subsidization among the de-
veloping countries will perpetuate the dis-
array and deterioration of global welfare that 
high levels of interventions in agricultural 
markets have long caused. Rising levels of 
protection and subsidies would exacerbate 
trade tensions in world agriculture. Avoiding 
such an outcome is not a responsibility of 
the developing countries alone. The devel-
oped countries, if they want to avoid future 
escalation in levels of protection and subsi-
dization, must bring their own high levels of 
support under tighter control.
 Finally our analysis calls attention to 
the broader economic environment affecting 
agriculture, as emphasized by Josling and 
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Valdés (2004) and others, by addressing the 
effects of exchange rate misalignment for 
India and China. The magnitude of exchange 
rate effects has become smaller for India 
after its economic reforms in the early 1990s, 
as the exchange rate has subsequently moved 
closer to its equilibrium value. Thus Indian 
farmers have not experienced sharp policy 
shocks from exchange rate adjustments in 
recent years, nor are they likely to in the 
near term. But for China the undervaluation 
of the yuan has remained a macroeconomic 
policy issue. Our analysis demonstrates that 
the Chinese agricultural sector could face 
substantial disruption from changes in ex-
change rate policy in coming years.
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